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This thesis looks at a number of debates relating to how practices of classification and 
explanation in the social sciences differ from those in the natural sciences. Against the 
background of an extant discussion that is fragmented and sometimes contradictory, my 
thesis develops the notion of hybrid kinds as a key unifying concept for understanding and 
resolving a range of debates on the relationship between the natural and social sciences. 
Chapter 1 sets out my account of hybrid kinds. By critically evaluating the discussion of 
Searle’s theory of social kinds, I argue that the social kinds in question are best understood 
as hybrid kinds that are constituted of a base kind and a status kind linked by a relation 
of status conferral. Chapter 2 applies the hybrid kind account to Epstein’s grounding-
anchoring model of social kinds and argues that the latter is fundamentally flawed. 
Chapter 3 turns to the question of moral and political values in the semantics and ontology 
of social kinds and explores how the direct and indirect influence of such values could be 
justified. Chapter 4 marks the move from largely ontological considerations to exploring 
the role of hybrid kinds in scientific contexts. Against the widespread criticism of 
Hacking’s claim that human kinds cannot be natural kinds, I argue that an appropriate 
understanding of the epistemic role of natural kinds and of the capricious nature of social 
feedback effects renders his claim more viable than hitherto acknowledged. Chapters 5 
and 6 use the previous findings on hybrid kind ontology and epistemology to advance a 
central debate at the crossroads of the natural and social sciences: the discussion on 
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This thesis looks at a number of debates relating to issues of classification and explanation 
in the social and natural sciences. It investigates how – and why – practices of 
classification and explanation in the social sciences sometimes differ from those in the 
natural sciences. While these questions are neither very new nor very specific, I believe 
the following chapters address them in a way that is both novel and philosophically 
fruitful.  
To understand why, it helps to consider some characteristics of the extant debate on 
these questions. Many philosophical discussions try to show that the social and the natural 
sciences are essentially not that different. These discussions typically start with models of 
scientific method established within the context of the natural sciences and show how 
they can be applied to the social sciences. While this approach has some merit it also has 
important limitations. Most importantly, it predisposes us to look for similarities between 
the natural and the social sciences and potentially encourages us to shy away from 
differences where we shouldn’t.  
If we turn to the philosophical literature that investigates the social sciences on their 
own merit, rather than against the standard of natural scientific methodology, different 
problems emerge. Although these approaches set out to embrace the idiosyncrasies of the 
social sciences, the debate is so pluralist and often contradictory that it becomes difficult 
to identify special characteristics of the social sciences that any two philosophers agree 
on. We will consider individual approaches in more detail in the following chapters, but 
here are some brief examples for the purpose of illustration. Consider the topic of 
classification in the social sciences, that is, social kinds. These are sometimes also referred 
to as “institutional kinds”. Broadly speaking, social kinds are groupings of entities defined 
by a social property, i.e. a property which cannot exist in the absence of (human) social 
life.1 Accordingly, social kinds include a diverse range of classifications such as friend, 
money, tenant, limited company, football game, working class, war and recession.  
Some philosophers argue that social kinds are best understood through the lens of 
game theory, some insist they involve a distinct relation of “status conferral”, and others 
suggest that they can only be understood in terms of two distinct metaphysical relations 
(“grounding” and “anchoring”). Some of these philosophers conclude that social kinds 
                                                 
1  I think we can plausibly talk of animal social life and hence potentially animal social facts and social kinds. However, the 
discussion in this thesis focusses on the human realm. 
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are essentially the same as natural kinds, others insist that they are fundamentally different; 
some claim that social kinds are importantly normative, others deny this; and so forth. It 
is easy to lose one’s orientation in this fragmented debate. How do these different claims 
relate? And more importantly, which ones – if any – are correct? 
To complicate things further, there is significant overlap with the discussion on human 
kinds. Conceptually, human kinds can be distinguished from social kinds because the 
former are best understood as classifications of human individuals or human properties. 
Some social kinds are human kinds (tenant, friend, working class), but others are not 
because they are not classifications of human individuals or properties (money, recession, 
war). At the same time, not all human kinds are necessarily social kinds. The kind blood 
type A-negative is a classification of human individuals, but it does not make reference to a 
social property. Yet, as we will see in later chapters, even human kinds that are not defined 
in terms of social properties have an elusive tendency to become entangled in the social. 
The situation is no less confusing when we turn to the topic of explanation, and the 
question how social and natural scientific explanations of the same target phenomenon 
relate. Probably the most prominent case in point – and a core case study in this thesis – 
is the debate between biological explanations of gender differences in psychology and 
behaviour on the one hand and social scientific explanations of the same target 
phenomena on the other. Many people who are committed to feminism and gender 
equality would argue that biological explanations in this context reflect and reinforce 
harmful gender stereotypes. Accordingly, they tend to support social scientific 
explanations as superior explanations of the phenomena in question. The political fault 
lines are clear, the causal-explanatory ones much less so. Are these two types of 
explanations in conflict, as some people have suggested, or are they compatible, as others 
insist? And how does the fact that the stakes in this debate are so expressly political impact 
on the question? 
My thesis aims to bring some clarity into this confusion by using a key conceptual tool: 
the model of hybrid kinds. Simply speaking, a hybrid kind is a classification of entities that 
is associated with a social dimension or meaning. Due to the associated social meaning, 
the classification is leading a double life: on the one hand, it is picking out a group of not 
necessarily social entities (the base kind), on the other hand, it describes a group of entities 
with specific social properties (the status kind). What connects base kind and status kind 
is the fact that members of the base kind acquire the relevant social properties in virtue 
of being recognised as members of the kind. I argue that a central characteristic of many 
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social and human kinds can be understood in terms of this hybrid structure: by association 
with a social meaning, classifications simultaneously refer to a cluster of social properties 
(the status kind) and to a group of whatever underlying entities (the base kind).  
Money is a good example of a social kind that can be understood as a hybrid kind. The 
kind consists, among other things, of metal coins and paper bills (the base kind) which 
have acquired the social function of being a means of exchange (the status kind). 
Furthermore, the reason the coins and bills function as a means of exchange is because 
people collective recognise them as something over and above metal and paper. In a sense, 
it seems that we need to recognise something as money in order for it to function as 
money. This claim will be spelled out in more detail Chapter 1. 
The core idea is comparatively simple and has popped up in different places both in 
analytic social ontology and in social theory. However, I believe the idea’s potential as a 
unifying tool for understanding and resolving a range of debates on the relationship 
between the natural and social sciences has been hugely underestimated. My thesis 
explores this uncharted territory by developing the scattered remarks on the dual nature 
of social kinds into a coherent account of hybrid kinds. This hybrid kind model will not 
only provide a powerful tool for clarifying a number of ongoing discussions on the 
ontology and epistemology of social and natural kinds. It will also prove a fruitful starting 
point for investigating the questions of causal explanation and explanatory pragmatics 
touched on above.  
There are, of course, important limitations. For one thing, the hybrid kind model does 
not provide a general model of social ontology. There are, as will become clear over the 
course of this thesis, social kinds that are not hybrid kinds. Social classifications that lack 
a distinct social meaning will fall under this category. Examples include social kinds that 
are not widely recognised, for instance social scientific kinds which are not generally 
known outside a specific academic discipline (Zygmund Bauman’s tourists and 
vagabonds2) and social classifications which are not considered significant in a wider social 
context (Sainsbury customer, people with more than three best friends). 
Furthermore, my thesis does not claim that the hybrid kind model is the only or the 
single most fruitful way of thinking about the phenomena in question. What it does 
suggest is that the hybrid kind model is an invaluable tool to clarify and “streamline” a 
range of fragmented conceptual debates on social ontology and social explanations. 
Finally, the hybrid kind model and the ensuing analysis of scientific debates do not aim 
                                                 
2 Bauman 1998. 
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to prove a universal recipe for resolving any and all discussions between social and natural 
scientists on matters of political concern. Given the limited number of case studies that 
my inquiry focusses on, this claim would be unfounded. What my thesis does hope to 
achieve, however, is to overcome entrenched but fruitless ways of thinking about these 
matters and pave the way toward novel and more fruitful ones.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets out my account of social kinds as hybrid 
kinds. I begin by critically evaluating Searle’s account of social kinds, as well as the extant 
discussion of Searle’s account exemplified by Amie Thomasson and Francesco Guala. I 
argue that two characteristics of social kinds can be distinguished in Searle’s original 
discussion: reflexivity – the idea that social kinds have no instances without someone having 
an understanding of what they are – and hybridity – the idea that social kinds involve 
imposing a social status unto an existing classification of entities. Reflexivity has received 
the lion’s share of attention in the extant debate on Searle’s account – Thomasson 
endorses reflexivity, Guala rejects it. I argue that although Guala is right to reject 
reflexivity, critics and proponents of reflexivity alike have failed to recognise that the most 
valuable element of Searle’s account of social kinds is the idea of hybridity. As a result, 
neither Guala nor Thomasson provide a convincing account of the social kinds in 
question. A more promising understanding needs to focus on hybridity – the idea that 
social kinds involve a special sort of relation by which social statuses or properties are 
imposed onto existing entities. On the basis of these insights, I develop my hybrid kind 
model, which understands the kind in question as hybrid kinds that are constituted of a 
base kind and a status kind linked by a relation of status conferral. I then use this model 
to clarify questions about the ontology and epistemology of the kinds in question. 
Chapter 2 applies the hybrid kind model to another high-profile discussion in social 
ontology – the discussion on Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model. Epstein’s grounding-
anchoring distinction has received much critical acclaim. Nevertheless, many critics reject 
the grounding-anchoring distinction and suggest that anchoring can simply be understood 
as a form of grounding. I argue that Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model is flawed more 
fundamentally than his critics realise. Unwittingly, Epstein bases his model on an 
erroneous understanding of hybrid kinds that he then tries to extend to non-hybrid social 
kinds. As a result, the model is fit for neither. I conclude the chapter by providing an error 
theory of the intuitions motivating the grounding-anchoring model. 
Chapter 3 explores the role of moral and political (so-called “non-epistemic”) values 
in the semantics and ontology of social kinds. Some people insist social ontology has no 
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room for these values. Others object that non-epistemic values have a legitimate, maybe 
even necessary, say in how we conceptualise the social world. A prominent advocate of 
the later position is Sally Haslanger, who proposes that we should define social concepts 
in a way that best suits our legitimate purposes, which may be a question of explicitly 
moral or political considerations. Haslanger’s proposal has been heavily criticised by 
Francesco Guala. Guala argues that the question how to conceptualise the social world 
cannot be left “up to us” and the outcome of our potentially controversial moral and 
political disputes. Interestingly, both Haslanger and Guala rely on semantic externalism 
to defend their positions. I argue that recent criticism of semantic externalism lends 
support to the idea that moral or political values play an important indirect role in scientific 
ontology. I then point out that several of Haslanger’s examples advocate a direct rather 
than indirect role of these values. Using the hybrid model of social kinds developed in 
Chapter 1, I clarify how exactly the cases differ, and explore how the direct influence of 
moral and political values could be justified. 
Chapter 4 marks the move from largely ontological considerations to exploring the 
role of hybrid kinds in scientific contexts. I consider the long-standing debate on 
Hacking’s claim that certain human kinds cannot be natural kinds because they are 
affected by classificatory feedback effects. Critics have rejected this claim. They argue that 
certain biological kinds – which, on the account of natural kinds at issue, are paradigmatic 
natural kinds – participate in the very same sort of feedback effects as human kinds. I 
object that the extant discussion is flawed in two ways: it relies on an overly simplistic 
account of natural kinds as stable vectors for projections, and it does not acknowledge 
that the human kinds in question are hybrid kinds that pose special challenges to scientific 
understanding. I argue that natural kinds are better understood in terms of the factors and 
mechanisms that support patterns of change and stability among the members of the kind. 
Against this background, I identify several reasons why hybrid kinds might make poor 
candidates for natural kinds thus understood.  
Due to their structure of base and associated status, hybrid kinds can simultaneously 
be the subject of natural scientific and social scientific inquiry. In order to understand 
how social and natural scientific explanations relate in such a constellation, Chapters 5 
and 6 use our previous findings regarding the ontological nature and epistemic challenges 
of hybrid kinds to advance a longstanding, heated debate at the crossroads of the natural 
and social sciences: the discussion on biological versus social explanations of gender 
differences in human behaviour and psychology. Chapter 5 focusses on the issue of causal 
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explanation. Evolutionary psychologists propose that many psychological or behavioural 
differences between men and women are the product of evolved psychological 
mechanisms. Feminist theorists object that this research ignores environmental 
determinants of gender differences while naturalising and thus reinforcing the oppression 
of women. I argue that the extant debate fails to pinpoint the causal-explanatory conflict 
between these two approaches. To move forward, I suggest to distinguish disagreements 
about causal facts from disagreements about the requirements of good explanation. I 
argue that disagreements about causal facts occur only when evolutionary psychologists 
make claims about proximate mechanism. Such claims, I point out, are not usually 
warranted by evolutionary psychology’s methodology, because feminist inspired work in 
the social sciences suggests that important preconditions are not fulfilled. 
Chapter 6 continues this inquiry by looking at disagreements about explanatory 
pragmatics and its relation to feminists’ political concerns. Starting from the observation 
that many feminists tend to ignore evolutionary psychological explanations of gender 
differences altogether, I explore the potential for a “right to ignore” the relevant causal 
claims irrespectively of whether they are true or false. I argue that Maria Kronfeldner’s 
argument for a right to ignore, which centres on Alfred Kroeber’s defence of the 
autonomy of cultural anthropology from biological anthropology, cannot be applied to 
the feminist case. I consider two further common attempts to justify feminists’ ignoring 
of biological explanations and argue that both of them are problematic. Against this 
background, I develop an alternative justification. I suggest that feminists are often 
justified in ignoring biological explanation of gender differences because a whole range 























ARE SOCIAL KINDS SPECIAL? 
REFLEXIVITY AND THE HYBRID KIND MODEL 
What, if anything, makes social kinds different? Over the course of this thesis, we will 
encounter a number of different answers to that question. As a starting point, however, 
it makes sense to consider an account that predates and influenced many recent theories 
of social kinds: John Searle’s account of social kinds. Searle’s account made prominent 
the idea that social kinds are conventional or mind-dependent in a specific way– they are 
reflexive.1 Call this the reflexivity account of social kinds.  
Saying that a kind is mind-dependent simply means that the existence of the kind 
somehow depends on the existence of human minds. This feature is shared by a number 
of kinds which are not social kinds – such as mental states like pain – and is thus not 
particularly interesting in this context. Reflexivity, however, is a very specific form of 
mind-dependence. For Searle, to say that a kind is reflexive, generally speaking, is to say 
that the existence of the kind somehow depends on human beliefs, propositional 
attitudes, or intentional states about the kind itself.  
Searle’s account has made popular the idea that social kinds are epistemically and 
ontologically different from other kinds. The basic idea is that, ontologically, many social 
kinds are the way they are because we decided that they be like that. This idea is expressed 
in the form of metaphors suggesting that these kinds are “linked” or “glued together” by 
human convention, or that they lack “natural boundaries.” I will refer to this idea as the 
lack of natural cohesion of social kinds. From this alleged lack of natural cohesion, several 
philosophers have concluded that these social kinds must also crucially differ from natural 
kinds epistemically. Many social kinds, they have suggested, are epistemically transparent, 
meaning that these kinds fail to tell us something about the structure of the world because 
we cannot be wrong about them. 
Others have challenged this view. Francesco Guala argues that human beliefs about 
social kinds are neither necessary nor sufficient for their existence, and the associated 
claims about lack of natural cohesion and epistemic transparency are false. Guala suggests 
that social kinds are mind-dependent only in a minimal, linguistic sense: we cannot be 
                                                 




wrong about what counts as “money” in a folk conceptual sense that we collectively 
define, but that tells nothing about the kind money that has a central role in the social 
sciences. 
In this chapter, I argue that neither Guala nor his opponents provide a convincing 
account of the social kinds in question. Although Guala rightly rejects the predominant 
interpretation of Searle’s account, he ignores important insights from Searle’s original 
characterisation of social kinds. I argue that a more promising understanding needs to 
focus on the fact that these social kinds involve a special sort of relation, by which social 
statuses or properties are imposed (or conferred) onto existing entities. On the basis of 
these insights, I develop my own model, which understands the kinds in question as hybrid 
kinds. I then use the hybrid kind model to clarify claims about the ontology and 
epistemology of the kinds in question. For that purpose, I will first introduce Searle’s 
understanding of social kinds as reflexive kinds and the associated claims about their lack 
of natural cohesion and epistemic transparency. I then introduce Guala’s objections to 
this view and the alternative view he defends. After pointing out several problems with 
both accounts, I develop my own account of hybrid kinds and explore how it can be used 
to clarify the extant discussion.  
1.1 SOCIAL KINDS AS REFLEXIVE KINDS 
1.1.1 Searle’s account of social kinds 
The idea that social kinds depend on human beliefs goes back a long way.2 In more recent 
history, the most detailed and influential account of this has been formulated by John 
Searle (Searle 1995, 2010). Searle’s (1995) account of social kinds seeks to make sense of 
the puzzling observation that social kinds like money, property, governments and 
marriages seem to exist only because humans believe them to exist.3 The reason for this, 
according to Searle, is that such kinds are created by the (ongoing) collective acceptance 
of constitutive rules that have the form “X counts as Y in context C” (Searle 1995, 28). Via 
this process, existing objects are assigned a new status and accompanying functions that 
the phenomena could not perform in virtue of their pre-existing physical features – an 
“institutional” kind is created (Searle 1995, 46). For example, in the case of money (or, 
                                                 
2 Epstein (2015) observes that it goes at least back to David Hume, 
3 Searle refers to these entities as “social facts” and “institutional facts” respectively. Since many of his examples are more 
appropriately described as kinds, and since this thesis is largely concerned with kinds I, I will reformulate his remarks in 




more precisely, legal tender in the United States), Searle suggests that the relevant 
constitutive rule is something like the following: 
 
Money: Pieces of paper that are made from a specific material, have a specific physical design, 
and have been issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) count as money in the 
United States.4 
 (Searle 1995, 45-6) 
Importantly, according to Searle, the existence of kinds like money therefore depends on 
people having propositional attitudes about money. In order for something to be money, 
people need to believe that it is money. Searle describes this phenomenon as the “self-
referentiality of social concepts” (Searle 1995, 32, 53). In the following, I will refer to the 
kinds that fit this characterisation as reflexive kinds.  
Searle suggests that we can distinguish between two sorts of reflexive kinds. For some 
kinds, such as money, the existence of the kind or type depends on the human beliefs that 
the thing in question is money, yet individual tokens or instances of money can exist without 
being recognised as money. Call these sort of kinds type-reflexive. According to Searle, a 
dollar bill which falls straight from the printing press into a floor crack is money even if 
it is never recognised or used by anyone as money. At the same time, a circulated 
counterfeit dollar bill fails to be money even if no-one ever recognises it as counterfeit. 
Searle distinguishes type-reflexive kinds from a second sort of reflexive kinds for which 
both the existence of the kind (or type) and the existence of each individual instance (or 
token) depends on the human belief that the thing in question is or is not of the kind in 
question. As an example, Searle discusses the kind cocktail party. He suggests that an 
individual event is not a cocktail party if no-one thinks of it as a cocktail party. In other 
words, kinds of this sort are both type- and token-reflexive. For brevity, I will refer to 
them as token-reflexive kinds. 
1.1.2 The ontological and epistemological implications of reflexivity 
Searle’s account of social kinds as reflexive kinds has been highly influential. Although 
many people have argued, pace Searle, that not all social kinds are reflexive kinds, 
reflexivity is still commonly thought of as a key difference between at least some social 
kinds on the one hand and natural kinds on the other (Thomasson 2003, Khalidi 2015). 
Amie Thomasson points out that, while it might be plausible to say that all social kinds 
are mind-dependent – i.e. all social kinds depend on human mental states of some sort – 
                                                 





not all social kinds depend on human intentional states about the kinds (Thomasson 2003, 
585n8, 606). For example, kinds like bigotry, racism, or recession depend on certain mental 
states about other people or financial transactions, but those mental states need not be 
about the kinds themselves.5 In other words, Thomasson suggests a two-way distinction 
of social kinds between reflexive kinds on the one hand and non-reflexive kinds on the 
other. Muhammad Khalidi, another recent proponent of Searle’s view of social kinds, 
goes one step further than that. Taking up Searle’s distinction discussed above, he 
proposes a three-way distinction that distinguishes non-reflexive, type-reflexive, and 
token-reflexive kinds (Khalidi 2015).  
Of course, these classifications are not taxonomic ends in themselves, but are meant 
to demarcate important epistemic and ontological differences between different types of 
social kinds. Epistemically, reflexivity has been argued to entail transparency. According to 
Thomasson (2003), our knowledge about reflexive kinds is immune to certain forms of 
ignorance or error that (non-reflexive) natural kinds are susceptible to. More precisely, 
Thomasson argues that certain realist epistemological commitments associated with 
natural kinds do not fully apply to social kinds which are reflexive.6 Consider the example 
of money. According to Thomasson, the existence of money depends on the collective 
acceptance of the constitutive rule “bills printed by the BEP count as money in the US”. 
However, this rule establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for being money. As a 
result, she suggests, we can neither be wrong about the conditions for being money, nor 
can we be ignorant about these conditions given that money exists.  
Thomasson points out that her transparency thesis has important limitations. For one 
thing, it does not apply to non-reflexive social kinds. People can be racist, or a society can 
be in a recession, without anyone having beliefs about racism or recession. Epistemically, 
non-reflexive social kinds therefore differ remarkably from reflexive social kinds. While 
we cannot be ignorant or wrong about the nature and existence of reflexive kinds, 
knowledge of both the existence and nature of non-reflexive kinds depends on 
                                                 
5 The examples of racism might be a somewhat misleading example. On most account of racism, for racism to exist it is 
necessary that people believe (or did at some point believe) that humans come in distinct races and that some of these are 
superior to others. This is identical with some one-line dictionary definitions of racism. If we take these definitions at face-
value, people who belief that humans come in superior and inferior races and are aware of that have a concept of racism 
(contrary to Thomasson ibid; Khalidi 2015, 100n5). However, the concept of racism is usually (intended to be) a thicker 
one including the ideas that the belief in racial superiority is based on scientifically wrong assumptions, that it is morally 
objectionable, that is has specific political and economic functions, etc.. This “thick” concept of racism is obviously not 
necessary for the existence of racism.  
6 Thomasson makes the same observation for semantic commitments (such as the causal theory of reference). Since the 
focus here is on epistemic features of social kinds, the discussion is limited to these. For a discussion of the semantics of 




substantive scientific discovery. In addition, Thomasson emphasises that transparency 
does not imply that it is impossible to acquire any new knowledge about reflexive kinds. 
Although we cannot be wrong or ignorant about the nature of money, we can still have 
meaningful social scientific inquiry about the “causal relations” involving money, such as 
the “(perhaps) unintended and unnoticed oppressive consequences of our practices 
involving money” (Thomasson 2003, 606). In other words, while the existence of a 
reflexive social kind implies that we are aware of its (“definitional”) nature, empirical 
inquiry may be necessary to reveal its causal properties. 
Khalidi provides a very similar account of the epistemic consequences of reflexivity. 
He suggests that reflexivity marks the difference between kinds which are suitable objects 
for scientific inquiry and those which are scientifically interesting only to the extent that 
they participate in “new causal patterns”. However, unlike Thomasson, who thinks the 
crucial epistemic distinction lies between reflexive and non-reflexive kinds, Khalidi argues 
that it lies between type-reflexive and token-reflexive kinds. According to Khalidi, non-
reflexive and type-reflexive kinds function epistemically like natural kinds because their 
properties are subject to scientific discovery. Token-reflexive kinds, by contrast, can be 
subject to scientific discovery only to the extent that they participate in “new causal 
patterns”, i.e. are associated with properties that have not been “written directly into the 
category itself” (Khalidi 2015, 106-7). As an example of token-reflexivity, Khalidi 
discussed the kind permanent resident. He argues that it is entirely up to us (or our 
governments) what properties an individual needs to have to qualify as a permanent 
resident – we could decide that they need to be capable of swimming hundred metres 
underwater. Yet permanent residents can enter into novel causal patterns (such as mainly 
settling in urban areas) that can be discovered by empirical inquiry. 
Consider now the ontological implications of reflexivity. Thomasson and Khalidi both 
argue that the epistemic distinctions they identify reflect important ontological differences 
between different types of social kinds. According to Thomasson, reflexive kinds lack 
“natural boundaries.” She suggests saying that a kind has “natural boundaries” means that 
the kind corresponds to a structure in the world that is independent of our beliefs about 
it. It implies that the kind “is not merely a division artificially imposed on the world by 
human concepts” (Thomasson 2003, 582). In other words, for Thomasson, both the 
existence and the boundaries of a reflexive kind depend on human beliefs about the kind.  
Khalidi provides a somewhat different story. According to him, the epistemic 




connects or “unifies” the properties that characterise the social kind. While the properties 
that characterise non-reflexive and type-reflexive kinds are (at least partly) causally 
connected, the properties associated with token-reflexive kinds are linked by human 
convention i.e. are associated with the kind because of “social rule or convention” 
(Khalidi 2015, 106). More precisely, Khalidi suggests that non-reflexive kinds have only 
causally connected properties, type-reflexive kinds have both causally and conventionally 
connected properties, and token-reflexive kinds have only conventionally connected 
properties.7 Since, according to Khalidi, non-reflexive and token-reflexive kinds are at 
least partly understood in terms of causal properties, they function epistemically like 
natural kinds. Token-reflexive kinds are different because the properties associated with 
these kinds are not related by causal connections but merely by human conventions. 
Let’s briefly recapitulate, Thomasson and Khalidi both assume that there is a “realist” 
epistemic characteristic of natural kinds whereby what it means to be of the kind is subject 
to scientific discovery rather than human stipulation. They also agree that, while some 
social kinds share this feature, others lack it. These latter kinds, they argue, can be subject 
to scientific discovery only to the extent that they participate in unintended causal 
relationships. Finally, they both suggest that this epistemic distinction reflects important 
differences at the ontological level. The reason some social kinds cannot be subject to 
scientific discovery is because their “boundaries” or “unity” do not reflect the 
independent structure of the world but are a matter of human convention. 
At the same time, Thomasson and Khalidi disagree about where exactly these crucial 
epistemic and ontological differences can be found. For Thomasson, the distinction lies 
between non-reflexive and reflexive kinds; for Khalidi, between type-reflexive and token-
reflexive kinds. Furthermore, when discussing the underlying ontological differences, they 
not only disagree about where these differences ought to be located, but also – as far as 
the metaphorical language allows to conclude – about what exactly these differences 
consist in. While Thomasson believes the difference is a matter of the kinds having natural 
rather than conventional boundaries, Khalidi suggests it is a matter of having causal as 
opposed to conventional linkage among the kind’s properties. However, I suggest we put 
these minor differences to one side and instead recognise that both Thomasson and 
Khalidi are essentially suggesting that the properties that constitute (token-) reflexive 
kinds are held together by convention. I will refer to this idea as conventional cohesion. The 
                                                 




concept is a vague one, but it suffices to identify the intuition that underlies both 
Thomasson’s and Khalidi’s account.  
To summarise the previous discussion, we can identify three core assumptions about 
the nature of reflexive kinds. These are: 
 
(i) Conventional Cohesion: The properties that constitute the kind are “held 
together” by our beliefs. 
(ii) Epistemic Transparency: We cannot be wrong or ignorant about the nature of 
(token-) reflexive kinds. 
(iii) Type-token Reflexivity: Reflexive kinds fall into two types, some of which are 
type-reflexive and some of which are token-reflexive.8 
 
Not everyone agrees with the reflexivity account of social kinds. More recently, Guala has 
argued that we should wholeheartedly reject the reflexivity view and replace it with a realist 
account of social kinds that is informed by game theory (Guala 2010; 2014). As part of 
this proposal, all three core assumptions about reflexive kinds have come under attack. 
In the following section, I recapitulate and discuss Guala’s objections.  
1.2 GUALA’S OBJECTIONS 
According to Guala, the reflexivity view of social kinds is misguided because it does not 
provide a convincing account of its paradigm examples. Those social kinds that have been 
described as reflexive kinds are not reflexive at all – human propositional attitudes about 
them are neither necessary nor sufficient for their existence. To show this, he invokes the 
case of money, which has been a paradigm sample of reflexivity since Searle introduced the 
view. Guala argues that we can see that the belief that something is money is not sufficient 
for the existence of money by imagining a case of hyperinflated currency. In the context 
of hyperinflation, people might continue to refer to bills printed by the BEP as “money” 
even though they have ceased to use it as currency and used cigarettes instead. According 
to Guala, although they are still called “money”, these bills no longer perform the core 
functions of money as identified by economists: they are no longer used as a means of 
exchange, store of value, or unit of accounting. As a result, the bills are no longer money 
in the relevant sense of the term used by social scientists.  
                                                 
8 Thomasson recognises the distinction between type-reflexivity and token-reflexivity, but argues that it is inconsequential 




According to Guala, this shows that people’s belief that bills printed by the BEP are 
money is not sufficient for making the bills members of the kind money. The fact that these 
beliefs are also not necessary, he argues further, becomes obvious when we probe the 
notion of collective acceptance in more detail. To see this, it is helpful to distinguish 
between three notions of collective acceptance (Guala 2010, 252-8). The first one is the 
full-transparency notion of collective acceptance. It presupposes that people in a society 
know not only the conditions for membership in a reflexive kind, but they also know that 
the existence of the reflexive kind is a matter of their collective acceptance of these 
conditions. The second is a somewhat weaker cognitivist notion of collective acceptance. 
According to the cognitivist notion, individuals in a society need to be aware of (that is, 
consciously accept) the conditions for membership in a kind, but they can be ignorant of 
the constitutive role of the collective acceptance of these conditions. For instance, people 
need to collectively accept that a bill has to be printed by the BEP in order to be money, 
but they may be ignorant of the fact that the existence of money depends on their 
collective acceptance of this condition. Thirdly, there is the non-cognitivist version of 
collective acceptance. This version states that collective acceptance of membership 
conditions is a matter of implicit rather than conscious acceptance. On the non-cognitivist 
account, collective acceptance can be expressed in terms of patterns of action, for instance 
by individuals treating objects that fulfil certain conditions as members of the kind. But it 
does not require that these individuals have any conscious representation of what the 
conditions for membership in the kind are. 
As Guala points out, although proponents of the reflexivity account of social kinds 
need not be committed to the full-transparency notion, they need to endorse a cognitivist 
rather than a non-cognitivist notion of collective acceptance. The reason for this, he 
argues, is that a non-cognitivist notion of collective acceptance is incompatible with the 
reflexivity view’s core tenet that the existence of social kinds depends on propositional 
attitudes. Accepting a non-cognitivist notion of collective acceptance entails that 
collective acceptance can be a matter of patterns of action rather than propositional 
attitudes about the kind. Hence, if proponents of the reflexivity view were to endorse a 
non-cognitivist notion of collective acceptance, they would have to admit that 
propositional attitudes about reflexive kinds are not necessary for the existence of these 
kinds after all.  
More important for our purpose, Guala points out that a non-cognitivist notion of 




reflexivity account are trying to make (Guala 2010, 258). Saying that reflexive kinds can 
exist without anyone having any propositional attitudes about them is effectively the same 
as saying that everyone can be ignorant about the existence or nature of these kinds. In 
other words, non-cognitivist collective acceptance is in direct conflict with the reflexivity 
view’s core assumption of epistemic transparency.  
But not only that. In addition to Guala’s point about epistemic transparency, we can 
note that a non-cognitivist notion of collective acceptance would proof fatal to the other 
two core assumptions about reflexive kinds as well. This is because Conventional 
Cohesion and Type-token Reflexivity both depend on people having propositional 
attitudes about kinds or their members. Without anyone holding such attitudes, it can 
neither be the case that the conditions that constitute a reflexive kind are somehow unified 
or “held together” by people’s beliefs about them (Conventional Cohesion), or nor can 
there be a distinction between reflexive kinds that require beliefs about tokens and 
reflexive kinds that only require believes about types. In other words, on a non-cognitivist 
understanding of collective acceptance, Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic 
Transparency, and Type-token Reflexivity all fail.  
According to Guala, this is bad news for proponents of the reflexivity view: all three 
core assumption have to be rejected because the non-cognitivist notion of collective 
acceptance is the only plausible one. This, Guala argues, is because it is a truism that we 
can be wrong about the membership conditions of reflexive social kinds – we can wrongly 
believe that money is anchored by a gold standard, that the king is divinely ordained, or 
that witches have made a pact with Satan (Searle 1995, 47; Guala 2010, 256-9; 2014, 3). 
These examples of reflexive kinds show that we evidently hold factually false beliefs about 
such kinds. In some cases, such as for the kind witch, the beliefs in question could not 
possibly be true.  
On the basis of these arguments, Guala concludes that the reflexivity view of social 
kinds ought to be rejected. What does he make, then, of the alleged difference between 
those social kinds that have been classified as “reflexive” on the one hand, and non-
reflexive social kinds and natural kinds on the other? Was the intuitively so compelling 
idea that money depends on human beliefs in a way that recessions and tigers don’t just a 
mirage? In lieu of the reflexivity account Guala offers a proposal that acknowledges a 
distinction between kinds that are belief-dependent and kinds that are not. But his 
proposal spells out the distinction in a very different way. According to Guala those kinds 




about them – are better understood as being constituted by “systems of beliefs and actions 
in equilibrium” (Guala 2014, 3). He suggests that  
 
What matters is not what type of attitude people have toward a certain class of entities (the 
conditions they think the entities ought to satisfy in order to belong to that class), but what 
they do with them in the course of social interaction. The relevant attitudes, in other words, 
are directed toward the attitudes of other people. 
(Guala 2014, 5) 
 
In other words, Guala recognises a type of social kinds which are constituted by beliefs. 
Yet, pace the reflexivity account, he thinks these beliefs are not about the kinds themselves, 
but rather about the beliefs of other people, for example whether they will accept certain 
paper bills in exchange for goods and services.  
The collectively accepted beliefs philosophers have traditionally identified as 
constitutive of social kinds (such as “bills printed by the BEP are money”) play a very 
different role in Guala’s view. They are beliefs about coordination devices that facilitate the 
convergence of actions and beliefs which constitutes a social kind (Guala 2014).9 To 
understand this point, consider the example of money. In Guala’s view, in order for 
something to function as money, there needs to be a stable system of beliefs that others 
will accept certain items in exchange for goods. For such a stable system of beliefs to arise 
and remain, it helps if individuals agree on a “signal” that allows them to reliably predict 
each other’s beliefs and actions. In the case of money, Guala suggests, being printed by 
the BEP acts as such a coordination device, signalling that when presented with such a 
bill, others will accept it in exchange for goods. 
There are several problems with Guala’s account. For one thing, it relies on a game-
theoretic understanding of social life that isn’t universally shared (Hargreaves Heap & 
Varoufakis 1995). Since this debate would take us to far afield, I will not get into any 
details. A problem with Guala’s account that is much more pertinent to the discussion 
here, however, is that his account of social kinds does not apply to many kinds that we 
would intuitively want to include among the “belief-dependent” or “reflexive” kinds. It 
has been argued that racial kinds like black can plausibly understood as social positions 
that are constituted by being oppressed or discriminated against on the basis of skin 
colour (Haslanger 2012). This suggests a striking parallel between money and race. Just like 
money can be understood as patterns of actions and beliefs that are coordinated around 
specific types of paper, race can be understood in terms of patterns of beliefs and actions 
                                                 




that are coordinated around individuals that have certain physical features. However, 
whereas in the case of money, the relevant beliefs are about the beliefs and actions of other 
people (as Guala’s account requires), in the case of race, the beliefs are typically erroneous 
beliefs about the kind or tokens of the kind.  
To see this, consider in more detail the kinds money and race. In the case of money, we 
have seen above that the patterns of selling, buying, exchanging, etc., that constitute money 
may involve erroneous beliefs about the kind or its tokens, such as the belief that paper 
bills are anchored by the gold standard. However, according to Guala’s account, these 
erroneous beliefs do not by themselves produce the patterns of actions and beliefs that 
constitute money. To collectively create a stable system of buying, selling, and exchanging 
around these paper bills, people need to believe that other people will accept the bills in 
exchange for goods and services, now and in the foreseeable future.  
This is the main point of Guala’s game-theoretic account of social kinds. However, it 
is not the case for the example of race. Here, it is plausible to argue that the relevant 
patterns of beliefs and actions arise solely on the basis of individuals’ erroneous beliefs 
about the kind or its tokens. While it is important to recognise that racism is not simply a 
matter of individual prejudice, but a complex interplay of economic, cultural, and legal 
factors, it is possible for individual racist attitudes alone to give rise to relevant patterns 
of oppression and discrimination. For instance, a widespread belief that people with dark 
skin colour are less professionally capable than people with light skin colour can lead to a 
situation where the former people systematically end up in less well-paid and less 
prestigious professions than the latter. In this example, black then is a social kind 
constituted by a pattern of professional discrimination, and this social kind is associated 
via human beliefs with individuals who have dark skin. However, unlike money, the pattern 
that constitutes black does not require beliefs about the actions and beliefs of other 
people.10 Real-world cases of racism are certainly more complex than this and might be 
amplified by beliefs about the racist beliefs or actions of other people (e.g. “If I hire 
someone with dark skin, my racist customers will stay away”). Nevertheless, on a theoretic 
level, such kinds can be constituted by patterns of beliefs and actions that simply emerge 
as the aggregate of actions based on individual erroneous beliefs, i.e. their racist prejudices 
about the capabilities of people with black skin. Analogous arguments, I believe, can be 
made in the case of gender and witches. 
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A possible reaction to this would be to accept Guala’s account but exclude kinds like race, 
gender, and witches as a different type of phenomena that require a model of their own. 
This move, I believe, comes at too high a cost. The parallels between social kinds like 
money on the one hand and kinds like race and gender on the other are too cunning to be 
ignored. In both cases, a central feature of the phenomena in question is that certain 
classifications of entities (metal coins, humans of specific body types) are associated via 
human conventions with specific social functions or statuses. Accordingly, to formulate 
a unified account might improve our understanding of examples that fall into either 
category. This is not to say that Guala’s account should be rejected as a useful and 
illuminating way of understanding some social kinds, or at least some aspects of some 
social kinds, that have traditionally been understood as reflexive kinds. What I am hoping 
to show, however, is that when it comes to making sense of the phenomena traditionally 
referred to as “reflexive” kinds Guala’s account isn’t the only game in town. To the 
contrary, his account neglects some striking features of these kinds that deserve a model 
of their own.  
1.3 REFLEXIVE KINDS AS HYBRID KINDS 
While Guala’s proposal may elucidate one aspect associated with “reflexive” kinds, I will 
propose an alternative account that has several advantages. It is more general in two 
respects: it covers cases like race and gender in addition to those addressed in Guala’s 
proposal and it is not committed to a particular game-theoretic view of social reality. 
Moreover, it picks up a familiar element of social ontological theorising: its core aspect is 
expressed in Searle’s claim that reflexive kinds involve the imposition of a status function 
onto an existing object. In the following, I will first describe Searle’s discussion of status-
endowment and point out the overlap with Asta Sveinsdottir’s recent account of 
conferred properties. I argue that both accounts can be combined into a more general 
account of reflexive kinds as hybrid kinds that involve positioning existing objects or 
individuals in a new network of social relations. I then show how this account can be used 
to clarify the extant discussion on reflexive kinds, while avoiding the unnecessarily 
restrictive commitments of Guala’s account. 
1.3.1 Reflexivity’s lost brother – the idea of imposed status functions 
To develop this alternative account, we first need to distinguish two aspects in Searle’s 
(1995, 2010) characterisation of reflexive kinds outlined above. On the one hand, there is 




in the previous discussion, this idea has attracted the majority of philosophical attention. 
On the other hand, there is the less noted idea that such kinds involve the imposition of 
a status function onto an existing (kind of) object, individual, or event. So far, we have 
been focussing on the aspect of reflexivity because this aspect dominates the discussion 
on Searle’s account of social kinds and is considered as its defining characteristic (hence 
the terminology of “reflexive” kinds).  
In some respects, this is not surprising. The realist paradigm in philosophy traditionally 
understands its subject matter in terms of what exists independently of human belief, so 
as to distinguish the “real” from the “fictional”. Against this background, the observation 
that certain social kinds seem to depend on human beliefs about them, yet look so much 
unlike dragons and unicorns, can seem highly peculiar. If you think what is most striking 
about social kinds like money and requires explanation is their perceived mind-
dependence, it makes sense to define social kinds along that dimension. Most scientific 
and philosophical inquiries start with such “explorative” definitions of the target 
phenomenon. But explorative definitions typically leave a lot of room for improvement 
in the light of new insights. In the case of reflexive kinds, for example, we would want to 
know things like “Why are reflexive kinds dependent on beliefs about them?” or “What 
about reflexive kinds is dependent on such beliefs?” Most importantly, we would want to 
know how exactly the idea that these kinds are dependent on human beliefs relates to 
Searle’s other idea that these kinds involve imposed status functions. What is surprising 
in the case of reflexive kinds, then, is not that they have originally been characterised by 
an explorative definition focussing on their alleged reflexivity. What should surprise us is 
that this explorative definition has developed a life of its own as the dominant 
understanding of the phenomenon in question, while the idea of imposed status 
functions, and the question whether and how the idea of imposed status functions can be 
squared with the dominant understanding, has been largely disregarded. This, I will argue, 
has been much to the detriment of the extant discussion. We can get a much firmer 
understanding of the phenomenon in question if we explore the idea of imposed status 
functions instead. 
Let’s start by considering in more detail what Searle has to say on the matter. Searle, 
as argued above, believes that a reflexive kind is created by the collective acceptance of a 
constitutive rule of the form “X counts as Y in C”.11 What exactly is going on here? Searle 
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suggests that what the constitutive rule describes is the imposition of a so called status 
function onto existing objects, individuals, or events. In the formula, X refers to (a type of) 
existing objects, Y refers to the status function, and C to a specific context in which the 
constitutive rule applies. To clarify the idea of a status function, Searle distinguishes it 
from what he calls causal functions. According to Searle, status functions differ from 
causal functions in terms of what needs to be the case so that an object can perform the 
function. Objects can perform a causal function simply in virtue of their “intrinsic physical 
features” (Searle 1995, 39). Status functions, by contrast, cannot simply be performed in 
virtue of an objects existing features. Instead, they require our help in the form of 
collective acceptance or intentionality. A status function is a function that can only be 
performed because people collectively assign a certain status to that object. 
Searle illustrates the difference with the example of a stone wall that continues to 
function as a territorial boundary despite decaying over time (Searle 1995, 39-40). 
According to Searle, the intact wall can perform the function of a territorial boundary 
simply in virtue of its physical properties – it physically hinders people from leaving or 
entering the territory. In other words, being a territorial boundary is a causal function of 
the wall. The same is not true once the stone wall has decayed to a line of stones on the 
ground. The wall (or the remains thereof) no longer have the physical properties that stop 
people from crossing. Yet we would not be surprised to find that people living on both 
sides of the wall continue to recognise the remains as a territorial boundary, for instance 
by crossing it only with the allowance of people living within the territory. According to 
Searle, this illustrates how the function of territorial boundary can be realised in two 
different ways. Although the line of stones has lost the physical properties that allowed it 
to function as a territorial boundary (its causal function), it now performs the same role 
as a status function, i.e. in virtue of collective intentionality that assigns to the line of 
stones the symbolic status of a territorial boundary. 
1.3.2 Asta’s conferred property kinds 
Asta recently put forward an account that is very similar to Searle’s idea of imposed status 
functions (Asta 2008, 2011, 2013). Although Asta seems to have developed this account 
independently of Searle’s, it provides useful resources for clarifying some of the central 
concepts and mechanisms we have encountered so far. According to Asta, some social 
kinds are constituted by properties which are “conferred” onto existing objects, 
individuals, or events. I will refer to these kinds as “conferred property kinds” in the 




property, which we will specify below, the grounding property, i.e. the property that the 
conferral is attempting to track12, and a conferring subject, i.e. the individual, group, or entity 
that does the conferring. Her examples of conferred property kinds range from (baseball) 
strike to woman and man. In the case of strikes, the property of being a strike (conferred 
property) is conferred onto a pitch that has travelled a certain distance (grounding 
property) by the umpire (conferring subject). In the case of gender, being a man or a 
woman (conferred property) is conferred onto people with certain physiological or 
psychological characteristics (grounding property) by people in their social environment 
(conferring subjects).  
How does Asta’s proposal relate to Searle’s? Recall that, for Searle, status functions are 
imposed through collective acceptance of a constitutive rule “X counts as Y in C”. At 
first glance, Asta’s concept of a grounding property looks a lot like the X term, her 
concept of a conferred property looks like Searle’s status functions (expressed in the Y 
term), and the conferring subjects looks like it might have something to do with Searle’s 
condition C. We can confirm this impression by taking a closer look.  
Firstly, consider what it is that Asta and Searle claim is conferred or imposed. Since we 
are already familiar with Searle’s idea of a status function, we need to only look at Asta’s 
proposal. Asta’s terminology refers to “being a man/woman/strike” as conferred 
properties. This is semantically correct but slightly misleading in that it might suggest that 
the thing conferred is always a singular or basic property that cannot be further analysed 
(think of the property “being red”). Asta’s discussion makes clear that this is not the case. 
She argues that conferred properties like being a woman are in fact social statuses consisting 
of a set of constraints and “enablements” on an individual’s behaviour. In the case of 
gender, for example, Asta suggests that being classified as a man or woman means to 
occupy a social status that is characterised by specific duties, privileges and burdens (Asta 
2011, 60).  
In other words, Searle and Asta agree that, in the social world, there exists a special 
phenomenon by which social statuses are imposed or conferred onto existing objects, 
events, or individuals. What exactly then is a social status? It seems that Searle and Asta 
are disagreeing. Searle, as argued above, suggests that statuses are associated with a 
number of functions. The status money, for instance, is associated with the function of 
being a means of exchange, a storage of value, etc. (Searle 1995, 46). By contrast, Asta 
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suggests that statuses should be understood in terms of constraints and enablements. I 
propose that we need not decide between these two proposals, but can accommodate 
them into a more general account. 
1.3.3 Hybrid kinds 
According to my proposed account, a status consists of a set (or cluster) of social 
properties which are acquired by the process that Searle and Asta have described as 
“conferring” or “social imposing.” I take it that the notions of conferring and imposing 
are largely synonymous in this context, and will accordingly use them interchangeable in 
the following. The central idea seems to be that, by conferring a certain status on an 
existing object, people endow the object with new social properties that it previously 
lacked. To endow an object with a new social property means, essentially, that people 
relate to the object in a different way. Their attitudes towards the object change, either 
giving rise to new patterns of behaviours or coordinating and stabilising existing patterns 
of behaviour involving the relevant object. Social properties, on my proposed account, 
include functional properties on the social level (e.g. being a means of exchange, being a 
mentor), social constraints, privileges and expectations (e.g. not being allowed to be 
aggressive, being able to access child care, being expected to be a criminal), and possibly 
others. They are properties which are, at some level, constituted by social practices and 
can therefore only be exemplified in the context of social organisation. This idea, I believe, 
is captured by Searle’s suggestion that our ideas of these statuses are just “placeholders 
for patterns of activities” (Searle 1995, 57). Entities that share a specific status, i.e. a 
specific set of conferred social properties, can be grouped into a kind, and I will refer to 
these kinds as status kinds.  
Now that we have a firmer idea of what conferred statuses are, we can consider Asta’s 
and Searle’s proposals in more detail. Asta proposes that we should distinguish between 
two types of conferral. Statuses can either be conferred by some person or entity who is 
authorised to make that conferral, or they can be conferred by the attitudes and actions 
of people without drawing on any special authority. Asta refers to these processes as 
institutional and communal conferring (Asta 2017). Communal conferral occurs in the case 
of gender, for instance when people collectively identify a certain individual at a party as 
a woman. The property being a strike is an example of institutional conferral. According to 
Asta, being a strike is not conferred by collective acceptance, but is first of all an act carried 




Again, it might seem that there is a disagreement here: while Asta argues that we need 
to distinguish between institutional and communal conferring, Searle seems to suggest 
that conferring is always a matter of collective intentionality. But this disagreement is only 
superficial. In fact, both Asta and Searle acknowledge that there can be a cascade of 
conferred properties. Searle suggests that the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), 
which can (institutionally) confer onto individuals the status licensed driver, is itself 
constituted by a conferred status. Society has (communally) conferred onto the individuals 
who form the DMV the property issuing driver’s licenses (Searle 1995, 106). This is analogous 
with Asta’s baseball example, where the property being an umpire is also an institutionally 
conferred property, which has been conferred onto an individual by, say, the supervisory 
staff of Major League Baseball, and so forth. Although the details of these cases are 
debatable (is issuing a driver’s license really communally conferred onto the DMV, or is it 
institutionally conferred by an elected government?), we can see that conferring is not 
always directly a matter of collective intentionality, but can occur in a nested structure. At 
the same time, since we will eventually run out of authorised people or entities, this nested 
structure has to peter out in collective intentionality/communal conferral. 
So far, I used Searle’s and Asta’s account of social kinds to clarify the notion of status 
kind. To further comprehend the phenomenon underlying the discussion about reflexivity 
and to complete my account of hybrid kinds, we need to distinguish two further central 
elements. The first element is constituted by the objects onto which statuses are 
conferred. I will refer to the groups or types of objects that have a specific status conferred 
onto them as the base kinds. A base kind is constituted by objects, events, or individuals 
that have specific base properties. Following Asta’s idea of grounding properties, I assume 
that base properties are those properties that the conferring subjects try to track when 
they confer a social status.13 We have already encountered several examples of base kinds 
in the previous discussion. In the case of money, Searle’s account suggests that the base 
kind consists of bills printed by the BEP. Asta argues that human individuals having a 
specific role in biological production constitute the base kind for men and women, and so 
forth. 
Secondly, and more interestingly, there is the relation connecting the base kind and the 
relevant social status. Both Searle and Asta notice that there is something peculiar about 
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this relation. Searle describes it as a “nonphysical”, “noncausal” and “incidental” (Searle 
1995, 42, 49). Similarly, Asta suggests that 
 
there is not a fact of the matter as to whether the pitch is a strike or not independent of the 
judgment of the umpire, but rather it is the umpire’s judgment as to the trajectory of the ball 
that confers on the pitch the property of being a strike 
(Asta 2013, 720) 
 
These characterisations hint at something interesting, but they need further spelling out. 
I suggest one way of appreciating the peculiar nature of the connection between base kind 
and status kind starts with the observation that having the right base properties is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for having the relevant conferred status. Having the relevant base 
properties is not sufficient because without the social act of conferral, the base object 
does not exemplify the conferred status. It is not necessary either, because objects can 
acquire the conferred status even when they lack the base properties. As long as subjects 
do confer a status on an object it does not matter whether the motivating belief that the 
object has the appropriate base properties is correct or mistaken.  
This makes perfect sense in light of what we know now about conferred statuses. As 
argued above, to have a conferred status essentially means to be subject to specific 
attitudes and behaviours on a social scale. For instance, what it means for a piece of paper 
to have the status of money is that people use the piece of paper in exchange for goods, 
to pay off debts, etc. The piece of paper is money if and only if it has these social 
properties. In other words, there is nothing other than people’s conventions or 
agreements that connects the property “being a piece of paper printed by the BEP” with 
the social properties, such as being a means of exchange, that characterise the status money. 
For that reason, I refer to the connection holding between base kind and conferred status 
as conventional linkage. 
Putting these ideas together, we obtain an account of hybrid kinds that consists of 
three core elements: (i) a base kind, (ii) a status kind, and (iii) a relation of conventional linkage 
connecting the base kind and the status kind. In the penultimate section of this chapter, 
I use this account to clarify the extant discussion about reflexive kinds.  
1.4 RE-EVALUATING THE CORE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
REFLEXIVE KINDS 
Having argued that the notion of hybrid kinds provides a better way of thinking about 




that have been made about reflexive kinds in the extant discussion. Recall that these claims 
are: 
 
(i) Conventional Cohesion: The properties that constitute the kind are “held together” 
by our beliefs. 
(ii) Epistemic Transparency: We cannot be wrong or ignorant about the nature of 
(token-) reflexive kinds. 
(iii) Type-token Reflexivity: Reflexive kinds fall in two types, some of which are type-
reflexive and some of which are token-reflexive. 
 
I will first consider Type-token Reflexivity before moving on to Conventional Cohesion 
and Epistemic Transparency. 
1.4.1 Type-token Reflexivity 
Type-token Reflexivity, as argued above, states that we can distinguish type-reflexive and 
token-reflexive kinds. Recall that, for both, the existence of the kinds in question depends 
on humans having propositional attitudes about the kinds. Yet, it is argued, type-and 
token-reflexive kinds differ with regard to the existence conditions of their individual 
members. For type-reflexive kinds, individual members of a kind can exist without anyone 
believing that they are members of the kind. For token-reflexive kinds this is not the case 
– their members do not exist (i.e. they do not have instances) unless we think of them as 
members of a specific kind.  
One problem with Type-token Reflexivity that has been ignored in the discussion so 
far is that it does not sit easy with a fairly uncontroversial assumption about kind ontology. 
The assumption states that whether or not an object is a member of a specific kind 
depends on whether or not it has the properties that characterise the kind. According to 
this assumption, no matter what sort of kinds money or woman are, something is money if it 
has money-properties, and someone is a woman if that person has woman-properties. For 
type-reflexive kinds, however, the existence conditions for instances of the kind are said 
to be very different from the existence conditions of the kind itself. It is assumed that 
instances of the kind can exist without anyone having propositional attitudes about these 
instances while the kind cannot exist without people having propositional attitudes about 
the kind. How can this be? 
The hybrid kind model allows us to get out of this muddle. The model proposes that 
the ontological structure of the kinds in question is more complicated than proponents 




understood as hybrid kinds consisting of a base kind that is conventionally linked to a 
status kind. As a result of this structure, however, the terms that are used to refer to the 
kinds in question are highly ambiguous. Prima facie, it is not clear whether they refer to 
the base kind, to the status kind, or maybe even to the whole lot.14 Depending on how we 
use the term “money”, for instance, we could be referring to the base kind, the status 
kind, or the whole hybrid kind. The crucial point is that each of these candidate meanings 
refers to a kind with its own definition or membership conditions. The base kind of 
money is constituted by bills printed by the BEP, the status kind is constituted by  objects 
that function as a means of exchange, and the whole hybrid kind is constituted by bills 
printed by the BEP, that, in virtue of conventional linkage, have acquired the social 
property of being a means of exchange. For each kind in question, however, the 
uncontroversial assumption holds true. To be a member of the base kind of money is to be 
a bill printed by the BEP, to be a member of the status kind of money is to be a means of 
exchange, and so forth. 
This realisation is crucial, because it clarifies how we should think about the thought 
experiment that motivated Searle’s distinction between type- and token-reflexivity in the 
first place: the bill that fell straight from the press into a crack in the floor. By saying that 
the bill is money even if it is never used as a means of exchange, proponents of Type-
token Reflexivity seem to suggest something like this: by accepting the constitutive rule 
“bills printed by the BEP count as money”, we can confer a status (being a means of 
exchange) onto a certain type of base kind (bills printed by the BEP) in a wholesale 
manner. In order for something bills printed by the BEP to have the status of money, we 
do not need to have certain attitudes towards each individual bill or use every bill for 
specific actions. My hybrid kind model suggests that this is wrong. Individual objects 
acquire membership in a status kind in virtue of the fact that they are subject to specific 
attitudes and behaviours. On this account, the bill that fell into the floor crack is not a 
member of the status kind money because it lacks the defining property of being used as a 
means of exchange.  
Proponents of Type-token Reflexivity could object that the bill which fell into the floor 
crack nevertheless has the status of money because we have the disposition to use it as a 
means of exchange if we get hold of it. I am inclined to agree with them. Since the patterns 
of social activities that constitute a status kind might be intermitted rather than ongoing, 
it seems plausible to allow that the disposition to be subject to certain attitudes or 
                                                 




behaviour can be sufficient for being a member of a certain status kind. Of course, the 
details of such a dispositional account need further clarification, but this would take us 
too far afield. For now, it suffices to note that reference to dispositional properties does 
not yield the results that proponents of Type-token Reflexivity are hoping for. The reason 
for this is because it shifts the defining characteristics of the entire status kind money from 
“being used as a means of exchange” to “having the disposition to being used as a means 
of exchange”. On a dispositional account, the status kind money depends for its existence 
on dispositional attitudes and actions, but so do its individual instances. In other words, 
Type-token Reflexivity cannot be salvaged by reference to dispositional properties. In lack 
of a better argument, Type-token Reflexivity should be rejected.  
1.4.2 Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency 
Next, consider Conventional Cohesion, which states that the conditions or properties that 
constitute the kind are “held together” by our beliefs. Drawing on the above observation 
about hybrid kind terminology, we can now appreciate that this claim is highly ambiguous. 
Within a single hybrid kind, it is possible to distinguish different sets of properties that 
each play a different role. On the one hand, there are the properties of the base kind. On 
the other hand, we have the conferred social properties of the status kind. Taken together, 
this gives us not one but three possible interpretations of the claim that the properties that 
constitute the kind are “held together” by our beliefs: 
 
(i) Conventional Cohesion of the base kind: Our beliefs “hold together” the properties 
that constitute the base kind. 
(ii) Conventional Cohesion of the status kind: Our beliefs “hold together” the properties 
that constitute the status kind. 
(iii) Conventional Cohesion of the hybrid kind: Our beliefs “hold together” the 
properties that constitute the base kind with the properties that constitute the 
status kind. 
 
Before moving on to discuss each of these cases individually, it is worth realising that the 
problem at hand extends to Epistemic Transparency. Epistemic Transparency is the 
assumption that we cannot be wrong or ignorant about the nature of a reflexive kind. 
Once we understand reflexive kinds as hybrid kinds, it is not clear whether talk of the 
“nature” of such a kind refers to the base kind, the status kind, or the entire hybrid kind. 





(i) Epistemic Transparency of the base kind: We cannot be wrong or ignorant about 
the nature of the base kind. 
(ii) Epistemic Transparency of the status kind: We cannot be wrong or ignorant about 
the nature of the status kind. 
(iii) Epistemic Transparency about the hybrid kind: We cannot be wrong or ignorant 
about the nature of the entire hybrid kind. 
 
In other words, to clarify the discussion around the remaining two core assumptions 
about reflexive kinds, we need to answer two questions: which of the interpretations of 
Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency do proponents of the reflexivity 
view have in mind? And which of these interpretations, if any, is making sensible claims 
about social reality? As to be expected, there is no direct answer to the first question, 
because proponents of the reflexivity view do not disambiguate of their core ontological 
and epistemological claims in the way the hybrid model requires. There is, however, an 
indirect way to answer this question. We just need to ask which interpretation of 
Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency proponents of the reflexivity view 
would have to commit to in order to support the implications for social scientific practice 
that they are defending.  
As discussed above, Thomasson and Khalidi both suggest that reflexive kinds can be 
subject to scientific inquiry only in a limited sense: it makes sense to investigate the novel 
causal relationships that these kinds enter into, but not the “nature” or “conditions for 
membership” of the kind. Furthermore, when discussing Epistemic Transparency, 
Thomasson and Khalidi are both explicitly comparing the epistemic role of reflexive kinds 
with that of natural kinds, which are commonly individuated by their central role in 
scientific inquiry. This is a role that, in the context of social science, only status kinds 
fulfil. When social scientists investigate, for instance, the “nature” of money, they 
generally talk about the status kind, such as the function of money as a means of exchange, 
rather than specific physical or etiological features of the base kinds.15 Similarly, social 
scientists commonly distinguish gender from sex to emphasise that they are concerned 
with the specific social role that individuals classified as men or women occupy, rather 
than with the biological differences between the bodies of the people so classified. In the 
social sciences, the status kinds associated with money and gender are of central theoretical 
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importance. The physical and etiological features of dollar bills or female bodies tend to 
be secondary. 
In other words, Thomasson’s and Khalidi’s remarks about the epistemic role of reflexive 
kinds strongly suggest that they are committed to Epistemic Transparency about status 
kinds. From this, we can infer which version of Conventional Cohesion proponents of 
the reflexivity view are committed to. We are able to make this inference because 
proponents of the reflexivity propose a specific logical relationship between Epistemic 
Transparency and Conventional Cohesion. As argued above, they believe that we cannot 
be wrong or ignorant about the “nature” of a reflexive kind because the existence of the 
kinds presupposed that we collectively accept a constitutive rule which sets out the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the kind. But this logical inference 
only works if Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency refer to exactly the 
same kind. Therefore, we can conclude that proponents of the reflexivity view must be 
committed to Epistemic Transparency and Conventional Cohesion about status kinds. 
Having established which versions of Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic 
Transparency are endorsed by proponents of the reflexivity view, the next thing we need 
to do is ask which versions of these assumptions provide an adequate picture of social 
ontology. I will address the different versions in turn, starting with those endorsed by 
proponents of the reflexivity account.  
1.4.3 Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency about status kinds 
To begin with, consider Conventional Cohesion about status kinds. As it happens, this 
assumption has already been vehemently criticized in the relevant literature. Rebecca 
Mason claims that it is not the case that kinds like money are constituted by properties that 
are “gerrymandered”, “stipulated arbitrarily” or “at our discretion” (Mason 2016). She 
argues that we could not simply “stipulate that money is defined by the properties of being 
blue before time, t, and being two miles from Lake Michigan” (Mason 2016, 842). Instead, 
what it means to be money is simply to fulfil the three core functions of being a medium 
of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of accounting.  
In a similar vein, Guala points out that economists have long realised that money’s 
core function of being a medium of exchange causally depends on its being a store of value. 
The reason for that, he suggests, is that trade takes place over time. Selling something in 
exchange for an asset in order to use that asset to purchase something at a later point does 
not make sense if that asset loses its value in the meantime. Hence, Guala argues, the core 




world is” rather than as a matter of arbitrary stipulation (Guala 2010, 260). In other words, 
both Manson and Guala believe that it is wrong to say that the properties that constitute 
money are in any way held together by us or our attitudes about the kind. Instead, they are 
determined by the way the social world happens to be.  
While these observations may be correct in the case of money, they do not seem to apply 
to all status kinds. Consider Asta’s example of a baseball strike, a corporate title like chief 
executive officer, or a legal kind like murder. In these cases, it seems plausible to say that the 
properties that constitute the conferred statuses are indeed a matter of human stipulation. 
The fact that a strike is a move that contributes to a strikeout, by which the batter’s turn 
is over and the other team takes its turn at bat, is explicitly defined in the rules for baseball. 
The rights, duties, and responsibilities that constitute the role CEO, and how these relate 
to the structure of a company, are defined by the company’s management and usually 
explicitly written into the company’s charter and employment contracts. Similarly, the fact 
that murder is a serious offence that carries a mandatory life sentence is defined in UK 
criminal law. 
In other words, for status kinds like strike, CEO, and murder, Conventional Cohesion 
hints at an adequate picture. The picture at hand is what I would call the “social artefact 
picture” of social  kinds: a society collectively decides (or authorises someone to decide) 
that a certain set of social properties is called “strike”, “CEO” or “murder” and then uses 
these terms to coordinate social life so as to implement or maintain the relevant practices. 
The properties that constitute the conferred status are stipulated in accordance with 
specific goals and purposes. Only afterwards is social life arranged so as to implement the 
properties that were agreed on beforehand. Note that this is compatible with 
Thomasson’s and Khalidi’s suggestion that such kinds can participate in novel causal 
relationships. For instance, we could empirically discover that CEOs are more likely than 
other groups of the population to have psychopathic traits. Nevertheless, as with artefacts, 
the fact that the defining properties of CEOs are coinstantiated in the world is a matter 
of deliberate design. 
To sum up, some status kinds are what I have called “social artefact kinds” and for 
them, Conventional Cohesion does in fact hold true. The properties that constitute the 
status strike or CEO or murder are, in a sense, “held together” by our beliefs, i.e. our 
deliberate efforts to organise social life in accordance with a given template, and thereby 
make it the case that these properties are coexemplified in the required way. Moreover, 




Cohesion to Epistemic Transparency holds for these kinds. Since we have explicitly 
stipulated the properties of that template, we cannot be wrong about what the properties 
of the resulting kinds are either. 
While the social artefact picture might be adequate for the cases discussed above, it 
does not apply to all status kinds, let alone paradigm cases in the discussion, such as money. 
For status kinds like money, to borrow Searle’s terminology, it seems more plausible that 
the social practices that constitute these kinds simply have “evolved” in the course of 
human history without any deliberate stipulation or design (Searle 1995, 47). We should 
also note that there might be borderline cases. Khalidi’s discussion of the kind metic is 
insightful here. Khalidi suggests that metic, a form of permanent residency in ancient 
Athens –in other words, a social status kind characterised by rights and duties explicitly 
stated in Athenian law – might be a formalised versions of social patterns that preceded 
the existence of the legal kind. According to Khalidi, it is likely that metic was modelled on 
an informal social role which was likely in place prior to the category metic. This informal 
status (call it proto-metic) included features like “participation in economic transactions and 
in military service and non-participation in the political process and in owning property” 
that were conferred on the basis of prejudice or informal convention (Khalidi 2015, 107). 
Hence, there might be cases of status kinds that start out as informal patterns of social 
life and only later become institutionalised and thus a matter of “social engineering”. 
Conversely, there may be examples of social artefact kinds that lose their deliberate 
enforcement mechanism at some point, yet linger on as informal patterns in social life. 
In summary, the discussion above suggests a somewhat limited, accidental victory for 
proponents of the reflexivity view. There are indeed status kinds for which the 
assumptions of Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency hold true. But they 
have only little overlap with the range of phenomena that the reflexivity account set out 
to explain in the first place. While Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency 
might apply to a subset of status kinds, they are not features of status kinds in general.  
1.4.4 Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency about base kinds 
Next, consider Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency about base kinds. 
Conventional Cohesion about base kinds states that the properties which constitute the 
base kind are “held together” by our beliefs. As with status kinds, this claim is true to a 
limited and somewhat trivial extent because some base kinds may be artefacts that we 
deliberately design and produce. If we use dollar bills as money, the pieces of paper onto 




that members of the base kind are rectangular slips of paper with specific print on them 
is because we deliberately made them that way. However, if we would decide to use, say, 
blue seashells as money instead, this would not be the case. The reason that these objects 
are blue, shell-shaped and shiny has nothing to do with our attitudes or actions. Again, 
there might be borderline cases. For instance, we could mark the seashells with a certain 
pattern before using them, thus making them more artefact like. At the same time, the 
status functions that we confer on base kind objects put practical limits on our “design” 
– as Khalidi observed, we could not use ice as money (Khalidi 2015, 105).  
In either case, the epistemic implications are modest. We can be wrong or ignorant 
about the nature of base kinds, even those that are the product of our design. It would be 
perfectly possible, for instance, to design, produce, and use certain paper bills as money 
without knowing that the bills are flammable, or that the ink on them is toxic. As a result, 
both Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency fail as general features of 
conferred status kinds.  
1.4.5 Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency about hybrid kinds 
The last candidates to consider are Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency 
about hybrid kinds, or more precisely, about the relationship between base kinds and 
status kinds. First, consider Conventional Cohesion about the relationship between base 
kinds and status kinds. On this interpretation, Conventional Cohesion states what is 
somehow “held together” by our beliefs is the connection between a base kind and a 
status kind. Searle seems to take note of this conventional relationship between base kind 
and status kind. He argues, for instance, that since “the conditions laid down by the X 
term are only incidentally related to the function specified by the Y term, the selection of 
the X term is more or less arbitrary” (Searle 1995, 49). (Recall that Searle’s X term and Y 
term roughly correspond to our base kind and status kind.) Unfortunately, neither he nor 
later proponents of the reflexivity view recognise that this is the only place in their theory 
where talk about kinds being “held together” by human beliefs makes the most sense.  
According to the hybrid model, the properties that constitute the base kinds and the 
properties that constitute the status kinds are in fact “held together” by our beliefs. The 
model states that to impose a status onto an existing object is to give that object a position 
in a network of social relations that it did not previously occupy. But in order for that to 
happen, people need to recognise or think about the object in a way that triggers a specific 
range of thoughts or actions in them. Otherwise – and in this sense I would endorse 




object-related thoughts and actions to be brought into line in a way that produces the 
social patterns that constitute a conferred status. In other words, the connection between 
base kind and status kind is “held together” by our thoughts because objects of a base 
kind function as members of a status kind only in virtue of the fact that we think about 
these objects in a certain way.   
What are the implications of this observation? If there is a plausible interpretation of 
Conventional Cohesion, might the same be true for Epistemic Transparency? Epistemic 
Transparency about hybrid kinds would suggest that we cannot be wrong or ignorant 
about the nature of hybrid kinds. The previous discussion suggests that this claim is false. 
If we can be wrong or ignorant about the nature of base kinds and about the nature of 
status kinds, it clearly has to be possible that we are wrong or ignorant about hybrid kinds, 
too. After all, hybrid kinds are nothing other than a compound of base kind and status 
kind, associated by relation of status conferral that is usually covert and hence something 
that we are even less likely to understand.  
But this is not to say, as Guala seems to suggest, that the kinds in question are just like 
natural kinds. To the contrary, the fact that the connection between base kind and status 
kind obtains in virtue of human beliefs has peculiar epistemic consequences that set 
hybrid kinds apart from natural kinds. Because the social practices that constitute the 
conferred status do not emerge spontaneously, but require the widespread recognition of, 
and resulting synchronised or coordinated modification of beliefs and actions towards 
members of the base kind, recognition as of a certain kind is necessary for obtaining the 
conferred status. And insofar as widespread recognition is automatically accompanied by 
the emergence of the relevant patterns of social action, it is also sufficient for obtaining 
the conferred status.  
To see this, consider in more detail the sort of beliefs that connect a status kind to a 
specific base kind. People do not simply believe, say “this is a bill printed by the BEP” or 
“this is a human with typical characteristics of female anatomy”. These beliefs alone would 
be insufficient to trigger the patterns of thought and behaviour which make a bill function 
as a means of exchange, or make an individual with female anatomy occupy the social 
position of women in a specific society. It is only when people recognise a bill printed by 
the BEP as something above and beyond a bill printed by the BEP, or an individual of 
female anatomy as something above and beyond an individual of female anatomy, that 




What is going on here, I suggest, is that people need to classify the object of the base kind 
as a member of a different kind which, in their minds, is associated with a specific concept, 
i.e. a set of propositional attitudes about the kind. In other words, people classify a paper 
bill as money, or an individual as a woman and, by doing that, think about the bill or 
individuals in terms of the associated concept. The concepts are public in the sense that 
there tends to be a significant overlap in the propositional attitudes that different people 
associate with the kinds. Moreover, as evidenced in the previous discussion, the content 
of the concepts does not have to be true. Guala’s discussion of kings and witches suggests 
that false beliefs can be just as effective in producing the relevant patterns of thought and 
behaviour as true ones. In fact, given the complicated hybrid structure of the kinds in 
question, there is reason to think that they will be false in most cases.  
The epistemic upshot of the previous discussion is this: We can be dead wrong about 
the “nature” of a hybrid kinds like money or woman in the sense that we can be wrong both 
about its base properties and its conferred properties. However, in a limited sense, it may 
be impossible for us to collectively be wrong about the hybrid kind’s extension. As argued 
above, identifying members of a base kind as, say, money, woman, or witch, and interpreting 
them through the associated concepts, are necessary for creating the relevant status kinds. 
Accordingly, if enough people come to identify somebody or something as money, a 
woman, or a witch, and think about and relate to them in accordance with the associated 
concepts, the individuals/objects will acquire the social status of money, woman or witch.   
This could make hybrid kinds epistemically transparent in a very limited yet interesting 
sense: it may be difficult to be collectively wrong or ignorant about which objects are a 
member of a hybrid kind because what makes these objects a member of the hybrid kind 
is a matter of people thinking about them in terms of an associated concept. Note that 
this form of epistemic transparency would be compatible with a limited amount of dispute 
over kind membership. Having the relevant status does require wide but not unanimous 
recognition as a member of the kind - we would continue to recognise five pound notes 
as money even if some shops refused to accept them as a means of exchange.  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I argued that the reflexivity view, which understands certain social kinds 
in terms of belief-dependence, should be replaced with an account of hybrid kinds, which 
understands them as base kinds associated with a social status. I defended the hybrid 




in scope and does not require us to commit to a specific game-theoretic view of social 
institutions. Finally, I showed how the hybrid model provides a more nuanced critique of 
the extant discussion, allowing us to distinguish different interpretations of the core 
assumptions of the reflexivity view. I argued that Type-token Reflexivity ought to be 
rejected and that Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency are not generally 
true when applied to either base kinds or status kinds. However, I also showed that there 
is an ounce of truth in Conventional Cohesion and Epistemic Transparency when applied 
to the relationship between base kinds and status kinds. Hybrid kinds are belief-dependent 
in the sense that members of the base kind possess the associated status only in virtue of 
the fact that humans have certain (true or false) beliefs about them. As a result of this, 
hybrid kinds may be epistemically transparent in the sense that we can be wrong about 
their nature but we cannot collectively be wrong about their extension.  
This shows that the underlying idea that the kinds in question are somehow different 
from natural kinds is correct. We will return to this idea, and its implications for scientific 
inquiry, in Chapter 4. Before that, it is time to take a more detailed look at what the hybrid 






































GROUNDS, ANCHORS, AND HYBRIDS 
THE ONTOLOGY OF SOCIAL KINDS 
In the previous chapter, I argued that a common way of thinking about a certain type of 
social kinds, the reflexivity view, is inadequate. Instead, the kinds in question are better 
understood as hybrid kinds, which are constituted by a certain status (or status kind) being 
imposed onto existing objects, events, or individuals (the base kind). In this chapter, I 
apply the hybrid kind model to a different and more recent discussion in social ontology: 
the discussion of Brian Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model of social ontology.  
Epstein proposes a model of social ontology according to which social kinds involve 
two distinct metaphysical relations: the relation of grounding, which is a familiar concept 
in metaphysics, and the relation of anchoring, which is a new concept introduced by 
Epstein. Although Epstein’s model has received a lot of critical acclaim, critics have 
rejected the idea that anchoring is a metaphysical relation distinct from grounding. I argue 
that Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model is flawed on a more fundamental level than his 
critics realise. Epstein, who suggests that the grounding-anchoring model is a general 
model of social kinds, has in fact modelled his account on an erroneous understanding of 
hybrid kinds. Using the hybrid kind model developed in the previous chapter, I show that 
the concept of anchoring is ambiguous and that neither Epstein nor his critics have 
provided an adequate analysis of any of its interpretations.  
In the following, I first introduce Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model. I then discuss 
the critics’ objections and point out several problems with them. After that, I argue that 
central examples in the discussion need to be understood as hybrid kinds that beget 
ambiguity. Once that ambiguity is clarified, it becomes apparent that the grounding-
anchoring model cannot be applied to the kinds in question. Turning to Epstein’s 
discussion of non-hybrid kind examples, I show that his model suffers similar problems 
in this context. I conclude the chapter by providing an error theory of the intuitions 
motivating the grounding-anchoring model. 
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2.1 EPSTEIN’S GROUNDING-ANCHORING MODEL OF SOCIAL 
ONTOLOGY 
Epstein’s account is motivated by the idea that social ontology can benefit from a closer 
engagement with existing tools in metaphysics. He suggests that we can advance our 
understanding of social kinds by distinguishing two metaphysical relations that are at work 
in the social world: grounding and anchoring (Epstein 2015, 2014). Consider grounding 
first. The notion of grounding has been developed in recent years in analytical 
metaphysics and is meant to pick out a specific metaphysical relation (Audi 2012b, Fine 
2001, Schaffer 2009, Rosen 2010, Correia & Schnieder 2012). 1 Although there is a fair bit 
of disagreement about the exact nature of this relation, we can ignore these disputes for 
most of our discussion and focus on the basic idea instead: the idea that a grounding 
relation states the “metaphysical” (as opposed to causal) reason why a certain fact obtains. 
This relation is sometimes described as the “in-virtue-of” relation. A grounded fact, so 
the basic idea goes, cannot obtain without its grounding fact, unless that grounding fact 
has been replaced by a different suitable grounding fact. Moreover, some people hold that 
grounding relations are asymmetric, obtaining between more and less fundamental facts. 
On this view, the grounds metaphysically explain the grounded facts, but not the other 
way around. Although Epstein notes that the assumption that some facts about the world 
are more fundamental than others is highly contested, he explicitly endorses it in the 
context of his social ontology (Epstein 2015, 70).   
A common example of a grounding relation is the relation between biological and 
physical facts. Biological facts, it is said, are grounded in physical facts, which is to say 
that biological facts exist in virtue of physical facts. According to this idea, a biological fact 
– such as the fact “hedgehogs have hearts” – cannot exists without its physical grounding 
fact – such as the arrangements of atoms and molecules that constitute a hedgehog heart 
– unless the latter are replaced with other grounding facts (imagine a parallel universe 
where hedgehog have tiny artificial hearts made from plastic and metal).  
A grounding relation in Epstein’s model obtains between two sets of facts: the grounds 
or grounding facts G, and a specific social fact F. As a toy example, he uses the familiar 
case of money. Epstein suggests that we could think of the specific social fact “Billy is a 
dollar bill” as being grounded in the fact “Billy is printed by the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing (BEP)”. In addition to grounding relations, which apply to singular social fact 
                                                 
1 Some participants in this debate would deny that grounding picks out a metaphysical relation at all. They suggest that it 
should be treated as a non-referring expression in the meta-language instead (see Fine 2010). 
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like “Billy is a dollar bill”, Epstein suggests that there are frame principles. Frame principles, 
to put it simple, are generalisations of grounding relations. Instead of saying that fact G 
grounds fact F (”Billy is printed by the BEP” grounds “Billy is a dollar bill”), they say that 
facts of type G ground facts of type F (being printed by the BEP grounds being a dollar 
bill).2 
In addition to the existing concept of grounding, Epstein proposes a new metaphysical 
relation of anchoring. Epstein introduces the concept of anchoring specifically to further 
our understanding social ontology, although he suggests in places that it might be 
applicable to ontological matters more generally. While grounds are the metaphysical 
reason why a certain social fact or type of social facts obtains, anchors are the 
metaphysical reason why a certain type of social fact has a specific type of grounding fact 
(Epstein 2015, 74). Note that an anchoring relation does not hold between the same relata 
as a grounding relation. A grounding relation holds between a social fact (or a type of 
social fact) and its grounds. An anchoring relation, by contrast, holds between a frame 
principle and its anchors (or anchoring facts). Accordingly, an anchoring relation does not 
apply to singular social facts but to types of social facts – anchors make it the case that 
facts of type A ground facts of type B.  
Coming back to Searle’s analysis of money, Epstein suggests that the grounding-
anchoring model applies as follows. As seen in Chapter 1, Searle suggests that the reason 
bills printed by the BEP are dollars is because we collectively accept that this is the case. 
According to Epstein, in Searle’s example, “x is printed by the BEP” grounds “x is a dollar 
bill”. Furthermore, the fact that this grounding relation obtains is anchored in our 
collective acceptance of the constitutive rule “bills printed by the BEP are dollar bills”. In 
other words, collective acceptance of the constitutive rule anchors the frame principle 
“being printed by the BEP grounds being a dollar bill”. 
To tie the grounding-anchoring model back to our discussion of social kinds, 
reconsider Epstein’s use of frame principles. As argued above, frame principles simply 
describe grounding relations for types of social facts as opposed to singular social facts. 
The move from singular facts to types of facts has two upshots. According to Epstein, 
the main purpose is that it allows us to theorise about counterfactual scenarios – we can 
say that if the BEP had printed paper bill B (which it did not print in the actual world) B 
would be a dollar bill. More interestingly for our purposes, it allows us to apply Epstein’s 
model to social kinds. The reason for this is that social kinds can, quite trivially, be 
                                                 
2 Note that Searle’s example refers to money rather than dollar. The difference, however, is largely immaterial for our purposes. 
41 
 
understood as types of social facts. For instance, the kind money is a grouping of all entities 
x for which “x is money” is true. This implies that there is a straightforward way of talking 
about the grounds and anchors of a social kind. Social kinds have grounds of the 
generalising sort expressed in frame principles. For instance, the frame principle “’’being 
printed by the BEP’ grounds ‘being a dollar’” can be interpreted as saying that “being 
printed by the BEP” grounds the kind dollar. Moreover, since anchors only apply to frame 
principles (that is, to types of social facts as opposed to singular social facts), it is easy to 
see how social kinds could have anchors. Anchors are what makes it the case that a social 
kind has specific membership conditions. On this understanding, to say that collective 
acceptance of a constitutive rule makes it that case that bills printed by the BEP are dollars 
is to say that collective acceptance of the constitutive rule anchors the kind dollar. 
Before we move on to critical replies to Epstein’s model, it is important to note the 
model’s intended scope. While it has been widely recognised that Searle’s story about 
collective acceptance applies at best only to a subset of social kinds (see Chapter 1), 
Epstein proposes his grounding-anchoring model as remarkably more general. His 
examples include mostly social kinds that would fall under the hybrid model described in 
the previous chapter such as law, money and president. But Epstein suggests that the model 
also applies to social kinds like mob, which may not fall under the hybrid model because it 
does not obviously involve a conferred status. In addition, Epstein argues that the model 
even covers material artefact kinds like Aldino typeface and pocket book (Epstein 2014).3 If 
Epstein succeeded in providing an ontological model that unifies all of these kinds, it 
would be an impressive achievement.  
Unfortunately, there are doubts that his grounding-anchoring model succeeds. There 
have been a number of critical replies to Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model. The most 
common target of criticism is Epstein’s discussion of anchoring. Epstein’s description of 
anchoring largely resorts to metaphors: anchors are facts that “put in place” a frame 
principle or specific grounding conditions for a social kind (Epstein 2015, 74, 81), or they 
are the “glue” holding together a social kind (Epstein 2015, 81; 2014). Nevertheless, 
Epstein insists that grounding and anchoring are different types of metaphysical relations. 
                                                 
3 Note that material artefact kinds do not fall under my understanding of social kinds. Social kinds, as I understand them, 
are constituted (partly) by social facts. Members of the kind do not exist in the absence of a social world with certain social 
relations and institutions in place. Material artefact kinds like pocket book, by contrast, depend on social facts in a causal rather 
than constitutive sense. They were causally produced by humans with a specific purpose in mind, but they do not rely on 
the existence of society for their own continued existence. If humans went extinct, there would still be pocket books and 
smartphones, but there would be no hipsters or laws. Material artefact kinds are also not the sort of kinds that typically 
figure in social scientific explanations, and are therefore of little interest in the context of an investigation that asks if social 
kinds can be natural kinds. 
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In particular, he argues against the view that anchors are just among the grounds of social 
facts, a position that Epstein calls “conjunctivism” (Epstein 2015, Chpt. 9).  
Against Epstein’s proposal, Jonathan Schaffer and Katherine Hawley defend 
conjunctivism. They both suggest that anchors are ultimately just grounds for social kinds 
or facts (Hawley 2017; Schaffer forth.). In other words, Schaffer and Hawley argue that 
anchors and grounds are the same type of facts and relate to social facts via a grounding 
relation. Mari Mikkola’s takes a slightly different stance (Mikkola 2017). She is willing to 
accept Epstein’s distinction between grounds and anchors to the extent that it allows us 
to usefully distinguish facts that “work at different ontological levels” (Mikkola 2017, 18). 
But she rejects the idea that grounding and anchoring are different types of metaphysical 
relations. According to Mikkola, instead of saying frame principles are anchored by a 
distinct type of anchoring facts, Epstein should say frame principles are grounded by these 
facts on a different ontological level. 
To appreciate this subtle distinction, it is important to understand the logical relation 
between the claims at hand. The claim that anchors are just grounds entails that anchoring 
is the same as grounding because anchors and grounds are individuated in terms of the 
metaphysical relation they involve. If all there is are grounds – that is, facts that relate to 
other, social facts via a relation of grounding – there is no reason to postulate a distinct 
metaphysical relation of anchoring. According to Mikkola, this is not true vice versa. The 
idea that anchoring is the same as grounding does not imply that anchors are the same as 
grounds because the terminology of “grounds” and “anchors” may refer to types of facts 
that ground social facts in crucially different ways. For the purpose at hand, however, we 
can largely ignore these differences between Hawley’s and Schaffer’s criticism on the one 
hand and Mikkola’s on the other. The important upshot is that all three critics take issue 
with the concept of anchoring, suggesting that it is not a relation sui generis, but is simply 
grounding in disguise.  
In addition to rejecting anchoring as a distinct metaphysical relation, there is another 
point of overlap in the critics’ objections. Both Mikkola and Schaffer object that at least 
some of the statements Epstein describes as frame principles (that is, statements of 
generalised grounding relations) do not describe grounding relations at all but are simply 
identity statements or stipulative definitions. Examples include statements like 
“committing certain crimes in the context of armed conflict grounds being a war criminal” 
(Mikkola 2017, 11-13) and  “killing someone with deliberate malice aforethought grounds 
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being a murderer” (Schaffer forth., 14-15). We can ignore these considerations for now, 
but I will come back to them later in the chapter.  
In light of these reactions, it is fair to say that the discussion surrounding Epstein’s 
grounding-anchoring model is far from resolved. It is neither clear whether anchoring is 
a relation that is genuinely different from grounding, nor whether Epstein’s frame 
principles actually describe an interesting metaphysical relation as opposed to mere 
identify or definition. Fortunately, the hybrid kind model developed in the last chapter 
provides a powerful tool for shedding light on these arguments. It allows us to see that 
both Epstein and his critics mischaracterise the ontology of the social kinds in question.  
To show this, I first address Epstein’s main argument for distinguishing grounding from 
anchoring. I argue that Epstein and his critics equally fail to recognise that the key 
examples in Epstein’s argument are hybrid kinds which are susceptible to ambiguity. Once 
this ambiguity is clarified, we can see that Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model is 
inadequate for both hybrid and non-hybrid social kinds.  
2.2 THE ARGUMENT FOR DISTINGUISHING ANCHORING 
FROM GROUNDING 
As stated above, a major objection to Epstein’s model of social ontology says that 
anchoring is in fact nothing other than grounding. To evaluate this objection, we first 
need to consider in more detail Epstein’s motivation for distinguishing anchoring from 
grounding in the first place. For Epstein, the need for a distinct metaphysical relation of 
anchoring is rooted in the observation that social kinds are “universal tools”. Certain facts 
that are necessary for the existence of a social kind obtain only at the specific time and 
place that we occupy. Nevertheless, we can reasonably ask whether the kind is instantiated 
at other times and places. He illustrates this with the example of the kind war criminal: 
 
One is a war criminal if one has committed or conspired to commit any of a long list of 
crimes in association with armed conflict. We can sensibly ask whether Caligula was a war 
criminal, or whether Genghis Khan was, having killed over a million inhabitants of a single 
city. We can also consider a possibility in which some virtuous person instead committed 
terrible crimes, and sensibly ask whether that person would be a war criminal. It does not 
matter whether, in that possibility, there is an International Criminal Court. What matters is 
only whether the person satisfies the conditions we have anchored. 
(Epstein 2015, 124) 
 
Let’s look at this passage in more detail. Epstein proposes that the grounding facts for 
war criminal are something along the lines of “having committed or conspired to commit 
certain crimes in association with armed conflict.” As a matter of fact, the grounding facts 
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for war criminal may exist or may have existed in many times and places of human history, 
such as under the empire of Caligula or Genghis Khan. But, Epstein seems to suggests, 
there is a further crucial ingredient to the kind war criminal. In a sense, there cannot be war 
criminals unless there is an international justice system that decides what it means to be a 
war criminal – such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
Curiously, however, it seems that we can reasonably ask whether Caligula or Genghis 
Khan are war criminals even though the ICC did not exist when they existed. In the 
passage above, Epstein insists that we can identify members of the kind war criminal during 
the Roman and Mongol empires, long before the ICC was established. This, in Epstein’s 
view, is what justifies the distinction between grounding and anchoring. Grounding is a 
metaphysical in-virtue-of relation in which both relata need to exist in the same time and 
place; anchoring is a metaphysical in-virtue-of relation to which this constraint does not 
apply.  
To clarify this point, Epstein argues that “when we assess [social facts] across other 
times and possibilities, we do not deny that they obtain merely because the anchoring 
facts do not obtain at those times and possibilities.” (Epstein 2015, 124). In other words, 
he suggests that the grounding relation described in the frame principle (“committing or 
conspiring to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict grounds being a war 
criminal”) obtains even in contexts where the anchors for the frame principle do not exist. 
Instead, when asking whether Genghis Khan was a war criminal, we can simply evaluate 
the situation in the light of the anchors that obtain at the time and place from where we 
ask the question. According to Epstein, we can only make sense of this observation if we 
assume that anchoring and grounding are different types of relations.   
Epstein’s argument for this claim is a bit elliptic, and he does not discuss the anchors 
for war criminal in any detail other than suggesting they involve the ICC. For our purposes, 
it helps to be a little more precise. We can say that war criminal is anchored by certain facts 
about the ICC, such as that the ICC exists and that it adopted specific legal instruments 
concerning war crimes, such as the Rome Statute. Accordingly, Epstein’s argument for 
distinguishing grounding from anchoring seems to go something like this:  
 
(1) Per definition of grounding, a social kind can only be instantiated when its 
grounds obtain.  
(2) The anchors for war criminal (the fact that the ICC exists, the fact that the ICC 
adopted the Rome Statute, etc.) did not obtain when Genghis Khan existed. 
(3) Genghis Khan was a war criminal, that is, he instantiated the kind war criminal.  
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(4) Ergo: There must be a distinct relation (called “anchoring”) which holds between 
a social kind like war criminal and its anchors.  
 
Epstein’s argument has attracted a number of critical replies. Interestingly, the objections 
are quite diverse and some of them are straightforwardly inconsistent with each other. 
Consider Hawley’s argument first. Hawley challenges premise (3). She denies that it makes 
sense to say Genghis Khan was a war criminal, at least in some contexts:  
 
[…] there are contexts in which it is not sensible to ask whether [Genghis Khan] was a war 
criminal, unless we mean to ask whether he violated whatever laws may have governed 
warfare at his time. Such imposition of modern categories onto historical figures is regarded 
by many (though not all) historians as anachronistic, and explanatorily fruitless. Thus, socially 
oriented historians of science, and sociologists of contemporary science, stress the 
importance of using “actors’ categories”, i.e. concepts available to the scientists [sic., actors] 
who are the subjects of study.  
(Hawley 2017, 10) 
 
In other words, Hawley objects that it is wrong to say that anchors generally behave 
differently to grounds. She points out that there are social scientific inquiries in which 
anchors play much the same role as grounds. Just as it would be wrong to classify Genghis 
Khans as a war criminal had he not committed or conspired to commit any crimes, social 
scientists might argue that we cannot say that Genghis Khan was a war criminal unless an 
equivalent of the ICC existed at the time when he committed his atrocities.  
Schaffer makes a very similar point (Schaffer forthc.). He argues that it is obvious that 
anchors behave like grounds when we consider the example of money. To see this, Schaffer 
asks us to imagine a scenario where the United States adopted Spanish dollars instead of 
U.S. dollars as their currency. The laws that entitle the BEP to print currency have not 
been passed, but there exists some alternative legislation regarding Spanish dollars. The 
BEP is still in the business of printing paper notes, but the notes are parking tickets rather 
than money. In this scenario, Sally holds a Spanish dollar in her right hand and a parking 
ticket in her left hand. We need to decide in which hand Sally is holding her money. 
According to Schaffer, Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model would commit him to 
saying the money is in Sally’s left hand. The reason for that, he suggests, is that Epstein’s 
model states that we need to answer the question based on which anchors obtain in the 
context from where we ask the question. In the actual world, there exists U.S. legislation 
which anchors the frame principle that being printed by the BEP grounds being money. 
Therefore, Schaffer concludes, Epstein would be committed to saying that the piece of 
paper in Sally’s left hand is money. That, Schaffer objects, is implausible – the sensible 
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thing to say would be that Sally is holding money in her right hand. According to Schaffer, 
whether the piece of paper in Sally’s right hand is money depends on what anchors obtain 
in the hypothetical scenario, for instance whether there exists legislation that makes 
Spanish dollars money. Just as with grounds, what matters are the anchors for money that 
obtain in the hypothetical scenario. As a result, Schaffer concludes that Epstein’s anchors 
function in just the same way as grounds.4  
Interestingly, while Hawley and Schaffer make a similar general point – that there is 
reason to think that anchors are just grounds – they disagree quite substantially on the 
nature of a specific case study. Hawley, as argued above, accepts that the statement 
“committing or conspiring to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict 
grounds being a war criminal” expresses a genuine grounding relation but denies that we 
can unambiguously classify Genghis Khan as a war criminal. Schaffer takes no issue with 
classifying Genghis Khan as a war criminal, but denies that “committing or conspiring to 
commit certain crimes within the context of armed conflict” are the grounds of the kind 
war criminal. According to Schaffer, the reason we can call Genghis Khan a war criminal 
is because “war criminal” is stipulatively defined as someone who commits or conspired 
to commits certain crimes in the context of armed conflict. In other words, “having 
committed or conspired to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict” is 
simply an explication of how we have stipulatively defined the kind that “war criminal”.  
This has crucial implications on how we understand the role of the ICC in relation to 
war criminal. According to Schaffer, facts about the ICC are neither grounds nor anchors 
for war criminal. Instead, they are simply historic facts about how (when, where, by whom, 
etc.) the term “war criminal” has been stipulatively defined. Once stipulated, definitions 
apply universally. We can correctly use a term to describe an individual even when facts 
about how the term has been defined no longer obtain. 
Incidentally, Schaffer is not alone with the idea that some of Epstein’s examples of 
grounding relations are simply definitions. With regard to Epstein’s example of murderer, 
Mikkola argues that it is doubtful whether being a first-degree murderer is really grounded by 
killing someone with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought. According to 
Mikkola, just like a square is an equilateral right quadrilateral, “being a murderer just is to 
kill with premeditation” (Mikkola 2017, 11-12). However, unlike Schaffer, Mikkola argues 
that the fact that these statements express definitions does not automatically imply that 
                                                 
4 Epstein would probably reject this argument because he wants to treat counterfactual scenarios like the money example 
differently from countertemporal scenario like the one involving Genghis Khan. But, as noted by Hawley (2017, 9-10), it 
is not clear on what basis he could make such a distinction. 
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they cannot be grounding statements. That, Mikkola argues further, depends on whether 
they are identity statements. Whether or not the statements in questions are identity 
statements in turn depends on how we individuate facts. For Epstein, who thinks that we 
should individuate facts by the propositions that they express, definitions can involve 
grounding relations. On a propositional conception of facts, statements like “x is a 
square” and “x is an equilateral right quadrilateral” describe two different facts. Hence, 
statements like “squares are equilateral rights quadrilaterals” are not identity statements 
and can express grounding relations.  
However, Mikkola points out that this would not be the case on a “worldly” 
conception of facts, where facts are “individuated by their constituents and the manner 
in which those constituents are combined” (Audi 2012a, 103; cited in Mikkola 2017). On 
a worldly conception of facts, the statements in question are indeed identity statements 
that cannot express grounding relations. According to Mikkola, Epstein fails to provide 
an argument as to why a propositional conception of facts is more suitable to the purpose 
of social ontology than the worldly conception. In other words, unlike Schaffer, Mikkola 
suggests that definitions can express grounding relations in Epstein’s account. But she 
criticises that the conception of facts which Epstein uses to make this possible lacks 
independent justification.  
The replies to Epstein’s argument are puzzling in several ways. For one thing, some of 
them – such as Hawley’s and Schaffer’s interpretations of the example of war criminal – 
are obviously in tension with each other. For another, there are problems with each of 
the arguments taken by themselves. Hawley seems to suggest that there might be some 
contexts where it makes sense to say “Genghis Khan was a war criminal” and other 
contexts where it does not makes sense, but she does not tell us what distinguishes the 
former from the later. Schaffer claims that some of Epstein’s examples are cases of 
grounding whereas others are stipulative definitions, but he does not clarify how exactly 
we can tell the former from the latter. The same is true of Mikkola’s suggestion that, on 
a “worldly” conception of facts, some of Epstein’s examples are identity statements. 
Overall, then, the critics’ responses to Epstein’s distinction between anchoring and 
grounding pose more questions than they answer. The reason for that, I suggest, is that 
both Epstein and his critics fail to fully recognise the ontological structure of the examples 
they are discussing. Kinds like money or war criminals are hybrid kinds. Since hybrid kinds 
consist of a base kind and a status kind, identifying the grounds and anchors of a hybrid 
kind requires substantial disambiguation. In the following, I disambiguate Epstein’s claims 
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about grounding and anchoring and explore what implications this has for his model of 
social ontology.  
2.3 GROUNDING AND ANCHORING FOR HYBRID KINDS 
2.3.1 Was Genghis Khan a war criminal? 
Let’s begin by reconsidering the central example of war criminal. Schaffer suggests that a 
war criminal is someone who commits specific crimes in the context of armed conflict, 
as defined by the ICC. Furthermore, he argues that this answer holds for the Mongol 
Empire just as much as for today. Hawley, by contrast, argues that it is sensible to say that 
a war criminal is someone who violates whatever laws govern warfare in their specific 
time and place.  
Who is right? The hybrid kind model developed in Chapter 1 provides a useful tool 
for resolving this discussion. The model suggests that some social kinds are best 
understood as hybrid kinds, consisting of a base kind and a status kind connected by 
conventional linkage. War criminal can be understood as a hybrid kind. The base kind of 
war criminal is the kind people who commit or conspire to commit certain acts in the context of armed 
conflict. It is this kind that we try to track when applying the classification of war criminal. 
But the story does not end here. Once we have identified a person who we believe has 
committed or conspired to commit the relevant crimes, we apply the classification of war 
criminal to them. By doing so, we confer onto the individual a specific social status that is 
constituted by a number of legal and social properties (such as being hunted by the police, 
being condemned by the public, etc.). 
This characterisation, of course, is a highly simplified version of how the process of 
status conferral actually works in this case. In reality, the process encompasses a complex 
nested structure of status conferrals involving the ICC and numerous other institutions. 
Nevertheless, the example allows us to realise that the relationship between base kind and 
status kind is one of conventional linkage by recognising how easily the two can come 
apart. The ICC might not be perfect – it may fail to commit the status onto individuals 
who have committed the relevant acts, and it might erroneously confer the status onto 
individuals who have not committed or conspired to commit the relevant acts. In such 
cases, an individual might have committed or conspired to commit certain crimes in the 
context of armed conflict but not occupy the legal and social position of a war criminal, 
or vice versa. 
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Understanding war criminal as a hybrid kind allows us to see that the discussion between 
Hawley and Schaffer has fallen victim to a common confusion with hybrid kind 
terminology. Since a hybrid kind consists of a base kind and a status kind which are 
connected in a peculiar way, the terms used to refer to these kinds are highly susceptible 
to ambiguity. Against this background, we can see that Hawley’s and Schaffer’s different 
linguistic intuitions are both warranted. Recall that, for Schaffer, it makes perfect sense to 
say Genghis Khan was a war criminal, because a war criminal simply is someone who, as 
defined by the ICC, committed or conspired to commit specific crimes in the context of 
armed conflict. Hawley, by contrast, has reservations about applying the term “war 
criminal” to Genghis Khan. Echoing the concerns of certain historians and sociologists, 
she suggests that calling Genghis Khan a war criminal makes sense only when we mean 
to say that Genghis Khan violated laws that governed warfare at his time.  
We can console these two seemingly conflicting views once we recognise that “war 
criminal” refers to a hybrid kind and therefore is ambiguous. As argued in Chapter 1, the 
hybrid kind term “money” can refer either to the status kind (being a means of exchange, 
etc.), to the base kind (specific pieces of paper), or to the hybrid kind as a whole. In the 
same way, “war criminal” can refer either to a base kind (people who commit or conspire 
to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict), to the status kind (people who 
occupy the legal and social position of someone classified as a war criminal) or the entire 
hybrid kind.  
On this view, we can see that Schaffer’s and Hawley’s claims are both correct. Schaffer, 
who suggests that the meaning of the term “war criminal” is someone who commits or 
conspires to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict, interprets “war 
criminal” in terms of its base kind. An interpretation of “war criminal” in terms of the 
base kind supports Schaffer’s claim that the term applies to Genghis Khan. Anyone who 
committed or conspired to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict is a 
war criminal on this interpretation. 
Hawley’s use of the term “war criminal”, by contrast, is best understood as referring 
to the status kind – the specific legal and social position that is conferred onto someone 
who is believed to have committed or conspired to commit certain crimes in the context 
of armed conflict. This interpretation supports Hawley’s suggestion that Genghis Khan 
was not a war criminal. When we use the term “war criminal” to refer to a status kind, the 
status kind we have in mind is a product of modern legislation and social practice. 
Whatever laws and public understanding were associated with warfare at the time of the 
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Mongolian empire, they were probably quite different from today’s. Therefore, even if a 
classification akin to war criminal existed at the time, it probably carried a different legal 
and social meaning. In other words, although the acts committed by Genghis Khan might 
have been regarded as cruel and atrocious in his time, it is very unlikely that they had the 
same legal and social status that they would have today. Against this background, Hawley’s 
suggestion that calling Genghis Khan a “war criminal” might be anachronist and 
explanatorily fruitless makes sense. Since Genghis Khan did not occupy the relevant legal 
and social position that characterises the status kind associated with war criminal, it would 
be wrong to apply the term to him in that interpretation. 
2.3.2 Implications for the grounding-anchoring model 
In the previous section, I argued that understanding war criminal as a hybrid kind allows 
us to realise that Hawley and Schaffer both provide correct yet incomplete analyses of the 
phenomenon in question. It is now time to consider how these findings square with 
Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model. As suggested above, applying Epstein’s 
grounding-anchoring model to the kind war criminal gives the following analysis: The 
frame principle for war criminal is “committing or conspiring to commit certain acts in 
the context of armed conflict grounds being a war criminal”. This frame principle is 
anchored, among other things, by the ICC’s adoption of statutes which say that someone 
who commits or conspires to commit certain act in the context of armed conflict is a war 
criminal, and ought to be legally punished in a certain way.  
The problem with this analysis is that it obviously ignores the hybrid nature of war 
criminal described above. Since war criminal is a hybrid of two kinds, we would expect at 
least two sets of frame principle and anchoring relation, one for the base kind and one 
for the status kind. Let’s see how this might work out. To avoid confusion, I will use “war 
criminalB” to refer to the base kind and “war criminalS” to refer to the status kind.  
Consider the base kind first. The corresponding frame principle would state 
“committing or conspiring to commit certain acts in the context of armed conflict 
grounds being a member of war criminalB”. This is odd. As argued above, the base kind for 
war criminal just is the grouping of people who commit or conspire to commit certain 
crimes in the context of armed conflict. In other words, when we talk about war criminalB, 
Schaffer’s and Mikkola’s objections hit a nerve. On this interpretation, the frame principle 
simply describes how “war criminal” has been stipulatively defined. As Mikkola has 
argued, whether such definitions can express grounding relations depends on which 
conception of facts one adopts in the context of social ontology. However, we can take 
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her argument somewhat further. While there is some discussion as to whether or not real 
definitions describe grounding relations (e.g. Rosen 2015), I am not aware of any such 
arguments with respect to stipulative definition. In any case, it is hard to see how 
stipulative definitions could be non-symmetrical, or how they could involve the lower-
level and higher-level facts that Epstein suggests are required for grounding. As a result, 
even if the frame principle for war criminalB expresses a genuine grounding relation, it is at 
best a quite untypical examples of the concept of grounding that Epstein has in mind. 
Likewise with the anchors for war criminalB. If we accept that the frame principle above 
expresses a genuine grounding relation, the corresponding example of anchoring looks 
very peculiar. To say that the ICC’s decision to call people who commit or conspire to 
commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict “war criminal” anchors war 
criminalB is akin to saying that my decision to define “splott” as the set of items in the 
bottom of my freezer anchors splott. The question why we use certain terms to refer to 
specific concepts or kinds might of interest to linguists. But it is hard to see how it could 
involve a distinct metaphysical relation that has previously gone unnoticed and warrants 
the introduction of a novel ontological term.  
In other words, if we interpret “war criminal” in terms of the base kind, Schaffer’s and 
Mikkola’s objections are correct. The frame principle states a definition, and the alleged 
anchors are facts about how the definition has been put into place. This shows that the 
grounding-anchoring model is inadequate for the purpose at hand. It does not provide 
any novel or plausible insights about the ontology of war criminalB. At best, it expresses in 
a more convoluted way relations which we already understand pretty well. 
Reason enough to move on to the next candidate. What would a grounding-anchoring 
analysis of the status kind war criminalS look like? In this case, the frame principle would 
be “committing or conspiring to commit certain acts in the context of armed conflict 
grounds being a member of war criminalS”. There is some reason to think Epstein intends 
for his model to apply to status kinds like war criminalS. To see this, consider his discussion 
of the example of first-degree murder. Epstein’s discussion of first-degree murder is based on a 
paragraph from the Massachusetts General Law (MGL), which says: 
 
Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable 
with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree.  




Anticipating Mikkola’s concerns, Epstein acknowledges that this paragraph, which states 
that murder committed with deliberately premediated malice aforethought is first-degree 
murder, might look like an identity statement. But he insists that this first impression is 
mistaken, and that the paragraph is better understood as expressing a grounding relation. 
To support this idea, Epstein refers to Searle’s discussion of social kinds, arguing that 
“Searle rightly stresses that being a first-degree murderer is a status. Statuses are not 
identical to their conditions. Being a dollar is not the same thing as being printed at a 
certain bureau.” (Epstein 2015, 92, my emphasis). This passage strongly suggests that 
Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model should be understood as a model of status kinds. 
Interpreted in this way, Epstein is no longer susceptible to the criticism that his frame 
principles are just identity statements or stipulative definitions – committing or conspiring 
to commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict is clearly not the same as 
occupying a specific social and legal status.  
The resort to status kinds, however, comes at a high cost because now a different 
problem arises. While the frame principle, interpreted as a claim about a status kind, does 
not state a stipulative definition of war criminalS, it does not describe a grounding relation 
either. As argued above, the relation that connects “committing or conspiring to commit 
certain crimes within the context of armed conflict” with the status kind of war criminal 
is the relation of status conferral. The status of war criminal is conferred onto individuals 
which are believed to have committed or conspired to commit the relevant crimes.  
Status conferral is evidently different from grounding. In the previous chapter, I 
suggested that Asta’s choice to call base properties “grounding properties” is a misnomer. 
Now that we have a better grasp on the notion of grounding, it is easy to see why. 
Grounds are the metaphysical reason (or part of the metaphysical reason) why a certain 
fact obtains. In the example at hand, this means the grounds of war criminalS are the 
metaphysical reason (or part of the metaphysical reason) why someone is a member of 
the status kind war criminalS. But the fact that someone has committed or conspired to 
commit certain crimes in the context of armed conflict is clearly not the metaphysical 
reason (or part thereof) why that person is a member of war criminalS. Being a member of 
war criminalS means occupying a specific legal and social position. To occupy that position, 
it is quite immaterial whether or not one actually has committed or conspired to commit 
certain acts in the context of armed conflict. What matters is that people (and, in a 
derivative sense, institutions like the ICC) believe one has committed or conspired to 
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commit these acts, and that they change the way they think about and interact with the 
individual accordingly.  
If anything, then, the role of the alleged grounds (committing or conspiring to commit 
certain crimes in the context of armed conflict) is more akin to a causal one. Quite 
plausibly, the fact that someone has committed or conspired to commit certain crimes in 
the context of armed conflict tend to play a causal role in leading the ICC to believe that 
the individual has committed or conspired to commit certain acts in the context of armed 
conflict. This belief, in turn, may cause a range of people to interact with and think about 
the individual in a way that makes him or her occupy the legal and social position of war 
criminalS.
5 Since the relation in question is not one of grounding, Epstein’s concept of 
anchoring – the metaphysical reason why a social kind has specific grounds – cannot be 
applied to war criminalS either.  
In other words, Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model cannot be usefully applied to 
the hybrid kind war criminal. The suggested frame principle either describes a stipulative 
definition (in the case of war criminalB), which is at best a questionable candidate for 
grounding. Or, when applied to war criminalS, it describes a relation of status conferral, 
which is clearly different from grounding. This has an impact on Epstein’s idea of 
anchoring. Since the frame principle for war criminalS clearly does not express a grounding 
relation, the concept of anchoring cannot be applied. In the case of war criminalB, where 
the frame principle might be interpreted as stating a (untypical) grounding relation, the 
alleged anchors are simply facts about how a definition has been put into place.  
Does this mean that Epstein’s model is unsuitable for hybrid kinds in general? Not 
necessarily. There is still the off-chance that cases like war criminal (and maybe first-degree 
murder) are just idiosyncratic examples. To address this concern, it is worth briefly 
considering another example, the classic case of dollar. The frame principle for dollar states 
“being a bill printed by the BEP grounds being a dollar”. According to Schaffer, unlike 
with the problematic cases discussed above, the frame principle for dollar involves a 
genuine grounding relation.  
To see whether the grounding-anchoring model can be successfully applied to the 
hybrid kind dollar, we again need to start by disambiguating the terminology. As argued 
before, the base kind of dollar consists of bills printed by the BEP, with the associated 
status kind being a means of exchange. Once the term “dollar” is disambiguated, it is easy 
                                                 
5 In other words, status conferral can be considered a causal relation if one believes in mental causation. Asta, by contrast, 
seems to suggest that it is a relation sui generis (e.g. Asta 2008). My thesis does not take a stand on this issue. 
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to see how Epstein’s model runs into the same problems. On the base kind interpretation 
of “dollar”, the frame principle again simply describes what has been defined by 
stipulation – that the base kind for dollar are bills printed by the BEP.6 If we interpret 
“dollar” as a status kind instead, the frame principle effectively says “being a bill printed 
by the BEP grounds being a means of exchange”. Again, this statement does not describe 
a grounding relation, but a relation of status conferral. As argued in Chapter 1, bills printed 
by the BEP function as a means of exchange because we confer that status onto them.  
In other words, contrary to Schaffer’s suggestion, the frame principle for dollar does 
not involve a grounding relation that is genuinely different from definition. Instead, the 
example runs into exactly the same problems as those we encountered with war criminal. 
This supports the idea that the grounding-anchoring model cannot be usefully applied to 
hybrid kinds in general. Furthermore, it allows us to see that both Epstein and his critics 
are wrong about the notion of anchoring. Anchoring is not a metaphysical in-virtue-of 
relation that is distinct from grounding, but anchoring is not grounding either.  
2.4 ANCHORING IN NON-HYBRID KINDS 
2.4.1 Anchoring as “gluing” 
While we have established that Epstein’s model is not suited for hybrid kinds, including 
many of his central case studies, it is too early to reject the model altogether. After all, 
Epstein is not the first to trip up on the phenomenon of hybrid kinds, and there a many 
other, non-hybrid kinds for which the grounding-anchoring model might be apt. In order 
to explore this option, we need to move away from the problematic hybrid kind examples 
and consider what Epstein has to say about grounding and anchoring more generally. 
A fruitful place to begin is by reconsidering the intended scope of Epstein’s model. 
Up until now, we have assumed that the grounding-anchoring model is limited to social 
kinds. In a remarkable passage, however, Epstein suggests that the scope of the model in 
principle extends to natural kinds as well. Referring to anchoring in terms of the metaphor 
of “gluing”, Epstein suggests that 
It is a general feature of kinds—not just social kinds like dollars and play tea parties—that 
something needs to glue them together. Even a natural kind like gold may need a bit of “glue,” 
to set it up as a natural kind. Some philosophers hold, for instance, that laws of nature play 
some role in acting as this glue. The idea is that all it takes for an object to be a sample of 
                                                 
6 This is not to say that all base kinds of hybrid kinds are established by stipulation. Some are established by social practices 
following implicit rules, as might be the case for gender and race in some contexts. In these cases, an explicit definition of 
the base kind would have more of the explanatory asymmetry associated with real definitions, and hence would be a more 
plausible candidate for grounding. For reasons I explain in the next section, this does not mean that the grounding-
anchoring model provides and adequate analysis of these kinds.  
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gold is to be composed of atoms with a particular atomic number. However, what unifies a 
chemical kind (like gold) into a natural kind is that the laws of nature make the chemical 
behave in certain regular ways. Without laws gluing the chemical kind together, it would not 
be a natural kind at all. 
(Epstein 2015, 81, original emphasis) 
 
This passage is helpful in several ways. Firstly, it makes clear that Epstein believes 
anchoring holds for both natural and social kinds. Secondly, the example of gold gives us 
a more detailed understanding of what anchors might be.  
Let’s look at this in more detail. As Epstein (2015, 67-68) acknowledges, a common 
way of characterising kinds (both natural and social) is by contrasting them with ad hoc 
sets of things. Members of kinds (such as tiger or communist) are said to have a great number 
of properties in common, whereas members of ad hoc sets of things (such as white things 
or things I can see from my desk) do not. This characteristic is not only used to distinguishing 
kinds from ad hoc sets of things. It is also assumed to explain the central role that kinds 
play in science.7 The fact that members of a kind have a great many properties in common, 
so the idea, facilitates induction. It allows us to infer from the fact that an entity has some 
property (such as having atomic number 79), to the fact that is has a great number of 
other properties (such as being yellow, malleable, and ductile).  
Coming back to Epstein’s passage above, this understanding of kinds suggests that 
Epstein’s metaphor or “gluing” hints at whatever makes it the case that the properties 
associated with a kind are reliably coinstantiated. To avoid misunderstanding, the 
underlying idea here is not that the properties of individual objects are at the risk of 
running off into all directions unless they are firmly held together. Instead, it is the 
assumption that there must be arrangements in the world which make it the case that 
objects which exemplify some properties associated with a specific kind will also 
exemplify other properties associated with the kind.  
Epstein points out that, for natural kinds, it is typically assumed that this function is 
carried out by laws of nature. In a footnote, he qualifies this claim by acknowledging that 
there are other candidates for bringing about this stable association of properties (Epstein 
2015, 81n5). Although Epstein does not mention it in this context, another such 
prominent “glue” candidate for natural kinds are homeostatic mechanisms (Boyd 1991, 
1999; Millikan 1999). According to Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account, 
                                                 
7 I will later argue that this conception of (natural) kinds is overly simplistic (see Chapter 4). However, we can ignore these 
problems for now as they are not relevant to the discussion at hand. 
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natural kinds are constituted by clusters of properties which are reliable coninstantited in 
virtue of specific causal factors or mechanisms.  
Although the passage above only mentions natural laws as potential anchors for natural 
kinds, in a different paper Epstein discusses homeostatic mechanism as potential anchors 
for social kinds (Epstein 2014). The aim of this paper, according to Epstein, is to show 
that social kinds can have diverse anchors (or “glues”) holding them together. To illustrate 
this, Epstein discusses the (allegedly) social kinds italic, Aldino typeface, and pocketbook. 
According to Epstein, all three have slightly different types of grounds. While grounds 
for italic are purely qualitative (to be italic, a font merely needs to have the qualitative 
feature of being written in a slanted style), the grounds for Aldino typeface are qualitative 
and “historical” and the grounds for pocketbook are qualitative and “functional”. In order 
to be Aldino typeface, a font not only needs to have certain qualitative features, it also needs 
to be a copy of Griffo’s original punches of Aldino typeface. And in order to be a 
pocketbook, an object not only needs to have the qualitative features of a book, it also needs 
to have the function of being easily carried around in a pocket. 
For the purpose at hand, we can put aside the question whether Epstein has accurately 
identified the grounds for these kinds. What is important is his discussion of anchoring 
that follows. According to Epstein, the reason Aldino typeface, pocketbook and italic have 
such different types of grounds lies with the fact that they have different types of anchors. 
Epstein’s reasoning here is somewhat fragmentary, but he seems to suggest that Aldino 
typeface is anchored as a historical kind in the sense developed by Ruth Millikan (Millikan 
1984, 1999). Aldino typeface’s “dominant glue”, Epstein suggests, is “the functional 
explanation for the proliferation of that particular family” (Epstein 2014, 14). In other 
words, what anchors Aldino typeface is a mechanism of (evolutionary) function – the reason 
that the properties of Aldino typeface are reliable associated is because the properties 
perform a specific function that allows them to be propagated through copying. Since, on 
this view, the copying of instances with specific qualitative properties is tightly linked with 
family lineages, Epstein concludes that the grounds for Aldino typeface involve family 
membership.  
The anchors for pocketbook, Epstein suggests, are slightly different. As with Aldino 
typeface, Epstein suggests that the reason that entities with the qualitative characteristics of 
pocketbooks exist is because they perform a certain function. However, unlike with Aldino 
typface, having the relevant pocketbook properties is not intricately linked to a specific 
lineage. Instead, pocketbooks can belong to a number of different copying lineages. As a 
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result, the grounds for pocketbook involve performing a specific function, but not 
membership in a specific lineage.  
In both cases, Epstein’s account of anchoring invokes the idea that specific property 
clusters are reliably coinstantiated because the properties fulfil specific functions. The 
parallels with HPC accounts of biological species are obvious and intentional. In a 
footnote, Epstein acknowledges that his image of “gluing together” a kind is taken from 
an exchange between Ruth Millikan and Richard Boyd on precisely this topic (Boyd 1999, 
Millikan 1999). More than that, he suggests that the theories discussed in this exchange 
“are, in part, theories of anchoring schemas“ (Epstein 2014, 11n16).  
We need to be careful when interpreting this claim. At first glance, it may seem that 
Epstein is suggesting that “gluing” is the same as anchoring. This would directly 
contradicts Epstein’s core assumption that anchoring is non-causal relation. As explained 
above, the HPC account is an account of causal mechanisms. Homeostatic mechanisms 
“glue together” a kind in the sense that they cause properties to be reliably coinstantiated. 
In other words, “gluing” holds together the properties that constitute a kind. This is not 
the same as anchoring. Anchoring, according to Epstein, is a relation that holds together 
a social kind (or type of social fact) and its grounds. What Epsteins seems to be saying, 
then, is that “glues” are anchors. Social kinds are anchored by the existence of specific 
“glues”, that is, homeostatic mechanisms that cause properties to be reliably 
coinstantiated. The existence of these mechanisms is what makes it the case that a social 
kind k has certain grounds G. 
2.4.2 Problems with anchoring as “gluing” 
Epstein’s discussion of anchoring is odd for several reason. Firstly, there is the fact that 
all three examples are artefact kinds. As mentioned at the outset, artefact kinds are 
somewhat peculiar examples of social kinds in that they (i) depend on human social life 
primarily in a causal rather than a constitutive sense, hence do not share what some regard 
the core ontological feature of social kinds; and that they (ii) are not generally the sort of 
kinds that play a central role in social scientific inquiry, hence are not the most obvious 
analogues of natural kinds. I suggest that we put this issue aside for now. If Epstein’s 
account proves to be promising with respect to artefact kinds, we can still worry about 
whether it can be generalised to more paradigmatic social kinds. Secondly, there is the 
question to what extent evolutionary functions can be attributed to cultural artefacts. 
There is a lively debate on this topic that I will not attempt to resolve here (Lewontin & 
Faccia 1999; Kronfelder 2010, Lewens 2015, Mesoudi et al. 2006). Instead, I will give 
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Epstein the benefit of the doubt and assume that the models can be applied to the 
examples he uses.  
Still, there remain further concerns which we cannot put aside so easily. These 
concerns are familiar from the discussion of hybrid kind examples above, and 
symptomatic of a more general problem with Epstein’s account. In the section on hybrid 
kinds, we saw that interpreting frame principles like “being a bill printed by the BEP 
grounds being a dollar” as referring to the base kinds of dollar implies that the frame 
principles state stipulative definitions. Now, we can see that this phenomenon is not an 
anomaly that occurs when we apply the grounding-anchoring model to hybrid kinds, but 
affects non-hybrid kinds as well. Epstein’s presentation of non-hybrid examples suggests 
that the frame principles have the form “Having property cluster G grounds being a 
member of kind k”. Depending on the example, property cluster G is either family 
membership plus qualitative properties, function plus qualitative properties, or merely 
qualitative properties. But by saying this, Epstein effectively suggests that the grounds for 
kind k are simply k’s instantiation conditions (see Epstein 2014, 3n4). As a result, applying 
the grounding-anchoring model runs into similar problems to the one’s discussed in the 
context of base kinds. The resulting frame principles describe definitions, and whether or 
not these involve genuine grounding relations depends on one’s conception of facts. 
But the problems go further still. Even if we admit that frame principles of the form 
“having property cluster G grounds being a member of k” describe a genuine grounding 
relation, it would not be the type of grounding relation that could possibly be anchored 
by homeostatic mechanisms. Anchors, as is clear from Epstein’s characterisation, are 
supposed to be facts which make it the case that a specific type of fact is grounded in a 
specific other type of fact. With respect to kinds, as argued above, this is translated into 
anchors being the facts that make it the case that a kind k has specific instantiation 
conditions G (rather than G*). In other words, anchors are what makes it the case that 
having property cluster G (rather than G*) grounds being a member of kind k. But the 
existence of a homeostatic mechanism simply does not make it the case that having 
property cluster G, rather than G*, grounds being a member of kind k. If anything, the 
existence of a homeostatic mechanism makes it the case that having property cluster G 
grounds being a member of a kind as opposed to an ad hoc collection of properties. If the 
homeostatic mechanisms were to disappear, the grounds for k would not suddenly change 
from G to G*. Instead, k would still be characterised (or grounded) by the very same 
properties, but it would cease to be a kind. The reason for that is that there is nothing in 
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the world that guarantees that properties G will be reliably coinstantiated. As a result, k 
loses its ability to facilitate inductive inferences. It enters the humble ranks of ad hoc 
collection of properties instead. In other words, Epstein’s reference to homeostatic 
mechanisms fails to elucidate his notion of anchoring. We are still left with an abstract, 
obscure concept that does not advance our understanding of social ontology. 
2.5 ANCHOR AWEIGH – AN ERROR THEORY OF THE 
GROUNDING-ANCHORING MODEL 
The discussion above showed that the problems with Epstein’s grounding-anchoring 
model are not limited to social kinds, but affect all kinds – natural and social, hybrid and 
non-hybrid – alike. How could Epstein’s account go so wrong? The purpose of this 
question is not to deride Epstein’s attempt at providing unified social ontology. As the 
discussion of the critical replies to Epstein’s model suggest, he is in excellent company. 
The fundamental flaws that underlie his grounding-anchoring model were either 
unnoticed or implicitly or explicitly shared by his critics. The reason for this, I believe, is 
that the problems with Epstein’s model reflect a widespread misunderstanding of social 
kinds which leads philosophers to incorrectly conceptualise hybrid social kinds and to fail 
to distinguish hybrid from non-hybrid kinds. In the remainder of the paper, I will sketch 
an “error theory” for the grounding-anchoring model which is based on this observation. 
To see just how easily the mistakes are made that trouble both Epstein and his critics, 
imagine starting to explore the topic of social ontology with an example of a non-hybrid 
social kind, such as inflation. Inflation is the process by which the general prices for goods 
and services are rising, and, conversely, by which the purchasing power of a currency is 
falling. In other words, the instantiation conditions for inflation are “being a process by 
which the general prices for goods and services are rising, and, conversely, by which the 
purchasing power of a currency is falling”. Now, consider the question of anchors, i.e. ask 
yourself “what could possibly make it the case that these are the instantiation conditions 
for inflation?” If your linguistic intuitions are the same as mine, this question looks 
straightforwardly odd. Giving it some further thought, you might feel inclined to say the 
question is pointless because “inflation” is simply defined as the process by which the 
general prices for goods and services are rising, and, conversely, by which the purchasing 
power of a currency is falling 
However, when you begin your exploration with the example of money (or dollar), which 
for historic reasons has become the paradigmatic example of a social kind, the situation 
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looks very different, because it also happens to be a paradigmatic hybrid kind. The 
associated statement that “bills printed by the BEP are money” is not obviously a 
definition or an identity statement. After all, in other societies, it is not bills printed by the 
BEP that are money, but rather bills printed by the Central Bank, or shells, or cigarettes. 
As a result, it suddenly seems to make perfect sense to ask “what makes it the case that 
these are the instantiation conditions for money?” In fact, Searle himself suggested that 
there must be a non-causal, metaphysical relation connecting these different types of facts 
(Searle 1995, 42). We know now that this impression results from the hybrid structure of 
the kind money, meaning that the term “money” is ambiguous and may refer both to the 
base kind (bills printed by the BEP) and to the status kind of money (a means of 
exchange). The problem underlying Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model, as well as his 
critics’ responses, is that they are informed by linguistic intuitions about statements whose 
ambiguity has hitherto gone unnoticed in social ontology.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I argued that Epstein’s grounding-anchoring model of social ontology is 
conceptually flawed in a way that extant criticism of his model has failed to pin down. 
The reason for this is that paradigm examples of Epstein’s account are hybrid kinds which 
beget terminological ambiguity. Disambiguation of the relevant kind terms suggested that 
Epstein’s examples of grounding and anchoring are not what he makes them out to be. 
Alleged grounding relations turned out to be either definitions or relations of status 
conferral. Alleged anchoring relations are neither grounding relations nor non-causal 
metaphysical relations distinct from grounding. Instead, anchoring can either be 
understood as a relation of how a definition has been put in place, or as a causal relation 
whereby anchors make it the case that a certain status is conferred onto objects of a base 
kind. As a result, I argued, the grounding-anchoring model is not applicable to the hybrid 
kind cases that are used in the discussion. 
I then showed that the problems with the grounding-anchoring model are not limited 
to hybrid kinds. The frame principle for non-hybrid kinds, too, describe definitions rather 
than typical examples of grounding relations. Furthermore, the analysis of anchors as 
homeostatic mechanism that Epstein offered in the context of non-hybrid kinds is 
implausible. While homeostatic mechanisms may stabilise property clusters in a way that 
makes them kinds rather than ad hoc collections of things, anchors are not responsible 
for a kind having specific instantiation conditions. In the penultimate section, I suggested 
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that the reason Epstein’s model faces so many difficulties is because the central idea of 
anchoring is incoherent. Unless it plays on the ambiguity of a hybrid kind term, the 
question why a kind k has instantiation conditions G is not an interesting or meaningful 
question in the first place. Having clarified the ontological structure of hybrid kinds, as 
well as the confusion it has caused in central debates on the nature of social ontology, it 
is time to turn to a different set of questions. In the next chapter, I consider what the 





VALUES IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
The discussion on the role of moral or political values in social ontology is a polarised 
one. Some people insist social ontology has no room for these values. If the social sciences 
want to make sense of the social world, the kind concepts that they use should simply 
reflect the way the world is. Moral and political values ought to be kept out of the equation. 
Others object that moral and political values have a legitimate, maybe even necessary, say 
in how we conceptualise the social world. A prominent advocate of the later position is 
Sally Haslanger. Haslanger proposes doing social ontology in a normative (or, in her 
words, “ameliorative”) manner. According to this idea, we should define social concepts 
in a way that best suits our legitimate purposes, which may be a question of explicitly 
moral or political considerations.  
Haslanger’s proposal has been heavily criticised by Francesco Guala. According to 
Guala, the question how we should understand social kinds cannot be left “up to us” and 
the outcome of our potentially controversial moral and political disputes. Instead, he 
insists that social kinds, just like natural kinds, are determined by the nature of the external 
world, and our kind concepts ought to reflect that. Interestingly, both Haslanger and 
Guala rely on semantic externalism to defend their position. While Haslanger uses 
semantic externalist arguments to support the kind concepts she proposes, Guala argues 
that semantic externalism is incompatible with a normative approach to social ontology 
and points us towards his favoured form of realism about social kinds instead.  
I point out that both Haslanger and Guala fail to appreciate the controversial status of 
semantic externalism even with regard to natural kinds. I argue that recent criticisms of 
semantic externalism lend support to the idea that moral or political values play an 
important role in scientific ontology. Values of this sort, so the idea goes, are needed to 
determine which set of properties associated with a paradigm sample is worth our 
scientific attention in the first place. In other words, moral or political values may play a 
legitimate indirect role in social ontology. A closer look at Haslanger’s examples, however, 
suggests that she advocates using such values in a direct rather than indirect manner. These 
cases would require a different type of justification to the one provided by critics of 
semantic externalism.  
In the following, I first introduce in more detail Haslanger’s normative approach to 
social ontology. I then recapitulate Guala’s objection to Haslanger’s proposal, before 
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turning to recent criticisms of the semantic externalist position that influences both sides’ 
arguments. I argue that these criticisms give traction to the idea that moral or political 
values play an indirect role in scientific ontology. I then point out that several of 
Haslanger’s examples advocate a direct rather than indirect role of these values. Using the 
hybrid model of social kinds developed in Chapter 1, I clarify how exactly the cases differ, 
and explore how the direct influence of moral and political values could be justified. 
3.1 HASLANGER’S ARGUMENT FOR VALUES IN SOCIAL 
ONTOLOGY 
According to Haslanger, moral and political values should play an essential role in what 
social kinds we recognise in the first place. She proposes that we need to stop arguing 
about what certain kinds “really” are, and instead focus on what concepts we need to 
further our legitimate goals. For Haslanger, this means that moral and political 
considerations have a legitimate role to play in how we conceptualise the social world. 
Haslanger’s examples range from race and gender to parent and marriage. Since race and 
gender are Haslanger’s central case studies, we begin by focussing on these.  
According to Haslanger, our legitimate purposes with regard to race and gender are to 
reveal and fight sexual and racial inequality. Terms such as “women” or “black” should 
be understood in such a way that best allows us to address these inequalities. These 
considerations motivate Haslanger’s proposal of hierarchical race and gender concepts. 
The concepts define women, men and racialized groups in terms of being systematically 
subordinated or privileged on the basis of certain bodily features:1  
 
S is a woman iff S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, 
legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction. 
S is a man iff S is systematically privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, 
social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily 
features presumed to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction.  
(Haslanger 2012, 230, original emphasis) 
 
A group is racialized iff its members are socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along 
some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and the group is “marked” as a target 
for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of 
ancestral links to a certain geographical region.  
(Haslanger 2012, 236, original emphasis) 
 
                                                 
1 Haslanger refines these concepts later on. For the sake of simplicity, I will stick to her preliminary definitions. “Iff” stands 
for “if and only if”. 
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Haslanger acknowledges that race and gender terms may have different meanings in 
different contexts, and that the concepts above might not be suitable in certain contexts, 
such as the biology lab. Nonetheless, she suggests that these concepts have a claim to 
being the dominant understanding of race and gender both in the public domain and in 
the social sciences (Haslanger 2014, 111, 113). This implies that, on her view, our 
understanding of social kinds such as race or gender may reasonably depend on our moral 
and political values in social scientific contexts. 
Interestingly, in addition to the normative argument above, Haslanger also provides a 
semantic externalist argument for her concepts. The semantic externalist argument 
suggests that there might be no need to rely on moral and political values when defending 
her concepts of race and gender. Instead, it states that these concepts make explicit what 
our race and gender terms have been referring to all along.  
Before we consider this argument in more detail, it is useful to sharpen our 
understanding of semantic externalism. Semantic externalism states that the meaning of a 
term can be determined by facts “outside” the speaker, especially facts other than the 
speaker’s beliefs about what the term means. It is a popular position in natural kind 
semantics. It has been argued that the meaning of natural kind terms is fixed not by 
speakers’ intentions, but rather by the common “essence” of paradigm samples. Speakers 
point to these paradigm samples in an original “baptism event” (Putnam 1975, Kripke 
1980). The original paradigm samples are often called “ostension”. A common example 
for externalist natural kind semantics is the term “water”. According to the semantic 
externalists, although competent speakers might simply think of water as watery stuff 
(colourless, odourless fluid that fills rivers and lakes, etc.), “water” really refers to H2O. 
This, so the argument continues, is because H2O is the common essence of objects in the 
ostension. 
According to Haslanger, semantic externalism is not confined to natural kinds with 
internal essences2, but can be applied whenever the ostension instantiates an “objective 
type”. Objective types are groupings of entities that have a “degree of unity among its 
members beyond a random or gerrymandered set” (Haslanger 2012, 374). Haslanger 
suggests that gender and racial categories are not unified by biological essences, but still 
instantiate objective types. More precisely, she thinks individuals in these groupings share 
common features beyond the superficial morphological characteristics on the basis of 
                                                 
2 There is an ongoing debate in what sense natural kinds have essences, and whether externalism in natural kind semantics 
requires internal essences (e.g. Boyd 1989; Häggqvist & Wikforss 2017). 
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which they have been classified as women or white. Categories like women, black or white are 
objective types in a social (rather than biological) sense. According to Haslanger, they are 
unified by the social characteristics of being subordinated or privileged along some 
dimension and by being targeted for such treatment based on one’s (observed or 
imagined) physiological characteristics. In the case of the term “black” for instance, our 
linguistic intuitions might suggest that we refer to a biological kind. According to 
Haslanger, however, we are justified in saying that the term really is referring to is a social 
group that is systematically subordinated and marked for this treatment by physical 
characteristics that are taken as indicators of specific continental ancestry (Haslanger 
2012, 236). Haslanger suggests that a similar argument can be made in the case of gender 
terms like “men” and “women” (Haslanger 2012, 230).  
3.2 GUALA’S CRITICISM 
According to Guala, there is an imminent tension between Haslanger’s commitment to 
doing social ontology in a normative manner on the one hand, and her commitment to 
realism (as evidenced in the semantic externalist argument) on the other. He argues that, 
as social scientists, we want our classifications to reflect the underlying structure and 
mechanisms that sustain the phenomena we are investigating. The nature of a social kind, 
he suggests, cannot be at the same time determined by our norms and values and by the 
way the world is (Guala 2016, 190). Hence, the question what social kinds are is not “up 
to us” and our values. Instead, it is “constrained by properties and mechanisms that are 
not fully under our control, because they are determined by the external world” (Guala 
2016, 190). Regarding the example of marriage, for instance, Guala claims that for a realist, 
“the meaning of marriage is determined by the way the world is, and the language that we 
use must be true to the way in which the (social) world is organized” (Guala 2016, 184-
5).  
Note that, in principle, Guala’s objection is not limited to moral and political values. 
His assumption that the nature of social kinds is determined solely by the social world 
could equally be used to exclude the influence of so-called epistemic values. In the debate 
on values in science, epistemic values, such as accuracy, simplicity or explanatory, are 
often distinguished from moral or political values, the so-called “non-epistemic values” 
(McMullin 1982; Longino 1990). The idea behind this distinction is that, unlike non-
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epistemic values, epistemic values are conducive to better scientific understanding.3 For 
that reason, the influence of epistemic values on scientific reasoning and scientific 
ontology is much more widely accepted than the influence of non-epistemic values.4  Since 
the influence of moral and political values is more controversial, and since Haslanger’s 
and Guala’s arguments are mainly concerned with them, the focus of this chapter will be 
on the role of non-epistemic values in social ontology. 
Guala points out that saying that non-epistemic values should not influence social 
kinds is not to say that non-epistemic values have no justified influence at all. Instead, he 
suggests that normative and realist concerns each play a legitimate role in a different 
context. There is space for moral and political discussions about which specific form of a 
social kind we want to adopt in society. For instance, we should consider moral and 
political values when deciding which sorts of marriage we want to codify in the law. 
Nevertheless, Guala insists that questions about the nature of social kinds – such as “what 
is marriage?” – ought to be left to social scientists to be answered purely according to 
their best theories and evidence. 
3.2.1 A tension between normative and realist concerns? 
To appreciate Guala’s critical reply to Haslanger, it is important to clarify how Haslanger 
understands the relationship between her normative argument and her semantic 
externalist argument. When reading Haslanger’s case studies on race and gender, it seems 
that the normative argument and the semantic externalist argument are not in tension at 
all. But this is not for the reason Guala suggests, that is, not because Haslanger suggests 
using normative and semantic externalist considerations in different contexts. Haslanger 
does not believe that the semantic externalist argument is about the ontology of race and 
gender while the normative argument is about which concept of race and gender to adopt 
in our social practices.5 Instead, Haslanger suggests that there is reason to believe that 
normative and semantic externalist arguments about race and gender point us in the same 
direction. Hierarchical concepts of race and gender are not merely the concepts that we 
should be using to identify and address sexist and racist oppression, they may also be the 
concepts that a semantic externalist analysis tells us we have been using all along.  
                                                 
3 Note that some philosophers suggest rejecting the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values altogether 
(Rooney 1992). Nevertheless, the distinction is still commonly used today.   
4 For an “arch-realist” position that seems to reject any kind of value-influence, see Lewis (1999). 
5 To be clear, Haslanger does believe that these two questions can and should be distinguished. But making this distinction 
is not what resolves the potential tension between normative and semantic externalist considerations in her proposal for 
race and gender concepts. 
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For Haslanger, this is no coincidence. She argues that it may be the “job” of racist and 
sexist ideology to mislead us by suggesting that categories can simply be found in nature 
when we have actually played an important role in creating them (Haslanger 2012, 366, 
383). In such cases, the primary normative demand on our conceptual apparatus may be 
to undo this masquerade and bring to light what our terms are actually referring to. This, 
she seems to suggest, is why the normative and the semantic externalist argument are 
likely to provide the same result in cases like race and gender. 
Haslanger’s approach to solving the potential tension between normative and semantic 
externalist considerations is not going to appease Guala. Although Haslanger suggests 
that normative and semantic externalist considerations coincide in the examples of race 
and gender, she offers no reason to think that the two can never come apart. Hence, even 
if we accept Haslanger’s reasoning up to this point, there remains an obvious question: 
what should we do if the normative and the semantic externalist arguments point us to 
different directions?  
For Haslanger, normative considerations have priority over realist ones. While she 
suggests that the prospects of making a semantic externalist argument in favour of her 
gender and race concepts are promising, she does not attempt to make these arguments 
in detail herself. Instead, she states that the primary aim of introducing the semantic 
externalist argument is to tackle a common objection to her race and gender concepts – 
the objection that these concepts are implausible because they run counter to our 
intuitions. According to Haslanger, the semantic externalist argument demonstrates that 
counter-intuitiveness is no reason for rejecting her concepts. Although the concepts are 
revisionary for conflicting with how ordinary speakers understand terms like “women” 
and “black”, they may be non-revisionary in the sense that they make explicit what social 
kinds our race and gender terms have been tracking all along. In other words, Haslanger 
is using semantic externalist considerations mainly opportunistically to further her 
proposal for normative social ontology.6 
Guala, by contrast, clearly prioritises realist concerns. He fears that letting non-
epistemic values determine our understanding of the social world puts questions of social 
ontology at the mercy of potentially controversial moral and political debates. Guala 
suggests that the debate on marriage is a case in point. Gay rights activists and anti-gay 
                                                 
6 Note that this is primarily the case for Haslanger earlier arguments (for instance Haslanger 2012, Chpt. 7). In later work, 
Haslanger is much more adamant that her race and gender concepts successfully explicate the meaning of race and gender 
terms on a semantic externalist account (Haslanger 2012, Chpt. 16). Here, it is no longer quite so clear whether Haslanger’s 
thinks normative concerns should have the final say in social ontology. 
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religious conservatives both put forward definitions of marriage which are based on their 
conflicting moral and political values. If we commit to normative social ontology, it looks 
like we cannot determine what marriage is without first settling a normative dispute about 
the moral status of homosexuality.  
According to Guala, this is an unhappy situation for social scientists – there are no 
signs that the normative dispute will resolve any time soon, and social scientists are neither 
experts nor authorities on questions of morality. Only a realist social ontology can save 
us from these troubles. We want social scientists, on the basis of their best theory and 
evidence, to give a single best answer to questions like “what is marriage?” just like natural 
scientists are able to provide a single best answer to the question “what is water?” (Guala 
2016, 200).7 For that, Guala insists, we need to put normative considerations to one side 
and focus exclusively on the semantic externalist project of finding out which “real” kinds 
our social kind terms are referring to (Guala 2016, 192). Doing social ontology in this 
sense, he suggests, “saves the realist principle that what marriage is, is primarily a scientific 
issue”, and “opens the space for a descriptivist, scientific approach to the issue of same-
sex marriage” (Guala 2016, 199). In other words, Guala argues that pursuing a strictly 
realist social ontology which is independent of moral controversies would allow us to 
determine the nature of marriage independently of any moral or political commitments. 
The discussion suggests that there is an important connection between endorsing 
semantic externalism about social kind terms on the one hand, and arguing that non-
epistemic values have no place in defining social kinds on the other. Guala believes that 
fully embracing a realist, semantic externalist position on social ontology means 
embracing the idea that the meaning of social kind terms is fixed unambiguously. In 
Guala’s view, to say that there is only one correct or best realist understanding of social 
kind terms thus creates a stable bulwark against the influence of social or political values. 
But the argument has a weak point. While discussing the prospects and implications of 
extending semantic externalism from the realm of the “natural” to the realm of the 
“social”, Haslanger and Guala both have lost sight of a crucial fact: even within its 
traditional remit of the “natural”, semantic externalism is far from uncontested. This point 
is all the more important because the discussion exemplifies a tension that arises not only 
in the social sciences more generally, but also in other disciplines, such as psychiatry (see, 
for instance, Geuss 1981; Cooper 2007). In the following, I argue that recent criticism of 
                                                 




semantic externalism about natural kind terms undermines Guala’s argument for value-
free social ontology.8 
3.2.2 Criticism of semantic externalism about natural kind terms 
To understand recent criticism of semantic externalism, it is useful to distinguish between 
a semantic and an ontological claim. The semantic claim states that the reference of a 
natural kind term is fixed by factors which are external to the minds of speakers, namely 
by the underlying “nature” or “essence” of the objects that the term has been 
paradigmatically applied to. The ontological claim, which is not always made explicit, 
states that the nature of this underlying “nature” is determined unambiguously by 
reference to a paradigm sample. Sören Häggqvist and Asa Wikforss argue that spelling 
out this ontological claim is important. It allows us to recognise that the success of 
semantic externalism heavily depends on a monist assumption about the ontology of 
natural kinds (Häggqvist & Wikforss 2017).  
According to Häggqvist and Wikforss, the “guiding idea” of semantic externalism 
about natural kinds is that “once a sample (or set of samples) is fixed, the world 
accomplishes all the carving needed to determine extensions irrespective of human 
interests” (Häggqvist & Wikforss 2017, 17). In other words, the semantic externalist 
thinks there is one single correct or privileged way of distinguishing the objects in the 
world into water and non-water, marriage and non-marriage, etc. Furthermore, the 
semantic externalist assumes that this distinction is determined by a specific defining 
property that the objects in the paradigm sample share. 
The first major objection to the premise that ostension to paradigm samples 
determines the referent of natural kind terms is the so-called “qua problem” (Devitt & 
Sterelny 1987). The qua problem states that ostension to a paradigm sample fails to fix 
the referent of a natural kind term, because the individuals in the sample will typically 
instantiate a number of kinds. For example, if we try to establish the kind term “giraffe” 
by simply pointing to a group of giraffes, the term could pick out any of a number of 
kinds or types instantiated by those individuals, such as animal, mammal, herbivore, spotted 
thing, etc.  
The qua problem has pushed many people away from a purely externalist account 
toward a hybrid theory about the semantics of natural kind terms (e.g. Devitt and Sterelny 
                                                 
8 There are further problems with Guala’s proposal (see, for instance, Clarke 2017; Epstein 2016). These problems are not 
addressed here because they concern Guala’s specific proposal, rather than his general defence of doing social ontology in 
a “strictly realist” manner. It is possible to endorse Guala’s defence of a value-free realist understanding of social ontology 
without committing to his specific game theoretic account of social kinds.   
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1999; Stanford and Kitcher 2000).9 On such a hybrid theory, the reference of natural kind 
terms is not solely determined by the nature of the paradigm samples, but partly depends 
on what descriptions speakers who baptise natural kind terms associate with these terms. 
The descriptions need to be specific enough to disambiguate the reference of the kind 
term. At the same time, they need to be general enough to allow for the possibility that 
speakers can be mistaken about the nature of the kind. After all, even proponents of 
hybrid theories want to be able to say that scientists discovered the nature of the stuff we 
have been referring to as “water”, not that they have simply changed the meaning of our 
term. A possible candidate for a speaker description striking this balance is the idea of a 
causally specified placeholder (Devitt & Sterelny 1999, Stanford & Kitcher 2000). Roughly 
speaking, this view suggests that natural kind terms were intended to refer to whatever 
underlying physical or structural property is causally responsible for the observed 
properties of the individuals in the paradigm sample.  
Without going into the details of specific causal placeholder proposals, we can note 
that there is reason to doubt that this response is available to Guala. The reason for this 
is that many kinds that play a central explanatory role in the special sciences cannot be 
identified with an underlying physical or structural property that all and only members of 
the kind possess (Dupre 1981, 1993; Millikan 1999, Boyd 1991). Instead, it has been 
argued that such kinds are better understood as homeostatic property clusters (HPC) 
(Boyd 1989, 1991, 1999). HPCs are constituted by a cluster of properties that are reliably 
but not perfectly co-instantiated, together with the causal factors or mechanisms which 
make it the case that the properties are reliably co-instantiated. As a result, HPC kinds 
generally cannot be identified in terms of a single underlying property. For HPC kinds, 
there is no straightforward way of telling how ostension to a paradigm sample could fix a 
term’s meaning on a causal placeholder account. 
Guala believes that social kinds are best understood as HPC kinds. On his realist 
account, social kinds are individuated in terms of their function, where the function 
consists in solving coordination problems. Guala argues that marriage, for example, 
typically solves several different coordination problems at once, such as procreation, child 
rearing and socialising, economic cooperation, and emotional support (Guala 2016, 198). 
At the same time, he observes that no single subset of these problems can be necessary 
and sufficient for marriage, because historical and anthropological evidence shows that 
humans have used contractual relationships to solve a variety of different combinations 
                                                 
9 Hybrid theories of natural kind semantics are not be confused with the hybrid model of social kinds.  
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of these coordination problems. Guala therefore concludes that marriage “does not have 
a single essential function” and is better understood in terms of a cluster of coordination 
problems (Guala 2016, 199). In other words, Guala assumes that the social sciences need 
an HPC account of social kinds.  
In order to support his strictly realist account of social ontology, then, Guala has to 
provide an account of how reference-fixing works for HPC kinds. But it is difficult to see 
how this could be done. HPC kinds, as argued above, cannot generally be identified with 
a set of shared observable properties. Instead, the motivating idea behind the HPC 
account is that, on a superficial level, many kinds featuring in the special sciences are 
“unified” merely by a form of family-resemblance of their members. Now, if certain 
objects that we find in the world are merely characterized by family-resemblance, it would 
not be possible to pick out a kind by pointing to a sample of them. Any attempt at drawing 
a kind boundary across the patterns of gradual change would be a matter of convention 
rather than something that reflects the structure of the world. Proponents of HPC, 
however, believe that there is an important difference between the patterns that 
characterise HPC kinds and mere family-resemblance. The idea is that HPC kinds are 
constituted by individuals that resemble each other due to the same sort of underlying 
mechanisms. In other words, HPC kinds are not individuated by specific sets of 
properties, but by clusters of properties that are reliably associated due to specific causal 
mechanisms.  
Note that this qualification does not give us, and is not supposed to give us, sharp kind 
boundaries. The clustering produced by the mechanisms is still imperfect, hence might 
result in individuals that cannot clearly be assigned to one kind or another. But this is not 
a problem for semantic externalism, which can allow for the fact that natural kind terms 
might be vague. What semantic externalism needs, however, is the ability to identify some 
kind of boundary (sharp or not) in a non-arbitrary place. Otherwise, the groupings picked 
out as HPC kinds would not be groupings that reflect actual structures in the world at all, 
but rather a matter of convention. If that were the case, speakers’ attempts at fixing the 
reference of natural kind terms by pointing to samples of these groupings would obviously 
fail. The hope of proponents of the HPC account, then, is that the mechanisms and causal 
factors that bring about the reliable clustering of properties can do this work for us. These 
mechanisms, so the idea, tell us where in a world of gradual change we can find natural 
boundaries, and they fix the reference of natural kind terms by attaching the terms to 
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those “underlying” causal factors and mechanisms that produce the reliable clustering of 
properties.  
Unfortunately, people have expressed serious doubts on whether underlying mechanisms 
can do what proponents of HPC accounts are asking of them (Craver 2009, Häggqvist & 
Wikforss 2017). According to Carl Craver, the questions which mechanisms define a kind, 
when two mechanisms are mechanisms of the same type, and where one particular 
mechanism ends and another begins all cannot be answered without reference to 
conventional factors, such as specific human interests and purposes (Craver 2009). In 
other words, the problem of identifying natural boundaries, which reference to 
homeostatic mechanisms was supposed to solve at the level of clustering properties, 
reoccurs at the level of homeostatic mechanisms. The upshot is that we fail to individuate 
HPC kinds on the basis of specific homeostatic mechanisms, just as we failed to 
individuate them on the basis of specific properties. 
According to Häggqvist and Wikforss, Craver’s point has crucial implications for 
natural kind semantics – it makes semantic externalism about HPC kinds untenable 
(Häggqvist & Wikforss 2017). They argue that Craver’s objection implies that it is not 
possible to point to an underlying mechanism that causally unifies the objects in the 
paradigm sample. As a result, ostension to such a sample does not fix the reference of 
natural kind terms unambiguously. Instead, we need to rely on further speaker-internal 
considerations to determine the reference of natural kind terms, such as their “overall 
function […] in ordinary classification, as well as how kinds are used and talked about in 
the sciences” (Häggqvist & Wikforss 2017, 18). This suggests that, at least for HPC kinds, 
there are serious doubts about the adequacy of semantic externalism. 
3.3 SCIENTIFIC ONTOLOGY WITHOUT SEMANTIC 
EXTERNALISM 
It is time to recapitulate the main points from the discussion above. We established that 
Guala’s “realist” objection to normative social ontology hinges on the semantic externalist 
assumption that there is one correct or privileged meaning of (social or natural) kind 
terms. This privileged meaning, so the semantic externalist story goes, has been 
established in a baptism event by ostension to paradigm samples. We then observed that 
establishing the meaning of kind terms cannot be quite so straightforward because 
individuals in the paradigm sample typically instantiate a variety of kinds. This made 
semantic externalists gravitate toward causal placeholder accounts. According to these 
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hybrid accounts of natural kind semantics, the meaning of a natural kind term is partly 
determined by speakers’ intentions to pick out whatever causal features explain the shared 
observed properties of individuals in the paradigm sample.  
Without going into the general problems associated with causal placeholder accounts, 
we noted that this strategy is unlikely to be available to someone who, like Guala, defends 
semantic externalism in the context of an HPC account of natural/social kinds. This is 
because the HPC account owes an explanation as to how the underlying mechanisms 
“carve nature at its joints”. It is not clear how these mechanisms themselves can be typed 
and individuated without reference to conventional elements such as explanatory 
interests. Without such an explanation, semantic externalism about HPC kind terms 
cannot avoid collapsing into a conventionalist account, according to which the meaning 
and extension of kind terms is at least partly determined by our goals and interests.  
Once Guala is forced to admit that the meaning of social kind terms inevitably depends 
on explanatory interests and purposes, it becomes much harder to insist that non-
epistemic values must be kept out of the process. This is because non-epistemic values 
often legitimately shape our explanatory interests and purposes. I will say more on this 
below. Of course, Guala could still insist that the true meaning of social kind terms is 
fixed by whatever explanatory purposes or interests featured in the baptism event. There 
is merit in this position, as we will see further below. Once the meaning of a social (or 
natural) kind term has been determined in the light of specific explanatory aims or 
interests, there is good reason to argue that we cannot simply change the term’s meaning 
in the light of different aims and interests. Yet, by admitting that the meaning of these 
terms are essentially a matter of which interests “were there first”, this response fails to 
save Guala’s realist commitment. The meaning of social kind terms can no longer be 
determined by the structure of the external world alone. 
3.3.1 Avoiding “anything goes” in grouping and labelling 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that there is a serious problem with 
Guala’s argument against normative social ontology. Guala attempts to extend semantic 
externalism from natural kinds to social kinds without recognising the unresolved 
challenges semantic externalism faces even with respect to natural kinds. In response, I 
suggest that we reject Guala’s argument and instead return to the worries that motivated 
it. Guala fears that, unless semantic externalism succeeds, we are left with an implausible 




To be a realist is precisely to believe that reference is determined by the world, if anything, 
and it is not “up to us […]”. According to the realist, […] the identity of any entity is robust 
to a limited range of manipulations only, so there are changes to [a social kind] that will 
necessarily turn it into something else. Just as the term “senator” cannot be stretched so far 
as to include Caligula’s horse, so there are arrangements that cannot be legitimately called 
“marriage,” regardless of what we want the latter to be.  
(Guala 2016, 190)  
 
In other words, Guala worries that once we reject a semantic externalist account and allow 
that the meaning of social kind terms can be influenced by our values and interests, we 
throw out of the window all worldly constraints on how to classify social entities. As a 
result, we risk ending up with a social ontology that looks entirely unfit for scientific 
purposes. 
This is quite a serious concern, but is it justified? To answer this question, it is useful 
to distinguish two worries in Guala’s characterisation. The first worry is that there must 
be some worldly constraints on what sort of entities can sensibly be grouped together. 
Guala suggests that we should be suspicious of a position which – assuming our interests 
dictate it – would allow for the British Show Pony Society, the German Parliament, and 
Victoria sponge cake to be grouped together as a single social kind. Call this the grouping 
worry.  
The second worry is slightly different. It concerns how far we can extend existing labels 
such as “marriage” to refer to different groupings, hence will be called the labelling worry. 
The labelling worry is independent of the grouping worry. For instance, even if it was 
legitimate to group together the British Show Pony Society, the German Parliament, and 
Victoria sponge cake, we might have good reasons for not wanting to call that grouping 
“marriage.”  
In light of this distinction, we can see that the motivating concern behind Guala’s 
defence of a strictly realist position is to avoid collapsing into an “anything goes” position 
with respect to both grouping and labelling. In the next section, I argue that Haslanger 
recognises and attempts to address both the grouping and the labelling worry. Finding 
her responses insufficient, I discuss how they can be modified so as to meet Guala’s 
concern.   
3.3.2 Responding to the grouping worry 
The grouping worry is addressed in Haslanger’s objective type constraint on social kinds 
discussed above (Haslanger 2012, 200-10). The objective type constraint says that, 
although social kinds need not be defined in terms of an underlying “essence”, they do 
have to track real distinctions in the world. In other words, the objective type constraint 
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demands that the entities that we group together in a social kind at the very least need to 
have certain properties in common.  
At first glance, the objective type constraint might look like a promising way of 
addressing the grouping worry. Objective types, so it seems, cannot be constituted by 
arbitrary conglomerations of entities. But a closer look suggests that there is a serious 
mismatch between Haslanger’s objective type constraint and the constraints that are 
commonly put on scientific ontology. The objective type constraint is at the same time 
weaker and stronger than widely accepted scientific constraints. Given that the motivation 
behind the grouping worry is the need to group entities in a way that is useful from a 
scientific point of view, this would mean that Haslanger’s objective type constraint is 
inadequate.  
Consider the problem in more detail. The objective type constraint is stronger than 
commonly accepted constraints on scientific ontology because it demands that there is a 
property that all and only entities in the social kind have in common. The constraint 
thereby falls behind the widely endorsed HPC account of scientific kinds. According to 
the HPC account, there need not be a single property that all and only members of the 
kind share. Instead, natural kinds are characterised by a cluster of reliably associated 
properties, none of which are individually necessary for kind membership. Moreover, 
proponents of the HPC account argue that HPC kinds are perfectly adequate for a 
number of scientific endeavours because they facilitate inductive inferences, 
generalisations, and predictions. By putting a constraint on social ontology that rules out 
HPC kinds, Haslanger’s constraint is unnecessarily restrictive. 
At the same time, the objective type constraint is weaker than widely accepted scientific 
constraints. This is because it allows for social kinds to be unified by a single, relational 
property. Social kinds which are unified only by a relational property could be highly 
arbitrary from a scientific point of view. Haslanger suggests that her objective type 
ontology would include sets such as “the set of objects currently on my kitchen counter” 
and “the set of numbers randomly selected by the New York State Lottery on January 1, 
2011” (Haslanger 2012, 202, 208). Since these two examples are no less arbitrary than the 
set of The British Show Pony Society, the German Parliament and Victoria sponge cake 
(unified, say, by the relational properties of entities I am currently thinking about), the 
constraint clearly fails to address the grouping worry in any sufficient way. It is unable to 
tell us how we can balance the idea that social and natural kinds are inevitably grouped in 
light of our values and interests with the requirement that the resulting groupings be 
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suitable for scientific inquiry. In the following section, I develop a response to the 
grouping worry by distinguishing direct from indirect influence of non-epistemic values. 
3.3.3 Direct and indirect influence of non-epistemic values 
Consider the following general model for an indirect role of non-epistemic values. 
According to this model, we can understand the process of choosing scientific ontology 
as a two-stage process. At the first stage, we filter out all those groupings that are not 
scientific kinds. “Scientific kinds” here can be understood, as broadly as possible, as 
groupings that are suitable for epistemic purposes. The scientific kinds requirement is 
meant to reflect the commitment that the kinds that feature in the sciences group entities 
in such a way as to allow us understand, explain, predict, or control certain aspects of the 
world. There is substantial disagreement about what sort of groupings are best suited for 
these purposes (Boyd 1989; Khalidi 2013; Magnus 2014; Slater 2015; Ereshefsky & 
Reydon 2015), but the scientific kinds requirement can be agnostic about which of these 
accounts is most adequate (maybe they all are for different scientific purposes). The point 
it makes is that, in order to qualify as a scientific kind, entities need to be grouped in a 
way that facilitates epistemic purposes. The distinction which the scientific requirement 
makes might be vague, but it is specific enough to allow us to disqualify groupings that 
clearly fall on the wrong side. Hence, “the set of objects currently on my kitchen counter” 
and “the set of numbers randomly selected by the New York State Lottery on January 1, 
2011” do not qualify as scientific kinds because such groupings are not fit for epistemic 
purpose. They will not allow us to understand, explain, predict, or control certain aspects 
of the world. 
The problem with the scientific kinds requirement is that it cannot explain how we end 
up with a specific limited set of kinds that allow communication and progress in the 
sciences. There are potentially innumerable aspects of the world that we could attempt to 
understand, explain, predict or control. Accordingly, even after filtering out all non-
scientific kinds, chances are that we will still be left with a huge number of scientifically 
adequate groupings with respect to any previously established putative kind. Luckily, there 
is a widely accepted response to this problem. At least among philosophers of the special 
sciences, it is fairly common to think that the question which scientific groupings we 
ultimately adopt as social or natural kinds is a matter of our explanatory interests (e.g. 
Kitcher 1984, Brigandt 2009). In other words, scientific kinds which we actually use in 
the special sciences need to be constructed in such a way as to allow us to understand, 
explain, predict, or control aspects of the world which are of interest to us.  
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This is the second stage of the model, and the stage where non-epistemic values come 
into play. Explanatory interests, so the idea, do not simply fall from the sky. As 
demonstrated in various case studies, explanatory interests are often, and possibly 
inevitably, influenced by non-epistemic values (Anderson 1995, 2004; Longino 1990, 
2013; Gannett 2010; Kitcher 2011; Brigandt 2009; Ludwig 2017). In other words, the 
model suggests that non-epistemic values play a legitimate, maybe even necessary role in 
scientific ontology, because they decide which aspects of the world we care to investigate 
in the first place. This means that the role of non-epistemic values is constrained in a 
crucial manner. Non-epistemic values may only have an indirect influence on scientific 
ontology. Non-epistemic values decide which epistemic goals and interests determine our 
scientific ontology, but they do not shape scientific ontology directly. 
Incidentally, what it means for non-epistemic values to exert indirect influence on 
social ontology is well illustrated by Haslanger’s central examples of race and gender. 
Recall that, according to Haslanger, race and gender are not defined by biological 
characteristics such as morphology or genes, although these characteristics are relevant in 
a derivative sense. Haslanger argues that race and gender should be defined in terms of 
social positions of systematic privilege/subordination that individuals are allocated to on 
the basis of certain (real or imagined) bodily features. Moreover, she suggests that 
grouping individuals in this way is useful to advance specific epistemic aims. For 
Haslanger, this is first and foremost the aim of identifying and explaining racial and sexual 
inequalities, which includes elucidating “how social forces, often under the guise of 
biological forces, work to perpetuate such inequalities (Haslanger 2012, 226-7).  
Note that Haslanger’s reasoning is not trivial or circular because it does not presuppose 
the race and gender kinds just defined. “Racial and sexual inequality” is not to be 
understood as inequality between her race and gender kind that are, per definition, 
systematically privileged or subordinated. In the case of gender, for examples, Haslanger 
clarifies:  
 
Given the priority I place on concerns with justice and sexual inequality, I take the primary 
motivation for distinguishing sex from gender to arise in the recognition that males and 
females do not only differ physically, but also systematically differ in their social positions. 
What is of concern, to put it simply, is that societies, on the whole, privilege individuals with 
male bodies.  




In other words, the sort of inequality that Haslanger’s concepts aim to identify and explain 
is best understood as a systematic inequality between individuals of different types of 
bodies.  
Importantly, although these definitions of race and gender are obviously influenced by 
non-epistemic values, such as the commitment to social equality, the role played by these 
values is merely indirect. The commitment to social equality motivates the epistemic aim 
of identifying and explaining racial and sexual inequality. Haslanger’s definitions of race 
and gender are designed to further these epistemic aims. But the value of social equality 
does not directly influence who gets to be classified, say, as a woman.  
To make the contrast clear, it is useful to consider what it means for non-epistemic 
values to directly influence ontological choice. Non-epistemic values have a direct 
influence on our ontological choices if they do not take a detour via explanatory aims. 
This means that we group entities in a certain way not because it allows us to understand, 
explain, predict, or control aspects of the world that will help us realise moral or political 
values, but because it directly furthers moral or political purposes. An example of this 
would be the decision to classify the Alabama Sturgeon as a species because it would allow 
us to implement conservation measures reserved for endangered species (see Scharpf 
2000, quoted in Ludwig 2017, 1263). 
While many people accept the indirect influence of non-epistemic values on 
ontological decisions as an epistemically legitimate and probably even necessary aspect of 
scientific inquiry, the direct influence is much more controversial.10 It is easy to see why. 
Individuals grouped together according to non-epistemic criteria will not generally share 
the properties that are epistemically relevant to the scientific project at hand. If social and 
natural kinds have been carefully grouped so as to facilitate specific epistemic aims, any 
tampering with these groupings under the direct influence of non-epistemic values will 
likely render them less suitable for furthering these epistemic aims than they were before.  
In sum, the discussion above suggests we can recognise a legitimate role of non-
epistemic values in social ontology while answering Guala’s grouping worry. The solution 
is to limit the influence of non-epistemic values to an indirect role. Objects are grouped 
into natural and social kinds in light of what we are interested in understanding, 
explaining, predicting or controlling, but what we are interested in understanding, 
                                                 
10 David Ludwig (2017) argues that we need to accept both the direct and indirect influence of non-epistemic values on 
ontological choices. However, his argument only shows that direct influence does happen, not that it is a desirable or 




explaining, predicting or controlling is often informed by our moral and political values. 
Since social and natural kinds will only be able to facilitate these purposes if they group 
entities with respect to relevant properties and relations, arbitrary conglomerations as the 
ones described above are excluded from scientific ontology. 
3.3.4 Addressing the labelling worry 
To fully answer Guala’s concerns, we still need to address the labelling worry. This means 
we need to know under which circumstances we are can use existing terminology to refer 
to groupings other than those the terms traditionally refer to, and when we should be 
using new terms instead. We can address this problem by returning to Haslanger’s race 
and gender concepts. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Haslanger not merely 
proposes a new way of grouping individuals in the light of normative interests. She also 
suggests using existing terminology for the job, namely familiar terms like “woman”, 
“man”, “black”, etc. As Haslanger acknowledges, demonstrating that a novel way of 
grouping individuals supports a specific epistemic aim is not the same as demonstrating 
that we are justified in appropriating existing terminology to refer to the new grouping 
(Haslanger 2012, 225). How exactly does Haslanger justify using terms like “woman” and 
“black” for her novel groupings, especially considering the looming confusion with 
ordinary understandings of these terms? Would we not all be better off introducing new 
labels for this purpose?  
According to Haslanger, the answer to that question depends on two conditions, a 
political and a semantic one. The political condition involves considerations such as “the 
acceptability of the goals being served, the intended and unintended effects of the change, 
the politics of the speech context, and whether the underlying values are justified” 
(Haslanger 2012, ibid.). The semantic condition requires that “central functions” of the 
term are preserved. Haslanger suggests that preservation of central functions can be 
achieved, for instance, if the terms continue to be used to “organize or explain a core set 
of phenomena that the ordinary terms are used to identify or describe” (Haslanger 2012, 
225).  
Further detail would be needed to decide whether these conditions can disperse 
Guala’s concerns. Unfortunately, Haslanger does not discuss them in any more depth. 
With regard to the political condition, this may be understandable. The political condition 
involves criteria that are highly context-dependent, such as unintended effects and politics 
of the speech context. For that reason, it may not be possible to give a more detailed, 
general description. Instead, the political condition will likely have to be assessed in a case-
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by-case manner, consulting available empirical evidence.11 This is not the case, however, 
for the semantic condition. Here, it should be possible to elaborate on a general theoretical 
level what it means for a term to continue to organise or explain the same “core set of 
phenomena” that it describes in ordinary language.  
One interpretation that immediately comes to mind is that the semantic condition is 
in fact a semantic externalist condition. On this view, the semantic condition states that 
terms can be appropriated if they continue to refer to the same paradigm sample 
“essence”. This would be a bad move for several reasons. For one thing, it would 
undermine the coherence of Haslanger’s argument for doing social ontology in a 
normative as opposed to realist/semantic externalist manner. By reintroducing semantic 
externalism through the back door, Haslanger would admit that normative social ontology 
is eventually bound by the constraints of semantic externalism. 
More importantly, interpreting the semantic condition as a semantic externalist 
condition would mean that Haslanger’s normative social ontology is subject to the same 
problems as semantic externalism. Recall that the core problem for semantic externalism 
about kind terms is that pointing to a paradigm sample alone leaves the meaning of the 
term in question underdetermined. If Haslanger’s semantic condition is understood as a 
semantic externalist condition, the only constraint it would put on terminological 
appropriation is that new definitions of a term must include individuals from the paradigm 
sample. 
To see this, consider the case of “woman”. Assume that the paradigm sample in the 
baptism event for the term “woman” consists of a group of human individuals with 
female anatomy. In light of the problems with semantic externalism, this would mean that 
we could use the term “woman” to refer to such diverse groupings as mammals, humans, 
humans with female anatomy, humans between the age of 25 and 35 years, residents of 
the country that the individuals pointed to happen to live in, and so forth. In other words, 
if Haslanger’s semantic condition is interpreted as a semantic externalist condition, it 
would be far too permissive to do the required work. But all is not lost. In the following, 
I use the lessons from the criticism of semantic externalism to outline how the semantic 
condition can be made to work. 
                                                 
11 See Saul (2006) for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
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3.3.5 Explanatory interests and semantic variation 
The discussion of semantic externalism showed that ostension to a paradigm sample 
determines the meaning of a term only in the light of epistemic aims or interests that 
decide which of the properties shared by the paradigm sample are relevant. This fact can 
be used to make sense of Haslanger’s semantic condition for appropriating existing 
terminology. According to the semantic condition, appropriating a kind term is justified 
if central functions of the term are preserved. As argued above, it is only with the help of 
epistemic interests that ostension to a paradigm sample can determine the meaning of a 
kind term. To make Haslanger’s semantic condition work, then, the key is to understand 
the “central functions” of a term in terms of the epistemic aim or interest that it serves. 
Accordingly, we should modify the semantic condition as follows: it is permissible to alter 
the definitions or concepts associated with existing scientific terminology as long as the 
new definitions serve a term’s existing epistemic aim.12 
The point can be illustrated using the familiar examples of race and gender. Plausibly, 
the epistemic aim – or at least one of the epistemic aims – of using terms like “men”, 
“women”, “black” and “white” is to explain patterns of human variation. In light of this 
epistemic aim, the question is what concepts or definitions of “women”, “white”, and so 
forth scientists should be using in order to understand and explain patterns of human 
variation. Traditionally, scientists approached the task by using biological definitions. 
They defined “men” and “women” in terms of biological reproduction, and racial terms 
in terms of continental ancestry. The reason for this was that they thought that underlying 
biological characteristics such as genes and hormones are causally responsible for the 
(assumed or observed) differences in behaviour and psychology.  
But the success of these definitions in furthering the epistemic aim of understanding 
patterns of human variation has been somewhat mixed. Generally speaking, biological 
definitions of sexual categories have turned out to be much more successful than 
biological definition of racial categories. The former allowed scientists to make numerous 
inferences and explanations about physiological differences and are well-established 
categories in, say, medicine. The latter had a much more limited inferential and 
explanatory use, and the few cases where scientists claimed epistemic success tend to be 
highly contested (Gannett 2005; Bolnick 2008; Feldman & Lewontin 2008). At the same 
time, it has become apparent that for many observed differences between members of 
                                                 




racial and sexual categories, explanations in terms of underlying biological categories are 
either misguided or highly incomplete. Instead, many race or gender differences of 
behaviour, psychology and even health may be a function of differential socio-economic 
status, prejudice and discrimination, rather than biology (Kaplan 2010). 
On the basis of these observations, Haslanger’s appropriation of race and gender terms 
could be justified as follows: The epistemic aim of race and gender terms is to understand 
and explain variation between racial and sexual groups (originally identified in terms of 
morphology). There is reason to believe that a number of differences between these 
groups are best explained by reference to social factors, in particular those associated with 
systematic privilege or disadvantage. Accordingly, biological definitions of terms like 
“women” or “black” will be of limited use in achieving the term’s epistemic aim. They 
will not help us identify and understand the social determinants of variation between racial 
and sexual groups. To elucidate these aspects of human variation, we should define 
categories like “men” or “black” in terms of the systematic privilege or subordination that 
individuals acquire on the basis of morphological markers.  
In the above argument, the semantic condition for terminological appropriation is 
fulfilled because the terms in question continue to serve the same epistemic aim. Terms 
like “women” and “men” have always been used to explain patterns of difference and 
inequality, Haslanger’s redefinition merely redirects our attention to a different set of 
potential causes. The discussion shows that we can interpret Haslanger’s semantic 
condition in a way that answers the labelling worry. The response will appease the realist, 
because the influence of non-epistemic values on labelling decisions is only an indirect 
one. It allows us to alter the definitions of existing scientific terms if it promotes the 
epistemic aim already associated with those terms. But it leaves no room for non-
epistemic values to influence our labelling choices directly.  
3.4 DIRECT INFLUENCE OF NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES 
REVISITED 
3.4.1 Reconsidering Haslanger’s examples 
It is time to briefly recapitulate the arguments in the previous sections. Having rejected 
semantic externalism and distinguished direct from indirect influence of non-epistemic 
values, the case for the influence of moral and political values on social ontology became 
harder to reject and, at the same time, less threatening for proponents of a realist social 
ontology. I illustrated this by distinguishing between a grouping and a labelling worry 
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behind Guala’s concern about normative ontology. The grouping worry, which is about 
individuals being grouped in a way that is arbitrary from a scientific point of view, can be 
answered by limiting the influence of non-epistemic values to an indirect role. Kinds need 
to be grouped in the light of epistemic interests, but these interests can in turn be 
motivated by non-epistemic values. The labelling worry, by contrast, expresses a concern 
about stretching the definitions of existing scientific terminology beyond recognition. It 
can be answered by demanding that changes in the concept associated with a term need 
to be made in a way that contributes towards the term’s existing epistemic aim. Since both 
responses allow non-epistemic values to influence grouping and labelling scientific kinds 
only in an indirect manner, they should be acceptable to a proponent of realist social 
ontology. 
This suggests that the only potential point of conflict that remains between realist and 
normative approaches to social ontology concerns the direct influence of non-epistemic 
values on ontological choices. While realists think that non-epistemic values may influence 
grouping and labelling choices only indirectly via epistemic aims, proponents of normative 
ontology might be inclined to say that direct influence is permissible, too. The discussion 
up to this point, however, could suggest that there is no such conflict between Guala and 
Haslanger. Instead, it seems that Haslanger, who is the main subject of Guala’s criticism, 
recommends only the indirect influence of non-epistemic values. Her main examples of 
race and gender consistently served us as case studies illustrating indirect influence of 
non-epistemic values. In other words, it seems that Haslanger’s social ontology is 
normative only to an extent that realist like Guala cannot really take issue with. After all, 
Haslanger seems to merely advocate the indirect influence of political or moral values in 
determining what epistemic purposes our ontological choices serve in the first place. This 
impression, however, is misleading. Looking beyond the examples of race and gender, we 
can see that not all of Haslanger’s case studies follow the pattern described above.  
To see this, return the example of marriage discussed at the very beginning of the 
chapter. On the realist view, it would not be permissible to include same-sex relationships 
in the social kind marriage simply for the immediate moral and political aim of furthering 
social equality. Doing so would mean letting one’s moral or political values directly 
influence ontological decision. But this seems to be exactly what Haslanger suggests. She 
argues that questions such as whether marriage happens only between a man and a woman 
“are not plausibly semantic controversies, but are social and political ones” (Haslanger 
2012, 433). In other words, Haslanger believes that the question whether same-sex 
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relationships are marriages is not a matter of facts (be they semantic or scientific ones), 
but of moral and political values. It is not a question about how the world is, but about 
how we want it to be.  
Are Haslanger’s claims about the normativity of the kind marriage in conflict with the 
realist commitment? Perhaps not inevitably. One simple way to avoid conflict might be 
to extend the range of purposes our ontological choices may serve. Once we acknowledge 
that social kinds can be understood differently in different scientific contexts, we may 
only be a small step away from saying that social kinds might be understood differently 
again in non-scientific contexts. The realist commitment is a commitment about scientific 
ontology, but we do not always group entities for scientific purposes. In non-scientific 
contexts, the primary purpose in using social kinds may not be epistemic. Instead, we 
might put them together for explicitly political and pragmatic ends, such as organising 
social life.  
According to this view, it would be misguided to apply the same demands on social 
ontology in both scientific and non-scientific contexts. While epistemic concerns may 
have priority in scientific contexts, where the direct influence of non-epistemic values on 
ontological choice will generally be detrimental to our aims, in certain public contexts the 
direct influence of moral or political values may be exactly what we need. In the case of 
marriage, an argument along these lines would go something like this: (i) in the public 
realm, we need to make ontological choices that further social equality; (ii) including same-
sex relationships in the kind marriage would further social equality; therefore, (iii) same-
sex relationships should be included in the kind marriage. But this argument is vulnerable 
to criticism. A proponent of a conservative account of marriage could argue that social 
equality merely demands that the legal status associated with marriage becomes available 
to same-sex couples. This purpose, the conservative could argue, is achieved once same-
sex couples are able to enter civil partnerships which entail the same rights and duties as 
marriage. It does not require to extend the term “marriage” to include legal partnerships 
between same-sex couples. In the remainder of this chapter, I use the hybrid kind model 
to show why this response is unconvincing.  
3.4.2 Hybrid kinds and the direct role of non-epistemic values 
To illustrate the point, it is helpful to briefly move from marriage to an example which 
Haslanger discusses in more detail – the example of the kind parent (Haslanger 2012, Chpt. 
14). Haslanger observes that primary school notes are usually addressed to “parents”, for 
instance in the form of invitations for “Parent Nights”, “Parent Breakfasts”, or “Parent-
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Teacher-Conferences”. According to Haslanger, there is a mismatch here between the 
common understanding of the term “parent” on the one hand, and the use of the term in 
school notes on the other. If we asked people what “parent” means, they would give an 
answer along the lines of biological parent, i.e. immediate progenitor. But this seems to 
be at odds with how the term operates in the context of the primary school notes. Here, 
we would expect that “parent” refers to primary caregivers, no matter whether they are 
biological parents, step parents, legal guardians, and so forth.  
Haslanger suggests that there are several possible ways of responding to this mismatch: 
(i) the school could insists that “parent” in their notes refers to the common 
understanding of biological parent; (ii) the school could address the notes to “Primary 
Caregiver” instead; or (iii) we could collectively alter our understanding of “parent” so as 
to refer to primary caregivers instead, at least in public contexts such as primary schools. 
While Haslanger is quick to dismiss the first option as “clearly misguided […] as a 
social/political matter”, she suggests that deciding between options (ii) and (iii) is 
somewhat trickier (Haslanger 2012, 390).  
For the sake of clarity, it is worth discussing the three options in more detail. Based on 
what we have established so far, there are two different grounds for rejecting option (i). 
We could imagine that the primary school really intends to only invite biological parents 
to the events. In that case, option (i) would be “fit for purpose” but we would be inclined 
to criticise the purpose at hand on moral or political grounds. For instance, we could 
argue that inviting only biological parents to the primary school events is harmful and 
discriminating towards children who do not grow up in traditional family arrangements, 
as well as towards their “non-traditional” primary caregivers. This is what Haslanger 
seems to have in mind when she rejects option (i). But there is a second, somewhat more 
charitable interpretation. Assume the primary school really wants to facilitate socialising 
and communication with whoever has primary responsibility in looking after the children. 
In that case, we should reject option (i) not on moral or political grounds, but for reasons 
of coherence. The reason the school cannot insist that “parent” refers only to immediate 
biological progenitor is because doing so would conflict with what they aim to 
communicate. In other words, the school cannot at the same time insist that “parent” 
refers to biological progenitors and continue using the terminology in its notes, because 
doing so would be inconsistent with their pragmatic aim in writing the notes. 
The example is instructive because it suggests that the main point of conflict between 
proponents of normative and realist social ontology concerns labelling rather than 
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grouping. The idea that we can group individuals in the light of non-epistemic aims – such 
as the aim to facilitate communication with whoever has primary responsibility in looking 
after children in a primary school – is quite uncontroversial. It is only when we try to label 
those groupings with existing terminology that we enter contested territory. This is where 
options (ii) and (iii) differ. Both acknowledge that the grouping commonly referred to as 
primary caregivers is the right one for the job at hand, but they disagree as to whether the 
term “parent” should be used to refer to that grouping. Haslanger states that it is not clear 
from her example which is the best strategy to adopt overall. Her point is merely to 
demonstrate, against the terminological conservative, that there may be considerations 
which point towards option (iii), i.e. maintaining the original term and modifying the 
associated meaning instead. Although Haslanger acknowledges that the decision to 
redefine terms must be made on a case-by-case basis, she believes there can be 
considerations that speak strongly in favour of doing so. 
In order to understand what exactly these considerations are, and how they relate to 
the ontology of the kind in question, we need to dig a little deeper. In the case of parent, 
Haslanger argues that “the term ‘parent’ brings with it a certain normative weight, 
entitlement, and so on, that the term ‘primary caregiver’ doesn’t” (Haslanger 2012, 401). 
Similar remarks lead us back to our original example of marriage. According to Haslanger, 
there is a reason why gay activists are fighting over the meaning of “marriage”, rather than 
simply opting for a different term like “civil union”. The term “marriage”, she argues, 
“links the institution to a broad range of other social phenomena, and does so in a way 
that ‘civil union’ cannot approximate” (Haslanger 2012, 402). In other words, Haslanger 
suggests that the decision between using new or existing terminology is not simply about 
words, but may have a wide-ranging impact on people’s lives.  
The hybrid model allows us to understand how a seemingly simple terminological 
choice can bring about such an impact. As shown in Chapter 1, the model describes how 
a specific grouping (the base kind) can be associated with a specific status (the status kind). 
The status kind consists of a cluster of norms, expectations, entitlements, etc. are socially 
associated with the grouping at hand. Parent and marriage can be understood in terms of 
these hybrid kinds.  Presumably, the terms “parent” and “marriage” were originally used 
simply to denote specific groupings of entities – biological progenitors in the former case, 
and something like a formally recognised economic, sexual, and emotional relationship 
between a man and a woman in the latter case. Yet, over time these classifications 
developed important lives of their own. Through being classified as a parent, or as 
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married, individuals simultaneously acquired membership in a status kind that locates 
them in a complex network of social relations, expectations, informal obligations, 
entitlements, and so forth. As argued before, this not only involves how one is viewed by 
others (and oneself) but also regulates access to various social resources and 
opportunities. 
Understanding parent and marriage as hybrid kinds allows us to see how non-epistemic 
values can be directly relevant to our terminological choices. Denying, say, adoptive 
parents the title “parent”, or gay couples’ legal relationships the title “marriage” also 
means denying them the social status that is associated with these labels. Since denying 
individuals the social status associated with such key social terms may have a far-reaching 
impact on their lives, the terminological choices in question can be of significant moral 
and political import. This argument provides a strong case for the position that moral and 
political considerations are directly relevant to terminological choice.  
An opponent of normative social ontology could respond that these concerns may 
legitimately influence terminological choices in the public realm, but they should have no 
impact on scientific terminology. They could argue that, in public contexts, where the 
benefits or disadvantages associated with being labelled in a certain way accrue, our use 
of terms like “parent”, “marriage” may directly depend on moral or political 
considerations. In scientific contexts, however, terminological choices should only 
depend on our epistemic aims. This response, however, presupposes a clear separation of 
public and scientific spheres that might be unrealistic. It disregards a potential tendency 
of the public to turn to scientists as experts on what terms like “marriage”, “parent” or 
“woman” mean. At the same time, it ignores the potential impact public labelling practices 
may have on the features of individuals studied by the sciences.13 
I will not attempt to draft general guidelines as to when the direct influence of such 
values is justified, that is, if and under what circumstances the described impact of 
classifications onto individuals should lead us to modify classificatory practices in 
scientific contexts. As mentioned above, the answer is likely to be quite context-
dependent and would lead us too far into the realm of moral and political philosophy.14 
Instead, I will instead take a closer look at the epistemic challenges that arise from this 
hybrid structure in the next chapter. What I hope to have demonstrated in this section is 
twofold. First, whatever reason we might have to preserve existing practices of labelling, 
                                                 
13 I will examine these interactions in greater detail in the next chapter. 
14 For an insightful discussion of the moral and political concerns associated with the status of woman, see Jenkins (2016). 
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there may be substantial moral and political considerations pointing the other way. 
Second, the hybrid kind model provides a solid ontological footing for understanding and 
addressing these complications.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I used the hybrid kind model to illuminate the question whether there can 
be a “strictly realist” social ontology void of any influence of non-epistemic values. I 
started the inquiry by considering Haslanger’s race and gender concepts, for which 
Haslanger offered both a normative and a semantic externalist argument. The normative 
argument suggests that we need to define social kind terms in the light of moral and 
political values, whereas the semantic externalist argument suggests that the meaning of 
social kind terms is determined by ostension to paradigm samples. Guala criticised that 
the normative and the semantic externalist are in tension. He proposed that this tension 
should be resolved by recognising that the meaning of social kind terms – just like natural 
kind terms – is determined purely by semantic externalist considerations.  
I argued that Guala’s objection to normative social ontology is unconvincing because 
it fails to engage with existing criticism of externalist natural kind semantics. A more 
detailed look at this debate suggested that semantic externalism (and its causal placeholder 
variation) are untenable for the HPC account of kinds favoured by Guala. I then argued 
that Guala’s realist commitment can be preserved in a weaker form, which requires that 
grouping and labelling choices in scientific contexts need to be made in the light of purely 
epistemic aims. Non-epistemic considerations, such as moral and political values, are 
allowed to influence ontological choices only indirectly, by determining which epistemic 
aims we decide to pursue in the first place.  
It turned out, however, that this understanding still leaves room for conflict between 
Guala’s and Haslanger’s positions. Although this is not the case for the examples we 
started out with – Haslanger’s race and gender concepts, so I argued, are prime examples 
of the indirect rather than direct influence of non-epistemic values – Haslanger is clearly 
suggesting a direct role for non-epistemic values in her discussion of “parent” and 
“marriage.” Using the hybrid kind model developed in Chapter 1, I suggested that 
Haslanger’s point is best understood in light of the social statuses associated with our 
labelling practices. The fact that our terminological decisions may have a wide-ranging 
impact on people’s lives suggests that moral and political considerations may legitimately 
play a direct role in these decisions. In other words, there is reason to think that non-
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In order to understand the full scope of the epistemic challenges posed by hybrid kinds, 
it helps to approach the phenomenon from a slightly different angle.1 While the previous 
chapters focussed mainly on social kinds, that is, kind classifications used in the social 
sciences, this chapter will take a step back and consider classifications in the human 
sciences more generally. “Human sciences”, here, is an umbrella term for any scientific 
disciplines that studies humans. It therefore encompasses a wide range of subjects ranging 
from sociology, history and psychology to medicine and genetics. The classifications used 
in these sciences to classify human individuals, traits or behaviours will be referred to as 
“human kinds”.  
The question whether the human world can be studied in the same way as the non-
human natural world has given rise to several heated controversies over the last two 
centuries. On the one side, proponents of the unity thesis argue that investigation of the 
human world ought to be modelled closely on our scientific methods for the investigation 
of the natural world. On the other side, proponents of the difference thesis defend the idea 
that the human world is importantly different from the natural world, and therefore 
requires methods fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences. Today, this 
highly polarised characterisation looks somewhat outdated. For better or worse, grand 
claims about the nature of “the natural” sciences as opposed to “the human” sciences 
have given way to a more nuanced investigation of specific scientific disciplines and 
approaches. Accordingly, the idea that the investigation of the human world requires a 
fundamentally different approach to that of the natural sciences has become a minority 
view in philosophy of science.  
One of the last spokespersons of this view is Ian Hacking. For Hacking, the special 
status of the human sciences lies with the kinds they study: while the kinds that figure in 
the natural sciences are independent of (or, in Hacking’s word, “indifferent to”) scientists’ 
classificatory practices, some human kinds interact with the classifications scientists are 
using. Hacking terms these kinds human interactive kinds and makes two controversial 
claims about them: (i) only human kinds are interactive kinds; (ii) human interactive kinds 
                                                 
1 A slightly modified version of this chapter has been published in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science under 
the same title (Laimann forthcoming). 
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cannot be natural kinds. Both claims have been vehemently criticised – the first on the 
grounds that there seem to be non-human interactive kinds; the second on the grounds 
that, even if the phenomenon of interactivity could be limited to human kinds, this would 
not prevent them from being natural kinds. Despite finding Hacking’s detailed case 
studies insightful, critics have converged on the conclusion that the general account of 
human interactive kinds which he extracts from them should be rejected.  
This chapter aims to challenge this consensus. I argue that, although the critics 
correctly identify weaknesses in Hacking’s argument, the dialectic of the extant debate 
misses the core conceptual problem of human interactive kinds. The problem is not that 
these kinds are particularly unstable but “capricious” – their members behave in wayward, 
unexpected manners which defeats existing theoretical understanding. The reason for 
that, I argue, is that human interactive kinds are often hybrid kinds consisting of a base 
kind and an associated status, which makes mechanisms that support patterns of change 
and stability systematically difficult to understand and predict. Accordingly, a shift in focus 
is due. I argue that we should stop understanding the question whether human interactive 
kinds can be natural kinds as hinging on the issue of ontological stability. Instead, we 
should focus on the role of understanding mechanisms that support patterns of change 
and stability in our epistemic practices surrounding natural kinds. Pace Hacking’s critics, 
considering human interactive kinds from this perspective potentially undermines their 
status as natural kinds. This has not been acknowledged in the extant discussion and 
merits further investigation. 
In the following section, I start by recapitulating the extant discussion between 
Hacking and his critics. In Section 4.2, I point out how the dialectic of this discussion 
centres on the issue of ontological stability over time. I discuss two reasons why this way 
of framing the debate is misguided. Firstly, it cannot account for the epistemic problems 
posed by human kinds that participate in stabilizing, as opposed to destabilizing, feedback 
effects. Secondly, it is based on an oversimplified account of the scientific investigation 
and use of natural kinds. If these observations are correct, the assumption that human 
interactive kinds are problematic because their objects are unstable is wrong and has led 
the discussion astray. In Section 4.3, I argue that human interactive kinds are best 
understood as hybrid kinds. I then show that such kinds may pose specific difficulties for 
scientific understanding, which gives credit to the idea that we should exercise special 
caution in thinking of them as natural kinds.  
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4.1 THE EXTANT DISCUSSION 
4.1.1 Hacking’s account of interactive kinds 
Hacking’s account of interactive kinds is motivated by a number of detailed case studies 
of psychiatric kinds like multiple personality disorder, child abuse, and schizophrenia (see 
Hacking 1986; 1988; 1991; 1992; 1995a). Hacking notes that the studied phenomena 
develop over time in a very peculiar way that is unknown to the natural sciences. The 
objects of classification “interact” with the classificatory schemes that are used to 
investigate them: classified individuals change, sometimes up to the point where the 
original classification is considered obsolete and thus revised. He calls these kinds 
“interactive” (or “looping”) kinds. Phenomena studied in the natural sciences, by contrast, 
are unresponsive to our classificatory practices. Quarks, to use Hacking’s familiar 
example, do not change in response to how we classify them.  
We can understand the underlying process as a two-phase feedback loop. In the first 
phase, individuals react to the classifications that are (potentially) applied to them by 
changing their behaviour and characteristics. This phenomenon has been described in the 
sociological literature on criminal behaviour under the name “labelling theory” (see, for 
instance, Schur 1971). However, Hacking’s account of interactive kinds features a second 
phase which has not been discussed in labelling theory. He suggests that the changes 
brought about by labelling can be so extensive as to render the original classification 
obsolete. Due to labelling effects, individuals might no longer correspond to the criteria 
or theoretical associations of the original classification. Upon noticing this development, 
those in charge of the classification (for instance scientists or politicians) may decide that 
the mismatch is serious enough to necessitate a revision of the definition or theoretical 
understanding of the classification. Hence, in the second phase, the change in individuals’ 
behaviour or characteristics feeds back into the understanding of the classification used 
to describe them.  
Hacking’s discussion of the changing symptom profile of schizophrenia provides a 
good illustration of this process (Hacking 1999, 113-114). He describes two iterations of 
the feedback loop, each of which features the two phases described above. According to 
Hacking, when the diagnosis of schizophrenia was first introduced, experts emphasised 
“flat affect” and considered auditory hallucinations a minor problem that was not specific 
to schizophrenia. With auditory hallucinations being such an “unproblematic” symptom, 
large numbers of people classified as schizophrenic expressed and reported them to their 
doctors. As a result, auditory hallucinations were found to be universal among 
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schizophrenics when the classification was operationalised about thirty years later, and 
were therefore established as a major diagnostic criterion. This is the first iteration of the 
feedback effect. A second iteration occurred as schizophrenia became a decreasingly 
“fashionable” diagnosis that individuals tried to avoid. Individuals stopped reporting 
auditory hallucinations; auditory hallucination ceased to be a widespread characteristic of 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia, and was successively de-emphasized as a diagnostic 
criterion. 
Hacking makes two controversial claims about interactive kinds. He argues (i) that only 
human kinds are interactive kinds and (ii) that human interactive kinds are not natural 
kinds. Some clarifications are in order before we proceed to the criticism of Hacking’s 
account. First, although Hacking often seems to refer to human kinds in general, he is not 
committed to saying that all human kinds are interactive. To avoid confusion, I will refer 
to those human kinds which are subject to the feedback effects described above as human 
interactive kinds. Second, given the controversy about the concept of natural kinds, we need 
to know what concept is at issue in this discussion. Hacking’s ideas about natural kinds 
are sketchy and – including kinds like mud (see Hacking 1995b, 352) – unusually 
permissive.2 Hacking’s critics recognise this, but argue that there is a substantial question 
as to whether human interactive kinds can be natural kinds according to more orthodox 
understandings of natural kinds that include biological species as paradigmatic examples 
(see, for instance, Boyd 1991; Dupré 1993; Millikan 1999). I put aside for now the larger 
debates about what natural kinds are and whether species qualify, and simply accept the 
critics’ assumption that species are paradigmatic natural kinds. I will come back to the 
account of natural kinds underlying this debate in Section 4.2. 
4.1.2 Classificatory feedback in non-human kinds 
Hacking’s claims have been subject to extensive criticism. Critics have invoked a variety 
of non-human kinds which allegedly participate in the same feedback effects as human 
interactive kind, including kinds of bacteria, marijuana plants, and livestock (Douglas 
1986; Bogen 1988; Cooper 2004). The most detailed case has been made with respect to 
domestic dogs (Khalidi 2010, 345-346). According to Muhammad Khalidi, research 
suggests that the process by which the species domestic dog diverged from wolves 
consists of many iterations of the two-phased feedback effect described above. In the first 
phase, individuals classified as tame were selectively bred, producing increasingly tame 
                                                 
2 In later work, Hacking (2007) distances himself from the notion of natural kinds altogether, arguing that the concept has 
outlived its usefulness. 
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individuals over time. In the second phase, upon recognising that extant individuals do 
not conform to the existing classification of them, humans revised their classifications 
(for instance from wolf to domestic dog, and later from domestic dog to particular dog 
breeds).  
These examples are not only used to reject Hacking’s first claim that only human kinds 
can be interactive, but are frequently taken to challenge his second claim that human 
interactive kinds cannot be natural kinds. As Rachel Cooper points out, many of these 
examples qualify as natural kinds not only on Hacking’s own, somewhat idiosyncratic 
account, but on many non-essentialist accounts of natural kinds that accommodate 
species as paradigmatic examples (Cooper 2004, 74-77). Accordingly, it looks like the 
classificatory feedback effects that Hacking identifies as unique to human kinds in fact 
produce similar patterns of ontological instability in paradigmatic examples of natural 
kinds This would imply that both of Hacking’s claims are false. 
Hacking’s staple response to this objection is to insist that the examples above do not 
qualify as interactive kinds on his view because the objects in question lack awareness of 
their classification (see, for instance, Hacking 1997, 15). Critics have pointed out a number 
of problems with this response. First of all, if awareness of one’s classification is a 
necessary feature of interactive kinds, some of Hacking’s own examples no longer qualify. 
Hacking suggests that although young children and individuals with severe autism might 
be unaware of how they are classified, they might nevertheless participate in classificatory 
feedback that involves “a larger human unit, for example the family” (Hacking 1995b, 
374). The idea seems to be that individuals who are unaware of how they are classified 
might nevertheless respond to the classification indirectly, for instance by responding to 
family members or caretakers who are aware of how the individual is classified. This 
implies that awareness of one’s classification is not a necessary feature of interactive kinds. 
Second, it has been argued that even if Hacking would consistently restrict his account 
of interactive kinds to kinds whose members are aware of their classification, he has 
trouble explaining why these kinds cannot be natural kinds. While change in reaction to 
becoming aware of one’s classification might be specific to humans, it is not clear how 
this makes human interactive kinds different from the examples of natural kinds discussed 
above. According to Cooper, in order to make this claim, Hacking would have to assume 
that classificatory feedback via awareness is of “greater metaphysical significance” than 
the classificatory feedback we find in other kinds (Cooper 2004, 79). Khalidi makes the 
same point with respect to feedback effects that are generated phylogenetically, via 
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selective breeding. He argues that Hacking provides no reason why these phylogenetic 
feedback effects do not have the same philosophical implications as feedback effects that 
are created ontogenetically, via awareness (Khalidi 2010, 352). 
In other words, both critics agree that even if Hacking stipulatively restricted the 
concept of interactive kinds to kinds whose members are aware of their classifications, he 
would still have to face two challenges. First, he would have to exclude some of the 
examples he previously described as interactive kinds from that category. Second, and 
more importantly, he would still owe a justification for the claim that human interactive 
kinds cannot be natural kinds. If Hacking wants to use the notion of interactivity to 
defend the idea of a fundamental difference between the human sciences and the natural 
sciences, an ad hoc emphasis on awareness will not do. Instead, so the critics suggest, he 
has to point to an ontological peculiarity of human interactive kinds that disqualifies them 
as natural kinds. Otherwise, his argument that human interactive kinds cannot be natural 
kinds fails. I will suggest that these objections, although correct, are somewhat beside the 
point: their focus on an ontological facet of Hacking’s account (instability over time) 
obscures the main conceptual problems of human interactive kinds. To show this, we 
need to discuss the premises of the above criticism in more detail, beginning with the 
underlying account of natural kinds. 
4.2 NATURAL KINDS AND ONTOLOGICAL INSTABILITY 
 
What, if anything, could prevent human interactive kinds from being natural kinds? The 
critics’ comparison of human interactive kinds with biological kinds suggest that the 
difference – if there is one – has to be ontological. This assumption is reflected in Khalidi’s 
question whether human interactive kinds are “real”, as well as in Cooper’s concern with 
whether classificatory feedback really marks “a fundamental metaphysical distinction” 
between human interactive kinds and natural kinds. However, when we look at how both 
critics frame their investigation, a different aspect emerges. Cooper motivates her 
discussion with reference to the central epistemic role that natural kinds play in scientific 
inquiry: 
 
If human kinds are natural kinds then this suggests that accounts of laws, explanations, and 
the basis of sound inductive inferences, developed for the natural sciences, can be carried 
across into the human sciences. If human kinds are not natural kinds, then this will be a 
reason for thinking that distinct accounts will be required.  




Similarly, Khalidi suggests that we should consider human interactive kinds as real, via 
adopting “a weak realist view that considers as real any kind that plays an indispensable 
role in explaining phenomena, making successful predictions, and otherwise featuring in 
successful inductive inference” (Khalidi 2010, 358). Both remarks suggest that the guiding 
motivation of the debate is not purely metaphysical interest, but the question whether 
human interactive kinds can fulfil the epistemic role of natural kinds.3 The critics’ concern 
with the status of human interactive kinds as natural kinds is effectively an epistemological 
and methodological one: if human interactive kinds are natural kinds, we do not need to 
come up with radically new approaches to understand them – their investigation can 
simply be modelled on the methods and epistemic practices used in the natural sciences.  
This hope stands in sharp contrast with some of Hacking’s remarks. He suggests that 
any attempt at investigating human interactive kinds in the same way as natural kinds is 
destined to fail, and that more suitable approaches are yet to be invented (see, for instance, 
Hacking 1997). Against this background, we can understand the rejection of Hacking’s 
account as an attempt to reassure us that the phenomenon Hacking describes is not as 
epistemically troublesome as he makes it out to be. To evaluate Hacking’s claims, we need 
to understand what could possibly hinder human interactive kinds from being 
scientifically investigated and epistemically used in the same way as natural kinds.  
On many occasions, Hacking suggests that the problem with using human interactive 
kinds as natural kinds has to do with the fact that they are unstable. In Hacking’s words, 
human interactive kinds are “on the move” or “moving targets” (see, for instance, 
Hacking 1999, Chpt. 4; 2006). This idea resonates with the example of schizophrenia 
discussed in Section 4.1. There, it seemed that by classifying individuals as schizophrenic, 
investigators unleashed a process in which the classified individuals change until they no 
longer fit the original classification. The resulting epistemic problem seems to be 
described most clearly with respect to the kind child abuse. Here, Hacking suggests that 
there might not be “a stable object […] to have knowledge about” (Hacking 1995a, 61). 
The idea seems to be that members of human interactive kinds constantly change in virtue 
of feedback effects, and we are not able to acquire knowledge and make inductive 
inferences about objects which constantly change over time. Accordingly, Hacking’s 
critics have focussed on instability as a potential problem for human interactive kinds’ 
status as natural kinds. Khalidi, for example, suggests that human interactive kinds seem 
                                                 




to pose an epistemological problem because “after successive iterations of the looping 
effect, it seems that we may no longer be dealing with the same thing we started with” 
(Khalidi 2010, 342). 
In other words, the debate is essentially about whether the members of human 
interactive kinds are unstable in a way that precludes them from functioning epistemically 
as natural kinds. Hacking seems to affirm this claim. His critics reject the claim on the 
grounds that similar patterns of instability are not considered a problem in the many 
examples of non-human kinds presented above. Neither side of this debate, however, 
seems to consider the association between ontological stability and the epistemic role of 
natural kinds worthy of further scrutiny. In the following, I discuss two reasons for 
questioning this assumption. Firstly, it is based on an account of natural kinds as vectors 
for projections and generalisations that is oversimplified. Secondly, it cannot account for 
the epistemic problems posed by human kinds that participate in stabilizing, as opposed 
to destabilizing, feedback effects. 
4.2.1 Understanding instability 
In order to bring into focus the assumptions about the relation between ontological 
stability and the epistemic features of natural kinds that form the background of the above 
discussion, we need to specify what kind of instability is considered a potential threat to 
natural kind status, and why. For that purpose, we first need to specify what sort of change 
we are talking about. As described above, there are two sorts of change involved in the 
classificatory feedback that characterises human interactive kinds. There can be changes 
to the members of a kind, for instance when the extension of the kind changes (new 
members join, extant members lose membership or cease to exist), or when the 
characteristics of the individuals within that extension change (members acquire new 
properties or shed old ones). Alternatively, there can be a change in the theoretical beliefs 
associated with the kind, such as when we discover new properties of the members and 
adapt our theoretical understanding to accommodate these. Although participants in the 
debate occasionally talk of kinds themselves “changing” or “being unstable”, this 
terminology should be avoided because it is ambiguous between these two quite different 
processes: the change of members is something that happens in the world, the change of 
theoretical understanding is something we deliberately bring about. What participants in 
the debate mean when they talk of a kind being “unstable” is that the members of the 




Note that not just any type of change among members constitutes this sort of instability. 
Change is abundant in the natural world and scientists understand, explain, and predict 
the behaviour of a great variety of objects which change over time, such as reactive 
chemical compounds, or animals that undergo metamorphosis. Take the kind water (H2O). 
We know a lot about the properties of this kind, for example that it has a melting point 
of 0 °C and a boiling point of 100 °C. However, we do not think that these properties are 
fixed or absolute, but know that they change depending on atmospheric pressure. 
Accordingly, natural kinds can have properties which are theorized as changing under 
specific circumstances, just as the melting point and boiling point of water are theorized 
as changing relative to atmospheric pressure. Therefore, what we mean when we say the 
natural kind water is stable is not that instances of water do not change under differing 
circumstances. We mean that, over time, instances of water do not change or develop 
new properties that are at odds with our existing scientific understanding of water. This 
suggests that we need to be more precise when asking whether instability prevents a kind 
from functioning as a natural kind category. The problem with human interactive kinds 
is not merely that the classified objects change, but that they change in ways which are 
unforeseen by our extant theoretical understanding of the kind. This is not the case for 
chemical compounds like H2O. 
The case is different for biological kinds like species. Here, existing members of a kind 
are constantly replaced by new members with slightly different properties. As a result, the 
set of properties that characterises members of a species can be transformed over time—
instances of domestic dog today are characterised by very different properties than 
instances of domestic dog 200 years ago. Hence, instances of a species can, in a sense, 
change properties in a way that is at odds with our existing understanding of the species 
at any given point. When critics liken the instability of a human interactive kind like 
schizophrenia to the instability of biological kinds like domestic dog, what they have in 
mind is this instability over time of the set of properties associated with a kind. The rich 
biological literature on species like domestic dog suggests that biological kinds are quite 
capable of facilitating prediction, explanation, and inductive inference, and thus 
epistemically qualify as natural kinds.  
Since members of human interactive kinds seem to change over time in much the same 
way as biological kinds, Hacking’s critics conclude that it is implausible to claim that the 
latter can have natural kind status whereas the former cannot. They anticipate that 
Hacking might respond by arguing that members of human interactive kinds change at a 
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significantly higher rate than members of biological kinds, and cannot have natural kind 
status for that reason. However, Cooper and Khalidi dismiss this point fairly quickly 
(Cooper 2004, 79; Khalidi 2010, 350). They argue that even if it was evidently true that 
the members of human interactive kinds change faster than those of non-human kinds – 
which they doubt – this would not by itself explain why human interactive kinds cannot 
be natural kind categories. The difference is, after all, only one of degree. 
But at this point, it seems like the critics’ metaphysical concerns with natural kinds 
have gotten ahead of their underlying epistemic motivations. It might be plausible to argue 
that a gradual difference in the rate of change cannot establish a metaphysical difference 
between human interactive kinds and natural kinds. However, given the motivating 
epistemic concern with natural kinds, the dismissal seems somewhat hasty. From an 
epistemic perspective, the claim that human interactive kinds cannot function as natural 
kinds because they change too quickly deserves serious consideration. After all, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to assume that a classification’s ability to facilitate inductive 
inferences that allow us explain the behaviour of past instances and predict the behaviour 
of future ones depends crucially on how much its objects have changed in the meantime.  
A defender of Hacking could develop this point further by arguing that an 
epistemically significant threshold lies between the rates of change of members of 
biological kinds and those of human interactive kinds: while members of biological kinds 
change slowly enough for our scientific understanding to catch up, members of human 
interactive kinds outrun our efforts to theorise about them. Ron Mallon explores this idea 
in some detail (Mallon 2016, Chpt. 7).4 According to Mallon, whether we can have 
knowledge about a human interactive kind depends on whether scientists manage to 
increase the accuracy of their theories about members of the kind at a higher rate than 
the rate at which the members change. I call this the hare-and-tortoise account of scientific 
understanding. Mallon illustrates this account in the case of biological species, arguing 
that scientists 
 
can have knowledge of members of these changing kinds that allows us to engage in 
successful induction, prediction, explanation, and intervention because our capacity to gain 
accurate knowledge of these kinds can (sometimes) be far more rapid than the processes that 
underwrite biological change. 
(Mallon 2016, 166) 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, Mallon uses this proposal to defend rather than challenge the claim that human interactive kinds can function 
as natural kinds. He suggests that we should expect human interactive kinds to often develop at a slower rate than the 
theories we formulate to explain them, because stabilizing feedback tends to be more prevalent and powerful than 




Certain aspects would need to be addressed further to develop this idea into a solid 
argument – for instance how to operationalize rates of change and rates of theory 
improvement in a way that allows us to compare the two. But instead of doing that, I 
want to draw attention to the limitations of the accounts of natural kinds and scientific 
understanding that underpin this line of argument. 
To begin with, the hare-and-tortoise account might suggest that there is an inverse 
relationship between the objects’ rate of change on the one side, and our ability to develop 
scientific understanding of them as natural kinds on the other: the more idle the objects 
of inquiry, the better they can be studied and function as natural kinds. However, there 
are reasons to think that change at a very slow pace poses problems of its own. Picking 
up Mallon’s example of species, it would not be far-fetched to suggest that the slow rate 
at which most readily observable species evolve has hindered our understanding of 
evolution. If horses and birds had the generation time of bacteria, we might have arrived 
at a theory of evolution, and hence a better understanding of the natural kinds horse and 
bird, at a much earlier point in human history. Change at a very slow rate tends to escape 
our attention and if this happens, we fail to incorporate this aspect into our theoretical 
understanding of the kind. Admittedly, the relative stability of the members of many 
species has epistemic advantages: we can make a great number of predictions and 
inductive inferences about members of the kind, precisely because change occurs at a rate 
slow enough as to not interfere with them. However, our inductive inferences across 
wider time spans will be susceptible to error, and our explanations will lack information 
on phylogenetic history and evolutionary mechanisms. Overall, we would be inclined to 
say that, without these, our knowledge of the kinds in question is highly incomplete at 
best.  
The example above shows that a slow rate of change of the members of a kind is by 
no means sufficient for the kind to facilitate scientific understanding. Other examples 
suggest that a relatively slow rate of change is not necessary for acquiring scientific 
understanding either. Consider bacteria. For some strains of bacteria, an individual can 
within thirty hours grow into a population in which every single base pair in the genome 
has mutated thirty times.5 It seems unlikely that scientific theories about bacteria really 
approach accuracy at a faster rate than that. Fortunately, scientists working on these 
organisms do not start out from scratch, but can draw on theoretical resources from other 
                                                 
5 See Pray (2008). 
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areas. For example, much of the knowledge applicable to bacteria is derived from the 
study of species which change at a less breath-taking speed, such as fruit flies. 
Additionally, experimental setups can be used to limit possible causes of change and to 
ease the process of tracking members of a specific strain without having to identify each 
bacterium on the basis of shared characteristics, as was achieved by the development of 
the pure culture method in microbiology (see O’Malley 2014).  
These arguments suggest that the hare-and-tortoise account that motivates the focus 
on instability is overly simplistic. Scientists’ ability to improve the accuracy of their 
theories does not simply stand in inverse relationship to the studied objects’ rate of 
change, but depends on a host of factors, such as the possibility of making relevant 
observations, the ability to draw on an existing understanding of underlying mechanisms, 
and the opportunity to study objects under laboratory conditions. Accordingly, when 
deciding how well human interactive kinds can fulfil the epistemic role of natural kind 
categories, all these factors need to be taken into consideration. This point has not been 
explicitly addressed in the extant discussion on human interactive kinds, which focusses 
mainly on stability.  
4.2.2 The problem of stabilizing feedback 
The second problem with focussing on ontological stability as a crucial feature of natural 
kinds is that this view cannot account for the epistemic challenges posed by human 
classifications which are stabilized, rather than destabilized, by classificatory feedback. 
Hacking tends to focus on case studies where classificatory feedback makes individuals 
“outgrow” existing classifications, such as the example of schizophrenia discussed above. 
Call this type of classificatory feedback destabilizing feedback. However, there is a second 
type of classificatory feedback – stabilizing feedback – which achieves the contrary result: 
labelling effects reinforce properties associated with a classification, which is then 
interpreted as support for the existing classificatory practice. Standard examples in 
labelling theory describe such a process. They suggest, for instance, that the fact that 
someone has been labelled a criminal plays a role in their engaging in further criminal 
behaviour (see, for instance, Lemert 1951; Becker 1963; Chiricos et al. 2007; Worrall & 
Morris 2011). If the confirming labelling effects of a particular category are powerful 
enough, members of the category will generally conform to the properties associated with 
the category to a higher degree than they would have had, had they not been labelled. In 
response, those in charge of the classification might interpret the fact that individuals fit 
their labels so neatly as confirmation of the classificatory practice. In keeping with 
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Hacking’s metaphor, we might say that human kinds which are subject to stabilizing 
feedback are “held in place” rather than “sent on the move”.  
For someone who believes that ontological instability is the main threat to human 
interactive kinds’ status as natural kinds, stabilizing and destabilizing feedback effects need 
to be treated radically differently. While destabilizing feedback prevents human kinds 
from being natural kinds, stabilizing feedback would presumably make them more 
suitable candidates for natural kind status. After all, if natural kind categories need to refer 
to stable objects in order to facilitate induction, explanation, and prediction, and 
stabilizing feedback provides us with such stable objects, it should enable at least some 
human interactive kinds to function as natural kinds.  
Dominic Murphy makes an argument along these lines (Murphy 2006, 267-270). He 
suggests that if the norms, social pressures, stereotypes, or medical opinions that facilitate 
stabilizing feedback persist over time, the resulting patterns of behaviour that characterise 
a human interactive kind might “freeze in place”, thus making the kind perfectly suitable 
for inductive inferences. Accordingly, a proponent of the view that ontological instability 
is the main threat to natural kind status would have to hold one of the following claims: 
(i) the concept of human interactive kinds includes only kinds which are subject to 
destabilizing feedback, or (ii) the concept of human interactive kinds also includes kinds 
which are subject to stabilizing feedback, but this does not commit us to saying that the 
latter cannot be natural kinds. While Hacking’s position on the matter is not entirely clear, 
from an epistemological perspective, both of the above claims should be rejected.6 The 
reason for this is that the epistemic challenges posed by stabilizing feedback can be 
substantial, and are in some respects more detrimental to the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge than the challenges associated with destabilizing feedback.  
The debate on the causes of differences between men and women is a notorious case 
in point. As already noted in John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women, the crux in this 
debate is that, for many observed behavioural or psychological differences between men 
and women, we have trouble identifying whether they are due to “nature” or due to 
“society” (Mill 1869/1984). In other words, it is difficult to identify whether the observed 
differences are due to underlying natural, biological differences between men and women 
or due to differences in social upbringing and differential social constraints and 
opportunities. If the latter factors play a role (as we now have plenty of evidence to 
                                                 
6 Hence, I am not suggesting here that Hacking’s critics are guilty of misinterpretation by wrongly attributing to him either 
(i) or (ii). At least with respect to (i), careful readers will find passages that support it, as well as passages that undermine it 
(see Hacking 1999, 34 versus Hacking 1995b, 369-370).  
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believe), it is very compelling to think of men and women as human interactive kinds that 
are subject to stabilizing feedback effects.  
We can imagine the underlying two-part feedback mechanisms operating in the 
following way: In the first part, individuals are born into a society that has certain 
preconceived ideas about men and women (for instance that there are natural differences 
between them which not only determine their distinct morphological features, but also 
differences in character, abilities, and preferences). The society socialises individuals and 
arranges social institutions in accordance with these preconceived ideas. As a result, 
individuals classified as men or women continuously encounter differential social 
expectations and constraints and, over time, develop behaviour patterns, character traits, 
and abilities suitable to their circumstances – they come to fit their classification. In the 
second part, the fact that individuals classified as men or women squarely conform to 
these preconceived understandings is interpreted as evidence for the adequacy of the 
existing classificatory practice and its theoretical associations. It looks like men and 
women do naturally differ in character, ability, and preferences. This feedback mechanism 
is iterated as scientific testimony to the existence of such natural differences between men 
and women emerges. Scientific testimony strengthens the associated labelling effects, 
which is again, in turn, interpreted as confirmation of the classificatory practice and the 
theoretical understanding that underpins it. Due to these classificatory feedback effects, 
scientists came to firmly understand men and women as natural kinds that facilitate 
explanation and prediction not only of anatomical features, but also of a broad range of 
behavioural and psychological characteristics. 
Assuming that this story is more or less accurate, we can see how stabilizing feedback 
effects not only obscured and facilitated the oppression of women, but also contributed 
to an erroneous understanding of the kinds men and women.7 Many explanations facilitated 
by this understanding have been either false or substantially incomplete. Moreover, since 
the theoretical understanding suggested that differences between men and women are 
largely invariable across different societies, predictions and inductive inferences made on 
its basis were unreliable. In other words, the example above suggests that human kinds 
which are subject to stabilizing feedback can make for very poor natural kinds. 
But more than that, there is reason to believe that human kinds which are subject to 
stabilizing feedback are, in some respects, worse candidates for natural kind status than 
                                                 
7 This is not to say that stabilizing feedback alone is responsible for the poor epistemic outcome. Other factors, such as bias 
on the part of an overwhelmingly male research community, have arguably played an important role (see, for instance, 
Longino 1990).  
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human kinds which are subject to destabilizing feedback. Destabilizing feedback is, in 
some sense, transparent. The fact that classified phenomena resist and undermine our 
classificatory practices rubs our nose in the fact that the classifications we are using are 
based on an inadequate understanding of the phenomena in question. Stabilizing 
feedback, by contrast, is opaque. The apparent success of our classification can lull us into 
a false sense of security about the adequacy of the theoretical understanding that 
underpins the classificatory practice. If these observations are correct, and stabilizing 
feedback is at least as, and arguably more, epistemically challenging than destabilizing 
feedback, the assumption that human interactive kinds are problematic because their 
objects are unstable is wrong. Instead, the case of gender differences suggests that the 
problem is down to an inadequate understanding of the underlying determinants of 
change and stability in members of the kinds—only when we understand the mechanisms 
that support patterns of change and stability among the members of a kind are we in a 
position to provide accurate explanations and make inductive inferences across a variety 
of contexts.  
4.2.3 Summary 
Putting together the observations from the previous sections, the assumed connection 
between ontological stability and the epistemic features of natural kinds starts to look 
rather fragile. There is reason to believe that the focus on ontological stability reflects an 
overly simplistic hare-and-tortoise account of scientific inquiry and natural kinds. The 
case of stabilizing feedback corroborates these findings. It suggests that using ontological 
stability as a chief criterion for natural kind status may leave us with an epistemically thin 
and potentially misleading understanding of the kinds in question. Fortunately, it also 
indicates where a more nuanced understanding can be found: our epistemic practices 
surrounding natural kinds require knowledge of the causal processes that support patterns 
of change and stability in the classified objects. In order to be able to explain, predict, and 
make inductive inferences about the behaviour of members of a kind, we not only need 
to know that members typically display certain patterns, but also why they display these 
patterns or what produces them. In other words, natural kind categories should be 
understood not simply as vectors for projections and generalisations, but as analytic tools 
that incorporate assumptions about the causal mechanisms which constitute the kind.  
These insights apply neatly to the example of domestic dog we started out with. 
Proponents of the hare-and-tortoise account suggest that domestic dog qualifies as a 
natural kinds because change in the set of properties associated with this kind occurs at a 
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pace slow enough for our understanding to “catch up” and produce accurate explanation 
and predictions. The discussion above suggests that something different is going on. It 
suggests that domestic dog is a natural kind because we understand sufficiently well the 
evolutionary mechanisms by which members of the kind change their characteristics over 
phylogenetic time. Hence, while changes in the set of properties associated with this kind 
might, in one sense, overhaul our existing understanding of domestic dog – dogs in 200 
years will probably look very different from dogs today – it is, in a different sense, 
perfectly in accord with our existing understanding. By contrast, if Hacking’s description 
of the historical development of schizophrenia is correct, the reason we are taken aback 
by the instability of the set of properties associated with schizophrenia is that we have a 
wrong or incomplete understanding of the causal processes that support it.  
In other words, in trying to understand whether human interactive kinds can be natural 
kinds, we ought to stop putting so much emphasis on stability and instead ask if there is 
anything about these kinds that hampers our efforts to understand the underlying causal 
processes. In the following section, I argue that considering human interactive kinds from 
this perspective provides some reasons to be cautious about their status as natural kinds, 
thus rendering Hacking’s account more convincing than his critics acknowledge.  
4.3 CAPRICIOUS KINDS 
 
What, then, is the problem with human interactive kinds, if not unusual instability? I 
suggest that the problem has to do with their peculiar ontological structure. Human 
interactive kinds tend to have a dual nature: while we commonly think of human 
interactive kinds in terms of the properties that explicitly define the category, they can 
also be understood in terms of the social position that individuals occupy in virtue of 
being recognised as members of the category. In other words, human interactive kinds fit 
the hybrid kind model developed in Chapter 1.  They consist of a base kind, constituted 
by the properties that define the category, and an associated status kind, constituted by 
the social position that individuals acquire qua being recognised and treated as members 
of the specific category.  
The example of men and women from the previous section is useful to illustrate this 
idea. It is one of the few cases where the dual nature of a hybrid kind has been 
comprehensively conceptualised, in the form of the sex/gender distinction. Feminists 
have historically used the sex/gender distinction to tackle the idea that differences 
between men and women are biologically determined (see Mikkola 2017). Roughly 
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speaking, the distinction between sex and gender was meant to distinguish differences in 
biology (sex) from differences that are due to culture and society (gender). Terminologically, 
this distinction is sometimes expressed by using “male”/”female” to refer to sex 
categories, and “men”/”women” to refer to gender categories. I do not adhere to this 
terminology, but instead use “men” and “women” in the theoretically naïve sense that 
makes no such explicit distinction.8  
While there are many ways to spell out the idea of gender (for instance in terms of gender 
identity, or socialised behaviour), the understanding which is relevant to my idea of a 
hybrid kind is best captured by the feminist slogan “gender is the social meaning of sex”. 
This slogan expresses the idea that gender is a social position or role that individuals 
occupy in virtue of being recognised as members of a specific sex, an idea which has been 
developed in much detail by Sally Haslanger (2012) and Asta Sveinsdottir (2011; 2013). 
As a social position, gender is characterised by the norms, expectations, privileges, 
constraints, and opportunities that apply to individuals qua being recognised as members 
of a certain sex. In my terminology, sex is the base kinds, and gender (understood as a 
social position) the associated status kind.  
As Asta (2013) argues in detail, the relationship between membership in the base kind 
and membership in the status kind is of a special and somewhat fragile nature – members 
of the base kind come to occupy the social position that characterises the status kind only 
if they are recognised as members of the base kind, and individuals who are wrongly 
believed to be members of the base kind might nevertheless come to occupy the 
associated social position. Although this relationship does not guarantee complete 
coextension of the base kind and the status kind, the properties of the base kind and the 
properties of the status kind are associated reliably enough to suggest that the terms 
“men” and “women” refer to hybrid kinds – they are commonly understood as, and often 
succeed in, distinguishing people on the basis of biological characteristics, yet they also 
unwittingly track an associated distinction in terms of social position.9 On this account, 
the distinction between sex and gender can be understood as an attempt to conceptualise 
the hybrid nature of the human categories men and women, with sex denoting the base 
kind and gender the associated status kind. 
While Haslanger and Asta use this perspective primarily to develop a detailed 
metaphysical understanding of gender and other status kinds, I am more interested in 
                                                 
8 See Saul (2006) for an argument that ordinary speakers do not distinguish sex from gender.  
9 Note that Haslanger and Asta would probably disagree with this characterisation—they suggest that “men” and “women” 
should better be understood as referring exclusively to the associated status kinds. See Saul (2006) for a discussion.  
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what it tells us about the prospect of using human interactive kinds as natural kinds. I 
think the classificatory feedback effects described by Hacking can be understood as 
feedback effects between a base kind and the respective status kind. By being classified as 
members of a human category defined in terms of  certain base properties, individuals 
come to occupy a specific social position (become members of the corresponding status 
kind) that is characterised by specific norms, expectations, constraints and opportunities, 
and that influences how others relate to them as well as how classified individuals relate 
to themselves. In virtue of these features, membership in the status kind can affect the 
characteristics of classified individuals, which may stabilize or destabilize our theoretical 
understanding of the base kind. In the remainder of the chapter, I argue that 
understanding human interactive kinds as hybrid kinds should make us wary about 
treating them as natural kinds. The reason for this is that hybrid kinds are susceptible to 
two problems which complicate their functioning as natural kinds: (i) biased 
conceptualisation, which theorises about the base kind whilst disregarding the status that 
is imposed onto members of the base kind; and (ii) difficulty conceptualising, explaining 
and predicting the social status that is associated with a base kind.  
4.3.1 Biased conceptualisation 
Biased conceptualisation describes a phenomenon by which we theorise about and 
investigate the base of a hybrid kind while paying little attention to the associated status. 
The discussion of stabilizing feedback suggests men and women had been conceptualised 
in a biased manner before the distinction between sex and gender was introduced. 
Similarly, reconsider Hacking’s paradigmatic example of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is 
commonly understood either in terms of a specific symptom profile, or in terms of an 
underlying neurological condition that is assumed to produce these specific symptoms 
(Murphy 2006). Yet the category schizophrenia also picks out a status kind, which is a 
specific position in a network of social relations that individuals occupy in virtue of being 
classified as schizophrenic. Hacking’s discussion details how people diagnosed as 
schizophrenic are singled out for particular interactions and treatments, and are subject 
to a number of specific expectations, opportunities, and constraints. In fact, Hacking 
makes quite clear that it is this network of social relations which mediates classificatory 
feedback in the kind schizophrenia.  
How does biased conceptualisation threaten the natural kind status of human 
interactive kinds? In order for a kind to function as a natural kind, we need to have a 
sound theoretical understanding of the causal processes that underpin the properties 
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associated with it. We want to know not only that members of the category typically 
behave in certain ways, but also why they typically behave in these ways and under which 
circumstances we should expect them to behave differently. However, when we conceive 
of a human interactive kind solely in terms of the base kind, without considering the 
associated status, causal pathways associated with the status disappear out of sight. If these 
causal pathways have a significant influence on the properties of classified individuals, 
undetected biased conceptualisation will prevent us from developing the causal 
understanding that is necessary to use human interactive kinds as natural kinds. In other 
words, although biased conceptualisation does not necessarily affect all human interactive 
kinds, or necessarily preclude a proper understanding of all those kinds affected by it, it 
is an unacknowledged potential hindrance to using human interactive kinds as natural 
kinds and, as such, needs to be addressed in the debate. 
The previous discussion suggests that the categories men and women have been 
severely affected by biased conceptualisation. Here, the focus on a biological 
conceptualisation concealed the role social positioning played in producing observed 
differences. Accordingly, scientists prioritised the search for biological determinants of 
the observed differences (such as brain size and shape, or hormones) over the search for 
social ones (such as socialisation or social structural constraints). The same might have 
been true for schizophrenia, if Hacking’s description is correct and changing medical 
beliefs did play a significant role in the changing symptom profile. In this case, it seems 
that conceptualising schizophrenia as a cluster of symptoms or as a neurological disorder, 
without taking into account the associated status, obscured changes in medical beliefs 
about schizophrenia as a possible cause for the changing symptom profile.  
In several places, Hacking remarks on our tendency to “biologize” or “geneticize” 
human interactive kinds (see, for instance, Hacking 2006; 1995b, 353). Although these 
remarks resonate somewhat with my idea of biased conceptualisation, they are misleading 
in that they suggest that biased conceptualisation always necessarily involves human kinds 
which are conceptualised as biological. This is not the case—kinds which are explicitly 
conceptualised as social can be hybrid kinds affected by biased conceptualisation, too. 
Other passages in Hacking align with this idea. He cautions that the classification woman 
refugee is associated with social and material factors that affect the characteristics of 
women thus classified (1999, 10-11), and that our tendency to think of children who watch 
television as a “species”, might reify the kind child viewer of television via classificatory 
feedback effects (1999, 27).  
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Unfortunately, Hacking does not say anything more concrete about effects of biased 
conceptualisation in each case. But we can illustrate the idea with the example of the kind 
unemployed. Here, the base kind, understood as being without paid work but available to 
work, is explicitly defined with respect to social institutions. Nevertheless, being 
unemployed is also associated with a status which, among other things, involves social 
stigma. If the social stigma of people classified as unemployed has a crucial influence on 
their properties, biased conceptualisation that only considers the base kind could lead to 
gaps in our understanding.  
There is some evidence that this has taken place with respect to health disparities 
between employed and unemployed people. O’Donnell et al. (2015), for instance, found 
evidence that stigma negatively affects the psychological and physical health of 
unemployed people, but also note that there is very little existing research on this 
hypothesis. Former studies, they argue, instead focus on factors like financial strain, or 
lack of time structure, social contact, and activity—all factors typically associated with the 
base kind rather than the status of the hybrid kind unemployed. As O’Donnell et al. 
observe, this perspective not only provides a limited theoretical understanding of the 
existing health disparities, it also obscures potential interventions, such as changing public 
perceptions of unemployment or teaching skills for coping with stigmatization.  
4.3.2 Studying social status 
If biased conceptualisation was the only potential problem with using human interactive 
kinds as natural kinds, the solution would be fairly straightforward: simply identify the 
associated status and understand what feedback effects it has on classified individuals. 
Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that understanding these statuses and their 
feedback effects is anything but straightforward. As Jaakko Kuorikoski and Samuli 
Pöyhönen point out, although much of social science is limited to describing patterns of 
social life, only an understanding of the underlying mechanisms allows scientists to make 
inferences about counterfactual scenarios and enables them to extrapolate findings to new 
contexts and identify effective interventions (Kuorikoski & Pöyhönen 2012, 191). Hence, 
in order to be able to explain and predict how the status associated with a classification 
affects classified individuals, we need to understand not only the social and psychological 
mechanisms that mediate feedback effects, but also the mechanisms that stabilise and 




Consider first the feedback-mediating mechanisms. Several philosophers have provided 
extensive discussions of these mechanism, often illustrated with examples supported by 
social scientific research (Drabek 2014; Kuorikoski & Pöyhönen 2012; Mallon 2016; 
Murphy 2006). Accordingly, I will not repeat their points here, but simply point to the 
diversity of causal pathways that this literature has identified. Mallon, for instance, 
distinguishes three main pathways by which classifications can lead classified individuals 
to change their behaviour: intentional change of behaviour, automatic change of 
behaviour, and environmental construction (Mallon 2016, 68-89). Each of these, he 
suggests, can occur via several different causal pathways. Intentional change, for instance, 
can happen via change in salient possibilities for action, or via strategic or non-strategic 
reasoning. Environmental construction involves processes such as transmission of culture 
and institutions, or modifications of the material and spatial environment. In addition to 
that, Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen point out that classificatory feedback can operate with or 
without the individual being aware of the classification (Kuorikoski & Pöyhönen 2012, 
196-197). They discuss examples showing how classificatory feedback can happen 
without awareness, through processes such as the alteration of the practical reasoning of 
classified individuals or the modification of other people’s expectations towards classified 
individuals.  
This literature suggests that, although it is possible to identify and, to some extent, 
empirically investigate the social mechanisms that mediate classificatory feedback, these 
mechanisms are quite varied and complex. To complicate things further, different 
mechanisms may pull in different directions, thus amplifying or attenuating their 
respective effects. For example, on the intentional pathway, the effect of me being 
classified as a criminal might be that the classification troubles me, so that I resolve to 
make special efforts to act lawfully in the future. At the same time, my efforts to do so 
might be frustrated by the structural and material constraints that affect me as someone 
classified as a criminal. I might, for instance, no longer be eligible for a variety of jobs, 
which makes earning a living via illicit activities a more compelling option.  
In addition to that, attempts at understanding and predicting classificatory feedback 
are complicated even further by the fact that the social meanings associated with 
classifications may vary both synchronically and diachronically. At any given time, a 
classification can mean different things in different contexts and interact with other 
classifications. Consider again the example of men and women. In this case, the 
conceptualisation and investigation of the associated status is relatively advanced, arguably 
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more so than in any other human interactive kind. In the last few decades, a 
comprehensive literature that theorises gender as a status kind has emerged (see, for 
instance, Oakley 1972; MacKinnon 1989), followed by systematic empirical investigation 
into the associated determinants of differences between men and women. Fields like 
social psychology, for instance, now provide ample empirical support for activists’ and 
critical theorists’ long-held claim that psychological differences between men and women 
cannot be explained purely in terms of biology, but require consideration of their differing 
treatment and positioning in society (see, for instance, Eccles 1987; Eagly 1987; West & 
Zimmerman 1987; Spencer et al. 1999).  
However, simultaneously with these developments, a discussion has emerged as to 
whether a unitary category of women’s gender is a useful category at all, given how racial, 
cultural, and class differences influence the positioning and experiences of individuals 
classified as women (see Spelman 1988; Crenshaw 1991; Butler 1990; Mikkola 2006; 
Stoljar 2011). At the centre of this discussion is the observation that the specific social 
position that an individual occupies in virtue of being classified as a woman varies greatly 
depending on a number of other factors. These include the background culture in which 
the classification is used, other classifications that are applied to the individual, as well as 
not classification-induced social and economic factors.10 The debate suggests that it might 
not always be possible to identify a unitary status associated with a certain classification. 
Instead, in order to understand the causal processes that support a human interactive 
kind, one needs to understand how the classification affects individuals in different 
circumstances and in interaction with other classifications. 
In addition to that, the status associated with a classification may change over time. 
Again, the problem is not that the social meanings of classifications change at all, but that 
they change over time in ways that are difficult to explain and predict. Why did the 
Stonewall riots in 1969 in New York lead to a gay liberation movement that radically 
changed the status kind associated with the category homosexual? Historians can discuss 
the merits of different hypothesis to explain this event and its impact, but they have little 
way to empirically decide between them. Events like the rise of the gay liberation 
movement are the result of complex social and political processes that possibly involved 
a unique constellation of a myriad of factors that cannot be reproduced or tested under 
                                                 
10 By “not classification-induced factors” I mean factors that do not depend on the individual being recognised as of a 
certain kind, although the factors might be causally associated with a certain kind. For instance, many people are poor 
because they are working class, but their being poor is not (or not primarily) due to being classified as working class. 
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laboratory conditions. As a result, social scientists cannot explain or predict changes of 
the meanings associated with human kinds with any certainty.  
These are both familiar points in the discussion of social scientific methodology, yet 
their relevance to the question whether human interactive kinds can function as natural 
kinds has not been explicitly addressed in the extant literature. In particular, they suggest 
that status kinds themselves may often make poor candidates for natural kinds. If we 
cannot explain and predict the social meanings associated with human classifications, we 
are in no good position to explain their respective classificatory feedback effects, or to 
make reliable inferences about what feedback effects the classification is going to bring 
about under different circumstances. Hence, although the above discussion does not 
establish that human interactive kinds can never function as natural kind categories – 
there might be cases where we have a firm understanding of the associated status, and the 
mechanisms facilitating feedback are few and well-studied – it does provide some reasons 
to be cautious.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I discussed Hacking’s heavily criticised suggestion that human interactive 
kinds cannot be natural kinds. I suggested that there might be more to Hacking’s claim 
than his critics acknowledge, albeit not for the reasons Hacking identifies. Hacking 
suggests that interactivity is primarily a phenomenon of instability of the set of properties 
associated with a kind. His critics rightly object that interactivity thus understood does 
not preclude human interactive kinds from being natural kinds. I argued that both sides 
miss the core threats to natural kind status because they presuppose an oversimplified 
understanding of the epistemic role of natural kinds. Natural kinds are not simply vectors 
for projections and generalisations, but analytic tools that incorporate assumptions about 
the causal mechanisms which constitute the kind. At the same time, human interactive 
kinds tend to have an ontological structure which compromises their ability to fulfil this 
epistemic role. They can often be understood as hybrid kinds, consisting of a base kind 
and an associated status kind, and are subject to several features that potentially threaten 
their status as natural kinds. These include the tendency towards biased conceptualisation, 
the diversity and complexity of mechanisms mediating classificatory feedback, and most 
importantly, the fact that there is reason to think that status kinds themselves make poor 
candidates for natural kinds. 
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What are the methodological implications of my account? Recall that the discussion so 
far has been characterised by two methodological positions. According to Hacking, the 
phenomenon of human interactive kinds supports the difference thesis. For him, the fact 
that human interactive kinds cannot be natural kinds implies that we need radically new 
and different methods for understanding these kinds. His critics, by contrast, seem to 
support the unity thesis. By insisting that human interactive kinds can be natural kinds, 
they suggest that investigating these kinds is just “science as usual” – we do not need 
methods that radically differ from those of the natural sciences.  
My own account locates the truth somewhere in between these two positions. 
Although there might be cases in which we understand the associated status and its 
feedback effects well enough to use a human interactive kind as a natural kind, there is 
reason to believe that some human interactive kinds will be unsuitable as natural kinds. 
Yet this need not imply that investigating these kinds requires a radically new 
methodology. Coming back to the example of the kinds men and women, extant work in 
this area suggests that many researchers are perfectly well aware of the challenges and 
have found different ways of responding to them. After the crucial initial step of 
theoretically distinguishing the status kind gender from the base kind sex, feminist 
theorists have offered an understanding of gender as diverse and context-specific (see, for 
instance, Spelman 1998; Butler 1990), or suggested to understand gender along a specific 
politically relevant dimension (see, for instance, MacKinnon 1989; Haslanger 2012). 
These accounts of gender might not have (and are often not intended to have) the 
inductive power that we typically associate with natural kinds. But they might nevertheless 
provide an adequate understanding of how particular social mechanisms produce 
properties associated with men and women in specific contexts, or elucidate aspects of 
gender that are of central importance in emancipatory politics. In other words, contrary 
to Hacking’s claim, the challenges of human interactive kinds need not demand a radically 
new scientific methodology. In many cases, a better engagement with the resources that 




WHAT CAUSES GENDER DIFFERENCES?  
HYBRID KINDS AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION 
Our inquiry so far helped us gain a better understanding of the relationship between 
ontological questions in the social sciences on the one hand and the natural sciences on 
the other. In particular, it allowed us to see that the hybrid nature of many human 
classifications has interesting epistemic implications. It is due to their structure of base 
and associated status that kinds like women, homosexual, or schizophrenia can simultaneously 
be the subject of natural scientific and social scientific inquiry. Against this background, 
it is time to consider a different set of questions: How do the explanations that are offered 
by social scientists and natural scientist in such a constellation relate? Do the explanations 
provided by each party have to be integrated in order to gain a fuller understanding of the 
phenomena under consideration? What role do explicitly moral or political aims and 
considerations play in this context?  
In order to answer these questions, I will turn to one of the most contested issues 
between natural and social scientists: the debate on explanations of gender differences.1 I 
will focus specifically on two generally opposed parties in this debate. These parties are 
proponents of evolutionary psychological explanations on the one hand, and proponents 
of social scientific explanations – in particular those arguing in the context of an explicit 
commitment to feminism – on the other. Broadly speaking, both approaches are 
concerned with psychological and behavioural differences between men and women. At 
the same time, they tend to conceptualise their subject matter in strikingly different ways, 
each reflecting the conventions and interests of their own discipline. Evolutionary 
psychologists mainly understand men and women as different types of biological 
organisms which have been subject to distinct evolutionary pressures. Social scientists, by 
contrast, look at men and women primarily as groups of individuals who occupy different 
social positions, and are therefore subject to different norms, values and expectations as 
well as different structural constraints. In the context of the hybrid kind model, we can 
                                                 
1 I use “gender differences” in the theoretically naïve sense of everyday language to refer to observed differences between 
men and women, especially psychological and behavioural ones. I am not invoking the sex/gender distinction discussed in 
previous chapters.  
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interpret this as evolutionary psychologists being concerned with the base kinds, and 
social scientists with the status kind, of the hybrid kinds men and women. 
A brief glance at the literature suggests an irreconcilable conflict between proponents 
of these two explanatory approaches. Evolutionary psychologists have developed an 
impressive amount of research which aims to show that psychological or behavioural 
differences between men and women are the product of evolved psychological 
adaptations. Feminist theorists criticise this research for being “genetic determinist” or 
“gender essentialist”. These catchwords generally express the objection that someone is 
ignoring the environmental determinants of gender differences while naturalising and thus 
reinforcing the oppression of women. Feminists accordingly argue that we need to pay 
more attention to environmental factors, in particular that we should seek social 
explanations of gender differences. 
Evolutionary psychologists reject feminist objections on the grounds that they are 
misrepresenting their science. They argue that, contrary to the allegations, evolutionary 
psychological explanations do account for a variety of environmental factors. Some 
proponents of evolutionary psychology go further than that. They insist that evolutionary 
psychological and social explanations of gender differences are compatible or even 
converging on similar conclusions. In either case, proponents of evolutionary 
psychological explanations suggest that the alleged tension with social explanations is 
merely based on a misunderstanding of the evolutionary facts.  
Although the debate is quite complex, the advantages of choosing it as a case study are 
many. To begin with, there is an exceptionally rich amount of literature to base our inquiry 
upon. In addition, causal and political questions in this discussion are thoroughly 
intertwined, illustrating a further layer of complexity in investigating hybrid kinds. Most 
importantly, despite the huge amount of (often heated) discussion that the topic has 
inspired, a detailed account of how exactly the different causal as well as political claims 
relate is still outstanding. I believe that both positions on the relationship between 
evolutionary psychological and social explanations of gender differences are mistaken. 
More precisely, I think that the interpretations offered by both sides are inadequate in two 
related respects: (i) they fail to correctly locate causal-explanatory conflict between the 
two approaches and (ii) they do not provide an account of how exactly the different causal 
claims relate to political concerns in this discussion. As a result, the following inquiry not 
only serves as a case study for illustrating the potential challenges to causally explaining 
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hybrid kind phenomena. By providing a long overdue clarification of the debate on gender 
differences, it also makes an important contribution to the debate itself.  
Section 5.1 will set the stage by pointing out a puzzle in the extant debate. While 
evolutionary psychologists can successfully fend off the objection that they neglect 
environmental factors, their rejoinder leaves us wondering if and where exactly the two 
parties disagree. In order to pin down this disagreement, it is prerequisite to understand 
what exactly the explanations proposed by each party are claiming. Section 5.2 tries to 
pinpoint the claims made by evolutionary psychologists by looking at their central concept 
of domain-specific psychological mechanisms. The concept runs together three ideas that 
need to be distinguished: domain-specificity, trigger innateness, and purpose-specific 
adaptation. I argue that only two of these, trigger innateness and purpose-specific 
adaptation, are relevant in the context of this debate. Section 5.3 turns to social 
explanations of gender differences. I propose a distinction between socialisation 
explanations and social structural explanations, as well as a distinction between three 
different types of socialisation explanations. Although the mechanisms picked out by 
these explanations tend to be empirically entwined, I argue that they need to be 
conceptually distinguished because they rely on different types of evidence. Section 5.4 
puts together the results of the previous two sections. It examines how exactly the 
different types of evolutionary psychological explanations relate to different types of 
social explanations and explores implications for the debate on gender differences. 
5.1 THE EXTANT DEBATE 
5.1.1 Feminist objections to evolutionary psychology 
As indicated above, feminist theorists tend to reject evolutionary psychological 
explanations for providing an “essentialist” or “genetic determinist” view of gender 
differences. Evolutionary psychological explanations, they argue, overestimate the relative 
importance of genes and understate the relative importance of environments in explaining 
human behaviour. Laurette Liesen, for instance, suggests that evolutionary psychologists 
“[…] downplay the flexibility of humans to respond to their current environments and 
circumstances” and therefore portray human behaviour as “extremely slow to change” 
(Liesen 2007, 52). In addition, feminists often object that evolutionary psychology justifies 
inequalities between men and women by naturalising them (Fausto-Sterling 2000; 
Contratto 2002). Hence, Betsy Lucal attributes her scepticism of evolutionary 
explanations of human behaviour to her impression that curiously many of these 
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explanations support current patterns of dominance (Lucal 2010, 47). Susan Contratto 
argues, more forcefully, that evolutionary psychology is “profoundly conservative” and 
“dangerous to feminism because it is used to justify and maintain the status quo” 
(Contratto 2002, 41). She concludes that the evolutionary psychological approach is 
“antithetical to change” in theory and practice and therefore has “no common ground” 
with feminist psychology (Contratto 2002, 43). 
These remarks illustrate two distinct but related objections that feminists level against 
evolutionary psychologists: a causal-explanatory and a political (or normative) one. The 
causal-explanatory objection states that evolutionary psychological explanations of gender 
differences are incompatible with social explanations because the former deny or 
underestimate the role of socio-environmental determinants of human behaviour. The 
political objection states that evolutionary psychological explanations are detrimental to 
furthering gender equality because they justify the status quo and undermine political 
change. Supposedly – although this is surprisingly rarely made explicit – what connects 
these two objections is the assumption that evolutionary psychologists use explanatory 
falsehoods to support conservative politics. Much speaks in favour of this understanding. 
The burgeoning literature offering comprehensive methodological criticisms of the 
branch of evolutionary psychology most vocal in this debate certainly suggests that the 
claims should be taken with a pinch of salt.2 However, I believe that matters are more 
complicated than extant appraisals of the debate acknowledge. This is true not only 
regarding the relationship between the causal claims made on each side, but also for the 
relationship between evolutionary psychologists’ causal claims and feminists’ political 
objections. In this chapter, I will focus on where exactly feminist social scientific 
approaches and evolutionary psychology disagree on the causal-explanatory level. 
Feminists’ political demands and their relationship to the causal claims made by 
evolutionary psychology will be the topic of Chapter 6. 
5.1.2 Evolutionary psychologists’ defence against the causal-explanatory objection 
Evolutionary psychologists have vehemently defended themselves against the objection 
that their approach is negligent of environmental determinants of behaviour. To the 
contrary, they argue, evolutionary psychology acknowledges a variety of ways in which 
socio-environmental factors can be relevant to human behaviour. In general, we can 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Gould & Lewontin 1979; Lloyd 1988; Buller 2005.  
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identify three ways in which evolutionary psychologists claim to account for the plasticity 
of human behaviour and psychology.  
5.1.2.1 Environmental plasticity 
The first type of plasticity recognised by evolutionary psychologists is environmental 
plasticity. Environmental plasticity is the idea that humans with a set psychological 
architecture are able to vary their behaviour in response to different environmental 
stimuli. For instance, Gangestad and Simpson (2000) suggest that humans switch between 
different mating strategies depending on the harshness of the environment. Because harsh 
environments require biparental care for reproductive success, so they argue, we should 
expect higher levels of monogamous mateship in more demanding environments and 
more promiscuous mateship in less demanding environments. In other words, 
environmental plasticity suggests that human behaviour and psychology can vary in 
response to different environments.  
Importantly, although this form of plasticity accounts for some observed variation, it 
assumes that this variation runs along paths that have been trodden by natural selection. 
Environmental plasticity assumes that the reason an individual shows behaviour B1 in 
environment E1 and behaviour B2 in environment E2 is because of a history of 
evolutionary selection. According to this idea, the reason the individual varies his or her 
behaviour as described is because, in the evolutionary past of the individual’s lineage, B1 
behaviour was adaptive in E1-like environments, and B2 behaviour was adaptive in E2-like 
environments. This idea is sometimes expressed in the claim that human possess largely 
identical adaptive conditional strategies which are “programmed” to respond differently to 
different environmental cues (Waynforth & Dunbar 1995; Thornhill & Palmer 2000; 
McKibbin et al. 2008). 
5.1.2.2 Developmental plasticity 
Evolutionary psychologists commonly distinguish environmental plasticity from 
developmental plasticity. Developmental plasticity is the idea that human psychological 
development can take different adaptive pathways depending on the cues in one’s early 
developmental environment. This suggests that humans do not merely vary in behaviour 
because they use their existing psychological make-up in response to different 
environmental cues. Humans can also vary in behaviour as a result of different 
developmental trajectories, which lead them to develop diverse psychological make-ups 
(such as different dispositions or preferences) in the first place. Buss’ explanation of the 
correlation between father-absence during childhood and incidence of casual sex in 
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women uses the concept of developmental plasticity. According to Buss, the correlation 
can be explained by the fact that father-absence is a developmental cue for polygamous 
sexual preferences. He suggests that the absence of fathers leads women to “conclude 
that men are not reliable investors”, which makes them “pursue a strategy of extracting 
immediate resources from a number of short-term partners, rather than trying to secure 
the continued investment of one” (Buss 2003, 93). In other words, Buss argues that the 
observed correlation can be explained as an adaptive sexual strategy. 
Note that, just like environmental plasticity, developmental plasticity is assumed to 
operate within the constraints set by our evolutionary past. Evolutionary psychologists 
claim that the reason an individual develops specific psychological characteristics in 
reaction to a certain developmental cue is because the developmental pathway in question 
conveyed a relative fitness advantage in past environments. In other words, both 
environmental plasticity and developmental plasticity follow paths established in the 
evolutionary pasts. The human mind in all its variability, according to this picture, is 
essentially a universal, two-level conditional programme shaped by natural selection.  
5.1.2.3 Cross-cultural variation 
In contrast to the previous to forms of evolutionary-shaped plasticity, evolutionary 
psychologists sometimes recognize a third type of plasticity – cross-cultural variation – that 
might lead humans astray of adaptive pathways. Cross-cultural variation is usually invoked 
to explain the fact that human psychology and behaviour varies across cultures. David 
Schmitt’s discussion of “sociosexuality” (the preference for sex with a variety of different 
partners) is a case in point. Schmitt suggests that there “[…] may be certain aspects of 
culture that influence our evolved psychology in ways that accentuate or attenuate sex 
differences in sociosexuality” (Schmitt 2005, 252). Importantly, Schmitt acknowledges 
that, in contrast to environmental and developmental plasticity, these cultural influences 
may alter behaviour in not necessarily evolutionarily adaptive ways. As an example, 
Schmitt discusses the influence of “egalitarian sexual standards and gender role beliefs” 
which may partly explain the cross-cultural pattern of differences in sociosexuality 
(Schmitt 2005, 272). In other words, evolutionary psychologists acknowledge that social 
or environmental factors can sometimes affect human behaviour and psychology in ways 
that cannot be explained in terms of adaptive conditional strategies. However, this does 
not mean that they give up on the idea of a universal, evolved human cognitive 
architecture. Schmitt is careful to point out that cultural influences merely “accentuate” 
or “attenuate” evolved behavioural dispositions. Human culture, on this view, is not a 
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factor that freely gives shape to large parts of human cognitive architecture in the first 
place.  
These are the three types of human plasticity evolutionary psychologists frequently 
invoke to respond to the objection that they are neglecting environmental determinants 
of behaviour. Are these concessions to plasticity enough to defuse the worries, and maybe 
even show that social and evolutionary psychological explanations of gender differences 
are compatible after all? Evolutionary psychologists Buss and Schmitt seem to think so. 
They claim that, contrary to feminist critiques, “feminists and evolutionary psychologists 
appear to converge on conceptualizations of human behavior as flexible and context-
contingent” (Buss & Schmitt 2011, 771, my emphasis). This description of the 
relationship between social and evolutionary psychological explanations is quite contrary 
to the feminist portrayal discussed above. Instead of suggesting irreconcilable conflict 
over the importance of socio-environmental factors, evolutionary psychologists portray 
the relationship with social explanations as one of compatibility and even convergence on 
similar understandings of human behaviour. Before we disturb this idyllic image with 
further scrutiny, we need to consider a fourth conceptual tool that plays a crucial role in 
evolutionary psychologists’ defence against feminist criticism.  
5.1.2.4 The distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations 
In addition to demonstrating their recognition of environmental determinants of human 
behaviour, evolutionary psychologists often invoke a second line of defence. In order to 
show that evolutionary psychological explanations are perfectly compatible with social 
explanations of human behaviour, they refer to the distinction between proximate and 
ultimate explanations (see Mayr 1963; Tinbergen 1963). Proximate explanations refer to 
causes that affect someone during their lifetime, such as developmental and 
environmental factors and cultural influences. Ultimate explanations, by contrast, refer to 
causes that affected the individual’s evolutionary history, most prominently factors 
leading to natural selection. Proximate and ultimate explanations, so the idea goes, address 
distinct causal questions. Proximate explanations answer questions about the 
developmental or environmental (including cultural) determinants of a certain trait. 
Ultimate explanations answer questions about the evolutionary origin of the trait, that is, 
questions as to why the trait has been passed on through the lineage.  
According to some proponents of evolutionary psychology, the proximate-ultimate 
distinction allows us to resolve the alleged conflict between evolutionary and social 
explanations of human behaviour. Social explanations, they claim, are concerned with 
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how the social environment affects the development and expression of an individual’s 
traits during that individual’s lifetime, hence are proximate explanations. Evolutionary 
psychological explanations, by contrast, are concerned with why these traits have evolved 
in the history of the human species, hence are ultimate explanations. Note that, on this 
understanding, evolutionary psychological explanations are restricted to describing the 
evolutionary underpinnings and adaptive function of human behaviour and psychology. 
Since they do not entail any claims about the proximate or developmental causes of 
human behaviour, they are simply incapable of carrying implications that could come into 
conflict with social explanations. 
These two types of explanation, it is sometimes suggested, are compatible simply in 
virtue of the fact that address distinct causal questions. Heidi Colleran and Ruth Mace 
make this point with regard to their research on human behavioural ecology (Colleran & 
Mace 2011). They argue that their research, which explores the selective advantages of 
certain behavioural variants over others, focusses on ultimate causes. For that reason, they 
suggest, explanations of the same behavioural variant that refer to proximate causes are 
not incompatible (Colleran & Mace 2011, 290). Colleran and Mace believe that this 
understanding can be generalised to evolutionary and social explanations more generally. 
They suggest that evolutionary and social approaches “[…] can be understood as asking 
different ‘whys’, and really do not have to be mutually exclusive” (Colleran & Mace 2011, 
292).  
Sometimes defendants of evolutionary explanations go further than that. They argue 
that social and evolutionary explanations are not merely compatible, in the sense that they 
do not come into conflict, but suggest that the two are complementary, hence that both are 
required for a “complete” understanding of the phenomenon in question. Aaron Goetz 
et al., for instance, argue that their sperm competition hypothesis, which addresses the 
ultimate causes of rape, is complementary with feminist social explanations that explain 
rape as a phenomenon of domination and control (Goetz et al. 2008). Along similar lines, 
Alfonso Troisi argues that proximate and ultimate explanations of gender differences in 
vulnerability to social stress are complementary, and that both need to be taken into 
account to understand the phenomenon (Troisi 2001). 
Evolutionary psychologists are not the first to suggest that ultimate and proximate 
explanations are compatible or even complementary – this is a common assumption in 
evolutionary biology (Mayr 1963; Tinbergen 1963). Section 5.4 will take a closer look at 
what exactly this statement entails. But it is important to note that arguments of this sort 
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make a crucial assumption. They presume that evolutionary explanations are restricted to 
describing the evolutionary underpinnings and adaptive function of human behaviour and 
psychology and do not entail any claims about the proximate or developmental causes of 
human behaviour. Regarding the discussion at hand, this assumption states that 
evolutionary psychological explanations are simply incapable of carrying implications that 
could come into conflict with social explanations, and vice versa. In other words, the 
argument from the proximate-ultimate distinction claims that although both evolutionary 
psychological and social explanations might be needed for a “complete” explanation of a 
specific human behaviour, the two types of explanations are, in a way, irrelevant to each 
other. We will come back to this assumption later.  
5.1.3 Summary 
In this section, we saw that evolutionary psychology acknowledges a range of 
environmentally determined behavioural flexibility. Contrary to feminists’ allegations, it 
thus looks like there is no straightforward sense in which evolutionary psychological 
explanations can be considered genetic determinist or ignorant of environmental factors. 
Reference to the proximate-ultimate distinction further suggested that any apparent 
conflict between social and evolutionary psychological explanations can be resolved by 
recognising that both explanations answer different types of questions. Accordingly, in 
place of the predominant image of irreconcilable conflict, some evolutionary 
psychologists have suggested a relationship of compatibility and complementarity. 
While further investigation is required to decide whether this response can really defuse 
feminists’ reservations about evolutionary psychology, one thing has become apparent. 
Contrary to what the heated discussion suggests, it is not at all clear where exactly 
proponents of social explanation and proponents of evolutionary psychological 
explanations disagree. If there is causal-explanatory disagreement between the two types 
of explanations, it does not simply consist in the fact that the former assert the relevance 
of social and environmental factors whereas the latter deny it. In order to decide whether 
social and evolutionary psychological explanations of gender differences really are 
incompatible, we first need to develop a better understanding of what each type of 
explanations is claiming. The next section makes a start on this task by looking at 
evolutionary psychology.  
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5.2 WHAT IS AN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXPLANATION? 
In the previous section, we encountered a puzzle regarding the relationship between 
evolutionary psychological and social explanations. Whereas feminists mostly suggest that 
the two are incompatible, proponents of evolutionary psychology have been eager to 
portray a more harmonious relationship. In this section, I argue that the perceived 
difficulty in identifying whether there is actual causal-explanatory conflict underlying the 
discussion at hand is not merely imagined. It results from a genuine confusion about the 
content of one of evolutionary psychology’s central concepts. Evolutionary psychologists 
who figure most prominently in the debate on gender differences generally emphasize 
that the human mind is a cluster of domain-specific psychological mechanisms (e.g. Buss 1990; 
Barkow 2006; Pinker 2002; Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Tooby & Cosmides 2005). A central 
claim of their explanations of gender differences is that the differences in question are the 
product of these domain-specific psychological mechanisms. In order to pin down the 
content of evolutionary psychological explanations, we therefore need to explore the 
concept of domain-specific mechanisms in more detail.  
5.2.1 Domain-specificity and the blank slate 
Evolutionary psychologists generally contrast domain-specific psychological mechanisms 
with domain-general psychological mechanisms. The concept of domain-general 
psychological mechanisms, in turn, is used to describe what evolutionary psychologists 
take to be the prevalent social scientific understanding of human psychology: the idea that 
a single or very few general learning mechanisms are responsible for most phenomena of 
human psychology and behaviour. According to evolutionary psychologists, the domain-
general mechanisms assumed by the social sciences are “[…] equipotential, content-free, 
content-independent, general-purpose, domain-general” or “[…] constructed in such a 
way that they can absorb any kind of cultural message or environmental input equally 
well” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, 29).  
According to this view, evolution has equipped the human mind with little more than 
a general purpose mechanism for learning, and all human behaviour is the product of 
learning or culture. Evolutionary psychologists usually refer to this model as the Blank 
Slate Model or the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) and they strongly disagree with it. 
They are at pains to point out that the SSSM is misguided and ought to be replaced with 
an understanding of the mind that is informed by evolutionary psychology (see Pinker 
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2002 for a book-length discussion). On these evolutionary psychologists’ understanding, 
the human mind is composed of a variety of domain-specific psychological adaptations.  
There are several reasons to be cautious about evolutionary psychologists’ portrayal of 
the social sciences as “blank slatists”. Firstly, the SSSM can most plausibly be ascribed 
only to very specific traditions in sociology and cultural anthropology – such as those 
associated with the work of Emile Durkheim, Margaret Mead, Franz Boas or Alfred 
Kroeber. Yet evolutionary psychologists tend to indiscriminately ascribe this model to 
social science as a whole. Hence the term “standard social science model”. This sweeping 
generalisation is rarely backed up with any references from social scientific publications. 
If references are included (as in Pinker 2002) they tend to be focussed on specific social 
scientific traditions and hence fail to be representative of the social sciences more 
generally. Most of all, there is little of no engagement with contemporary feminist critics 
of evolutionary psychology, despite the fact that they are one of the main targets of the 
SSSM objection. In other words, while there might be “blank slatists” among the social 
sciences, evolutionary psychologists generally fail to demonstrate that this view is shared 
by their feminist opponents, let alone the social sciences as a whole.  
In addition, evolutionary psychologists’ criticism of the blank slate model generally 
fails to acknowledge the fact that the model can be understood in two ways – either in 
terms of an ontological, or in terms of an explanatory commitment. Evolutionary 
psychologists typically understand the model in terms of an ontological commitment. This 
ontological commitment states that the human mind is constituted by a domain-general 
mechanism for learning, and that human behaviour is therefore largely determined by 
socialisation and culture. Interpreted as an explanatory commitment, by contrast, the model 
says that although facts about human biology and evolution are causally relevant for 
human behaviour, human behaviour cannot be understood in terms facts about biology and 
evolution. In order to understand why humans act and think the way they do, we need to 
make reference to their culture and society.  
This distinction allows us to recognise that at least some social scientists which have 
been accused of “blank slatism” may be not so much committed to the ontological claim 
that behaviour is only caused by culture and learning as to the explanatory claim that human 
behaviour is best explained in terms of culture and learning. When criticising social 
explanations of human behaviour, evolutionary psychologists typically base their 
assessment on the assumption that their opponents are committed to the ontological 
claim. They generally do not consider the possibility that the commitment could be merely 
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explanatory. In several cases, philosophers have claimed that this is wrong. The alleged 
“blank slatists”, they argue, do not so much deny genetic, evolutionary, or biological causes 
of human behaviour as to firmly ignore them (Longino 1990; Longino 2012; Kronfeldner 
2009; Jackson 2010). Moreover, they have insisted that this happens for sound 
methodological reasons. I will come back to this “right to ignore” in Chapter 6. For now, 
it suffices to note that social scientists who show evidence of using the SSSM might be 
committed to the explanatory claim rather than the ontological one. In this case, 
evolutionary psychologists would be misrepresenting the social scientist’ position. 
These two problems imply several challenges when it comes to making sense of the 
tensions between proponents of social and evolutionary psychological explanations of 
gender differences. Firstly, proponents of social explanations of gender differences might 
not be committed to the blank slate model at all. Nothing said so far rules out the 
possibility that one can coherently claim that a trait is both the product of learning or 
culture and the result of a specialized cognitive adaptation. Similarly, even if someone 
claims that a particular gender differentiated behaviour is the product of society or culture, 
this would not commit them to the idea that the same is true for all other characteristics 
of human behaviour or psychology. Since evolutionary psychologists have failed to show 
that proponents of social explanations are committed to the blank slate model, these 
options cannot be ruled out.  
Secondly, the discussion above suggests that the dispute in question might not be 
rooted in actual disagreements about what happens on the causal-ontological level. 
Instead, proponents of social explanations may object to evolutionary psychological 
explanations on the basis of an explanatory commitment to the blank slate model. In this 
case, proponents of social explanations reject evolutionary psychological explanations not 
because they believe these are factually wrong, but because they believe they provide 
somehow bad, misleading or unhelpful explanations of gender differences. If this is 
correct, the disagreement would not be a disagreement about causal facts, but a 
disagreement about the requirements of good explanation, which may depend on 
pragmatic and context-specific considerations. The next chapter will look in more detail 
at disagreements of this type, in particular the potential for a “right to ignore” certain 
claims about causal facts irrespectively of whether they are true or false. For now, we will 
focus on (real or imagined) disagreements about causal facts. 
Besides the two problems outlined above, there is a third and even weightier concern 
which brings us back to the concept of domain-specific psychological mechanisms. So 
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far, the concept is still lacking in clear, positive content. We have identified that the idea 
of domain-specific psychological mechanisms is at the heart of the debate over 
evolutionary psychological versus social explanations of gender differences. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the concept primarily serves the negative function of saying how a behaviour 
has not been brought about. As a result, it is not clear what characterises a behaviour as 
the product of domain-specific psychological mechanisms, other than the fact that it is 
not the product of domain-general learning mechanisms. In the following, we will see that 
this lack of detail obscures substantial ambiguity in evolutionary psychologists’ claims.  
5.2.2 Domain-specific mechanisms as purpose-specific adaptations 
One possible interpretation of the idea of domain-specific mechanisms comes from 
evolutionary psychologists’ commitment to ultimate explanations. If we take this 
commitment seriously, it suggests that domain-specific mechanisms are best understood 
as purpose-specific psychological adaptations. According to this understanding, to say that a 
behaviour is the product of a domain-specific psychological mechanism is to make a claim 
about the behaviour’s evolutionary history. It amounts to saying that the reason 
individuals today display the behaviour is because the psychological mechanisms that 
produces it has been selected for producing the behaviour in question. In other words, 
the behaviour in question is the product of a purpose-specific adaptation which conveyed 
a fitness benefit on our ancestors.  
In the context of the debate on gender differences, this understanding suggests that 
evolutionary psychologists’ claims that gender differences are caused by domain-specific 
mechanisms effectively says something like the following: gender-differentiated traits are 
produced by psychological mechanisms which have been selected for producing the traits 
in question. This understanding assumes that the selective pressures on male and female 
psychology have been very different in certain regards. As a result of this, men and women 
today possess different purpose-specific psychological adaptations which are responsible 
for observed gender differences in psychology or behaviour.  
Presumably, on this view, the opposing claim that gender differences are caused by 
domain-general mechanisms states that gender differences are the product of a purpose-
general adaptation. A plausible candidate for such a purpose-general adaptation would be 
the human capacity for learning. This seems to suggest that saying gender differences are 
caused by domain-specific mechanism means that they are not the product of learning. 
An interpretation of domain-specificity along these lines therefore dovetails nicely with 
evolutionary psychologists’ aversion to the idea that human behaviour is mainly the 
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product of learning. But there is a caveat here. Saying that a trait is the product of a 
purpose-specific adaptation mainly states that the trait persists in the lineage because it 
has been selected for a specific effect. Contemporary evolutionary theory, however, 
recognises several ways in which a domain-general adaptation like learning itself can be 
involved in bringing about more purpose-specific adaptations (Jablonka & Lamb 2005). 
There is reason to believe that bird songs, for instance, are purpose-specific adaptations 
that are transmitted down generations by learning. In the human realm, arguments to this 
effect have been made, for instance, with regard to tool use and imitation (see, for 
instance, Sterelny 2005; Heyes 2011; 2012).  
On an adaptationist understanding of domain-specificity, then, gender differences 
brought about by learning could be considered the result of domain-specific mechanisms 
if the fact that men and women learn different traits is itself a sex-specific adaption. We 
could imagine, for instance, that children learn gender-differentiated mate preferences 
from their parents, and that this learning pattern spread in the population because it 
conveyed a relative fitness benefit. Hypotheses of this sort are rarely considered in any 
detail in the extant discussion on gender differences. I will come back to it in Section 5.5, 
after laying out the different interpretations of evolutionary psychological and social 
explanations in more detail. For now, we merely need to note that saying a gender-
differentiated behaviour is the product of a purpose-specific adaptation does not 
necessarily rule out that the behaviour is learned. 
Incidentally, the interpretation in terms of purpose-specific adaptations reflects how 
more charitable critics of evolutionary psychology tend to understand the notion of 
domain-specific mechanisms. They suggest that evolutionary psychology is defensible as 
long as proponents strictly adhere to their commitment to ultimate explanation. While 
evolutionary psychologists can tell us whether a specific trait is an adaptation, they should 
leave claims about proximate or developmental mechanisms to sciences who are in the 
business of empirically investigating them – such as developmental biology, psychology, 
or empirical social science (Lewens 2003; Goldfinch 2015). At times, evolutionary 
psychologists adhere to this recommendation. They insist that claims about ultimate 
causation do not entail any implications with respect to the proximate mechanism that 
reliably reproduce these mechanisms in each generation of individuals. Consider, for 
example, a study by David Buss which found cross-cultural evidence (from 33 countries 
from six continents) for differences in mate preferences between men and women (Buss 
1989a). The findings suggests that, on average, women put a higher value on signs of 
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resource acquisition such as wealth and education than men. Men, by comparison, put a 
relatively higher value on signs of reproductive capacity, such as youthful appearance and 
beauty. According to Buss, these finding support the evolutionary (i.e. ultimate) 
hypothesis that men and women possess “adaptations to sex-differentiated reproductive 
constraints in our evolutionary past” (Buss 1989a, 14). To clarify that he is only committed 
to the ultimate hypothesis, Buss is cautious to insist that  
 
[…] these results yield little information about the proximate (social, psychological, 
physiological, ontogenetic) mechanisms directly responsible for their existence. Possible 
candidates include genetic differences between the sexes, sensory preferences analogous to 
food preferences, socialization differences during development, and structural effects at a 
societal level such as those that limit female access to economic resources […] research on 
proximate mechanisms is needed to develop a more complete explanatory account of 
observed sex differences in mate preferences. 
 (Buss 1989a, 13) 
 
In this passage, Buss emphasises that his findings only relate to the evolutionary (or 
ultimate) hypothesis that the observed partner preferences are purpose-specific 
adaptations for mate choice. Questions about the proximate causes of these adaptive 
preferences, by contrast, are still open and might turn out to involve socialisation or even 
social structural features. Importantly, Buss’ discussion recognises the caveat noted above. 
He acknowledges that the (ultimate causation) hypothesis that a behaviour is the product 
of a specialised cognitive adaption is compatible with the (proximate causation) 
hypothesis that the behaviour is due to learning or even social structural causes.  
More often, however, evolutionary psychologists’ characterisations of domain-specific 
mechanisms straddle proximate and ultimate claims – in spite of their own commitment 
to carefully distinguishing between the two. Evolutionary psychologists tend to overstep 
the boundary from ultimate to proximate explanations by attacking social explanations of 
the same behaviour. They suggest that the claim that a behaviour is the product of 
domain-specific mechanisms implies that it cannot be attributed to socialisation or social 
learning – both of which are evidently proximate mechanisms. Donald Symons, for 
instance, disagrees with Buss’ above statement and argues that he should be more decisive 
about the implications for proximate mechanisms (Symons 1989). In particular, Symons 
suggests that social explanations of gender differences are incompatible with Buss’ 
hypothesis of domain-specific mechanisms for mate preferences:  
 
[social] scientists typically attribute human mate preferences, and sex differences therein, to 
such things as “cultural conditioning”, “socialization”, “social learning” and “stereotyped sex 
roles”[…] all of which imply that these preferences are underpinned by some sort of 
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generalized brain/mind mechanism (presumably of association or symbol manipulation); in 
other words, such theories imply that specialized mechanisms of mate preference do not exist. 
 (Symons 1989, 34, my emphasis) 
 
In other words, Symons seems to believe that a behaviour cannot both be the result of a 
domain-specific mechanisms and have social factors as proximate causes. We could cast 
off Symons’ objection by insisting that evolutionary psychology’s domain-specific 
mechanism simply are purpose-specific adaptations, and that Symons must be confusing 
his terminology. Properly understood, Buss’ hypothesis that gender differences are due to 
domain-specific mechanisms is compatible with the proximate mechanisms invoked in 
social explanations. But this would ignore the fact that Symons’ line of argument is 
representative of how many evolutionary psychologists seem to think about domain-
specific mechanisms. In the context of the debate on gender differences, it is fairly 
common for evolutionary psychologists to say, for instance, that traits which are due to 
domain-specific mechanism cannot be the product of learning. This suggests that Buss is 
invoking an alternative notion of domain-specific mechanism, according to which such 
mechanisms entail information about proximate causation after all. In the following 
section, I explore what exactly that notion is.  
5.2.3 Domain-specificity and innateness 
To understand what evolutionary psychologists’ mean when they talk about domain-
specific mechanisms in the way described above, it is helpful to consider Muhammad 
Khalidi’s analyses of the concepts of domain-specificity and innateness (Khalidi 2010; 
Khalidi 2001). To avoid terminological confusion, begin with Khalidi’s account of 
domain-specificity. For Khalidi, a domain-specific psychological mechanism (or 
“cognitive system”, in his words) is a mechanism that is in principle generalizable to new 
domains but fails to do so in practice for reasons having to do with the system’s 
evolutionary history. In Khalidi’s words, a domain-specific cognitive system is a system 
that “[…] systematically fails to yield a correct result in the case of stimuli that the system 
did not evolve to deal with” (Khalidi 2010, 196). As an example, he discusses the alarm 
calls of vervet monkeys. Researchers found that vervet monkeys utter three distinct alarm 
calls to warn their group members from three types of predators (leopards, eagles, and 
snakes). Yet they fail to produce distinct alarms calls for other types of predators that are 
prevalent in their environment. According to Khalidi, the mechanisms that underlies the 
alarm calls is domain-specific because it could in principle be applied to produce alarm 
calls for other predators that are frequently encountered, yet fails to do so in practice. 
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The above analysis offers a notion of domain-specificity that entails information about 
proximate mechanisms. It tells us that domain-specific mechanisms have specific 
information-processing characteristics in their role as proximate causes. But there is 
reason to doubt that it is the notion of domain-specificity used by evolutionary 
psychologists. While Khalidi claims that his analysis elucidates what domain-specificity 
means in the cognitive sciences more generally, he suggests that evolutionary 
psychologists are guilty of misusing this concept (Khalidi 2010, 195). To illustrate this, he 
points to a crucial mismatch between evolutionary psychologists’ use of the concept of 
domain-specificity and his own analysis. Evolutionary psychologists regularly use the 
concept of domain-specificity to describe preferences (such as preferences for particular 
mate characteristics, or for short versus long-term mating). But preferences are not the 
kind of entities that could be domain-specific in Khalidi’s sense. This, Khalidi argues, is 
because preferences are usually not in-principle generalizable. Instead of relying on a rule 
or principle that could in principle be applied to other domains but fails to do so in 
practice, the proposed mechanisms for mate selection rely on information of a specific 
subject matter – mating and reproduction (Khalidi 2010, 195-196). As a result, preferences 
for physical features of potential mates are not in principle generalizable to other domains 
such as food choice, because both domains involve entirely different sets of stimuli.  
Since evolutionary psychologists frequently use the term “domain-specificity” to refer 
to preferences and other traits which are not in-principle generalizable, it would be fair to 
suspect that they may have something entirely different in mind when using the term. 
This idea gains tractions once we consider common beliefs about the relationship between 
domain-specificity and innateness. In a second paper, Khalidi observes that many people 
(including many evolutionary psychologists) assume that the two concepts are intrinsically 
connected (Khalidi 2001). They believe that traits which are innate are the product of 
domain-specific mechanisms, and vice versa (Khalidi 2001, 192). Khalidi, however, 
suggests that this is wrong. The two concepts are independent – a trait can be the product 
of domain-specific mechanisms without being innate, and vice versa. This opens up an 
interesting possibility. When talking about “domain-specific” mechanism as proximate 
causes, evolutionary psychologists might actually be referring to a very different concept 
– the concept of innateness.  
Incidentally, some evolutionary psychologists used to describe domain-specific 
mechanisms as “innate” in earlier writings (see, for instance, Tooby & Cosmides 1989a; 
1989b; 1990), but seem to have renounced this terminology in more recent publications. 
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Instead, newer publication talk about the innate only in scare quotes, and often for the 
purpose of illustrating social scientists’ misunderstanding of evolutionary psychology 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Tooby & Cosmides 2005). This shift in terminology might 
have been motivated just as much by political controversy as by conceptual disputes. The 
concept of innateness has been subject to a huge amount of conceptual scrutiny. Some 
people argue that the concept is hopelessly confused and is best done away with in the 
scientific literature (Bateson 1991; Bateson & Martin 1999; Griffiths & Machery 2008). 
Other suggest that it is best understood along the lines of environmental canalization 
(Ariew 1996; Ariew 1999).  
Khalidi’s argument, however, relies on a different understanding of innateness – trigger 
(or dispositional) innateness. The notion of trigger innateness has been first introduced by 
Stephen Stich (Stich 1975). It suggests that a psychological trait or capacity is innate if it 
is susceptible to a poverty of the stimulus argument. The paradigm example of a poverty of 
the stimulus argument is Noam Chomsky’s argument about innate grammar in human 
language (Chomsky 1957; Chomsky 1966). According to Chomsky, children could not 
possibly acquire the complex rules of grammar on the basis of the language information 
they are exposed to alone. The reason this is impossible, he suggests, is that they are not 
exposed to comprehensive information about which sentence structures are not 
grammatical. Nevertheless, children come to know the grammar of their native language 
– they know which sentences are grammatical and which are not. Chomsky concludes 
that the informational deficit, i.e. the “missing” information about which sentence 
constructions are ungrammatical, has to be innate.  
Against this background, Khalidi suggests that a human cognitive feature is innate if 
there is an “informational deficit” between the learning input an individual receives, and 
the behavioural output that it produces (Khalidi 2001, 193). He concludes that once we 
understand the concepts of innateness and domain-specificity in these ways, we can see 
that they are independent. In particular, contrary to what evolutionary psychologists seem 
to assume, domain-specific capacities can be the product of learning, and domain-general 
capacities can be innate (Khalidi 2001, 196). However, evolutionary psychologists could 
object to this by arguing a psychological capacity that is domain-specific can achieve this 
resistance to generalisation only in virtue of an innate component. If the psychological 
capacity was entirely the product of general learning mechanisms, so they could argue, we 
should expect it to extend to a new domain easily via learning, because general learning 
mechanisms are unable to discriminate between different domains. 
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To see that this is not the case, consider again the example of vervet monkeys. In 
principle, we need not make recourse to an innate component in order to explain why the 
very same learning mechanisms leads to the development of predator-specific calls in 
some domains (leopards, eagles, snakes) but not others (humans, diggers, dogs). Instead, 
the ability to discriminate between domains could be the product of learning. For instance, 
parent monkeys could condition their offspring early on to pay particular interest to some 
predators (i.e. leopards, eagles, snakes) but not others. As a result of this conditioning, the 
monkeys are “primed” to develop specific alarm calls in reaction to these predators but 
not others. In other words, domain discrimination could be achieved not by innate 
components, but by a specific learning trajectory which primes individuals towards certain 
domains. Although I am not aware of any research suggesting that this is the actual 
developmental trajectory for monkey calls, priming by learning is an abundant mechanism 
in human psychology. Trained musicians tend to be more alert to musical patterns than 
others, trained philosophers tend to be more perceptive of the logical structure of 
arguments, etc. If this reply is correct, Khalidi’s argument for the independence of 
domain-specificity and innateness stands.  
5.2.4 Domain-specificity, innateness, and gender differences 
The above discussion suggests that evolutionary psychologists who want to infer claims 
about proximate causation from the concept of domain-specific mechanisms are not 
talking about domain-specificity at all. Instead, the phenomenon they intend to refer to is 
trigger innateness. There are several additional considerations that support this idea. For 
one thing, the notion of trigger innateness provides a neat contrast between “innate” and 
“learned” that suits the argumentative strategy used by many evolutionary psychologists. 
To say that a  capacity is trigger innate is to say that not all the information necessary to 
perform the capacity has been acquired by learning – some of it must come from “within” 
the individual, for instance in the form of genetic representation (Shea 2012). This 
dovetails nicely with evolutionary psychologists’ engagement of environmental factors as 
detailed in Section 5.1. There, we could see that evolutionary psychologists tend to think 
of environmental factors as “cues” for adaptive conditional strategies. This suggests that 
many evolutionary psychologists think of environmental factors primarily as triggers for 
behavioural responses that have been “hard-wired” in our evolutionary past. For them, 
the concept of trigger innateness provides a coherent way of spelling out the claim that 
gender differences are not merely the product of learning while acknowledging the 
(triggering) influence of environmental factors.  
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Note that we cannot make sense of this characteristic if we interpret evolutionary 
psychologists’ claim in terms of domain-specificity or purpose-specific adaptation. 
Neither concept provides a coherent interpretation of the claim that gender differences 
are “not merely the product of learning”. The claim that gender-differences are due to 
domain-specific mechanisms, in the sense detailed above, does not rule out the possibility 
that the mechanisms have been domain-specialised through a particular learning 
trajectory. At the same time, claiming that gender differences are purpose-specific 
adaptation does not imply that they cannot be learned. Learned traits, as argued above, 
can be purpose-specific adaptations. 
In addition, interpreting evolutionary psychologists’ claims in terms of trigger 
innateness enables us to make sense of the political tension in the debate in a way the 
notions of domain-specificity or purpose-specific adaption do not. Neither purpose-
specific adaptation nor domain-specificity are of much interest in the debate over gender 
differences. Nothing in the literature suggests that proponents of social explanations take 
any issue with the suggestion that psychological mechanisms responsible for gender 
differences fail to generalise to other domains. And while some people take issue with the 
suggestion that gender differences are adaptations, this is usually down to the fact that 
they are unaware of the fact that adaptations can be transmitted by learning. Instead, as 
suggested above, they typically associate such claims with the suggestion that the 
differences in question are innate.  
In contrast to domain-specificity and purpose-specific adaptations, the concept of 
innateness has been the direct target of endless political controversies (Block & Dworkin 
1976; Lewontin et al. 1984; Fausto-Sterling 1992; Segerstra ̊le 2000). These controversies 
are generally based on the assumption that innate traits are immutable or otherwise 
outside our responsibility. Given the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the concept 
of innateness, it is not possible to straightforwardly decide whether this assumption is 
justified. But this does not detract from the fact that the assumption exists and continues 
to fuel political controversy. This suggests that the widespread feminist opposition to 
evolutionary psychological explanations of gender differences may reflect feminists 
picking up on the fact that such explanations continue to invoke ideas of innateness. 
Rather than struggling to pin down claims about domain-specific psychological 





The discussion above suggests there are two ways of interpreting evolutionary 
psychologists’ reference to “domain-specific” psychological mechanisms, neither of 
which involves domain-specificity as understood in the cognitive sciences. The first 
interpretation takes seriously the commitment of some evolutionary psychologists to only 
make claims about proximate causation. On this interpretation, domain-specific 
psychological mechanisms are purpose-specific adaptations. Evolutionary psychological 
explanations, on this view, state that particular gender differences are adaptations, but 
without making claims about the proximate causes for these differences.  
On the second interpretation, and despite evolutionary psychologists’ attempts to 
eliminate the “innate” from their writings, their explanations are best understood as 
making claims about a specific form of innateness called trigger innateness. Trigger 
innateness not only provides an understanding of the innate precise enough to be of 
scientific use, but also allows us to make sense of two common characteristics of 
evolutionary psychological explanations: the often suggested contrast with “pure 
learning” explanations, and their immediate political explosiveness. However, insofar as 
evolutionary psychologists make claims about trigger innateness, they betray their 
commitment to restricting themselves to ultimate explanations. Together with this 
commitment, the idea vanishes that social and evolutionary psychological explanations 
are compatible simply in virtue of the fact that they address different causal questions. If 
both social and evolutionary psychological explanations address proximate factors of 
gender differences, we need to take a much closer look to find out whether these 
explanations are compatible. But before we can address this question, we first need to 
clarify the nature of social explanations.  
5.3 WHAT IS A SOCIAL EXPLANATION? 
5.3.1 Socialisation and social structures  
An obvious way to think about social explanations, and the one favoured by many 
evolutionary psychologists, is in terms of learning. According to this idea, social 
explanations understand human psychology and behaviour as shaped by learning 
processes in a social context. In the terminology of sociologists, this form of learning is 
referred to as socialisation. Socialisation comprises a diverse range of learning processes by 
which an individual comes to understand, predict and to varying degrees internalise and 
adhere to the norms, values, expectations and traditions of the society they live in.  
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In the context of the debate at hand, the focus lies specifically on gender socialisation, that 
is, social learning processes which lead individuals to acquire gender-differentiated 
psychological characteristics or behavioural dispositions. An example of a socialisation 
explanation of gender differences would be the following. Assume it’s true that men, on 
average, place a higher value than women on a potential partner’s youth and physical 
attractiveness. A social explanation in terms of gender socialisation could argue that this 
is because men and women are taught very different values regarding partner choice. For 
instance, boys and men tend to be more exposed to the idea, be it via the media, peers, 
or parents, that having a beautiful partner is an important symbol of personal success and 
social status. Girls and women, by contrast, are more frequently confronted with the 
message that partners should be physically or economically powerful. These differences 
in socialisation, so the argument continues, lead men more than women to internalise the 
idea that youthfulness and beauty are very desirable characteristics in a partner. As a result, 
men explicitly or implicitly use these criteria in partner choice more so than women do. 
There are several different pathways in which socialisation can influence human 
behaviour and psychology. As the example above suggests, socialisation explanations 
often involve internalisation.  Internalisation, here, is understood as the process by which 
individuals make a social norm or expectation part of their own system of beliefs and 
values. One way in which socialisation can influence people’s behaviour is by conscious 
internalisation. Individuals who consciously internalise certain norms are aware that they 
support the norms in question. Unless they see reason to conceal their views, these 
individuals will typically express support for the norms in targeted questionnaires and 
interviews. Subconscious internalisation, by contrast, cannot be picked up so easily. 
Subconscious internalisation occurs when social norms, values or beliefs influence an 
individual’s psychology and behaviour without being reflected in the individual’s explicitly 
held values and beliefs. This phenomenon is usually discussed in the literature in the 
context of implicit bias. An increasing number of studies on implicit bias show that 
individuals can discriminate against individuals in accordance with gender or racial 
stereotypes even when their explicit convictions are egalitarian (Greenwald & Banaji 1995; 
Greenwald & Krieger 2006). This suggests that socialisation may occur subconsciously, 
without affecting an individual’s explicit attitudes. 
In addition to this, socialisation need not involve internalisation at all – what is socially 
learned need not become part of one’s personal belief and value systems. Instead, 
individuals might simply adapt their preferences and behaviour to social norms, values, 
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or traditions in an instrumental manner. If individuals adapt a social norm instrumentally, 
they act in accordance with the norm not because they believe it to be right or good, but 
simply because they know that the norm is socially enforced and that failure to comply 
will in some way be punished. As an example, we could imagine a case where a man 
prefers young and physically attractive women not because he believes they are 
intrinsically more desirable partners, but because he knows his peers will think less of him 
if his partner does not fulfil this description. Both cases – subconscious internalisation 
and instrumental adaption of social norms – suggest that the influence of socialisation 
cannot always be picked up straightforwardly. In particular, it is unlikely to show up in 
people’s reports of their own beliefs and attitudes and therefore requires additional 
methodological tools. 
Although this discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, it gives us a good idea of the 
diverse pathways by which socialisation can affect human behaviour and psychology. 
However, there is another form of social explanation which does not rely on the idea of 
socialisation at all. These are so-called social structural explanations. Social structural 
explanations have been discussed in detail by Sally Haslanger (Haslanger 2016; Haslanger 
2015; see also Jackson & Pettit 1992). According to Haslanger, social structural 
explanations explain the behaviour of an individual by referring to the position the 
individual occupies in a social structure without having to invoke individual psychological 
differences. Social structures, in turn, are networks of social relations which can obtain 
either between different individuals or between individuals and things. Importantly, social 
structures can constrain the behaviour of individuals in ways which can be explanatorily 
relevant.  
As an example, Haslanger discusses a social structural explanation for the continuing 
economic disadvantage of women relative to men (Haslanger 2016; see also Okin 1989; 
Cudd 2006). The example is illustrated with a couple, Lisa and Larry, who decide to have 
children. Lisa and Larry are completely identical with respect to their education, talents, 
interests, and intelligence. As a result, they are both perfectly equally qualified when it 
comes to either paid employment or child care/domestic work. However, given the 
society they live in, Lisa and Larry a facing a set of structural constraints when making the 
decision to have a child. The relevant constraints include having to do paid work to 
support their family, a shortage in affordable child care, and, importantly, a wage gap 
between men and women with women, on average, earning twenty-five percent less than 
men. While the need for paid work and the shortage in childcare in principle affect Lisa 
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and Larry equally, the gender wage gap affects them differently qua their social position as 
man/woman. This has a crucial impact on Lisa’s and Larry’s likely arrangements for 
childcare. According to Haslanger, the difference in earnings makes it “[…] reasonable 
for Larry to work fulltime and for Lisa to make adjustments in her work, e.g., to work 
part-time, to take time off, to take a less demanding job” (Haslanger 2016). Furthermore, 
insofar as most heterosexual couples in a society are subject to the same constraints as 
Lisa and Larry, their reasoning is representative of a general pattern in that society. Even 
if partners in all heterosexual couples are psychologically identical and perfectly rational, 
given the structural constraints, they will arrive at the same arrangements for distributing 
paid and domestic work.  
In addition, the upshot of this structurally caused collective decision pattern is to 
reinforce the structures that gave rise to it. For not only will it leave the majority of women 
with less economic power in their relationships, it also reinforces the existing wage gap 
between men and women. After all, from the perspective of employers, the decision 
pattern suggests that women are more likely than men to leave their career or to split their 
energies between paid work and housework. This makes women more risky job 
candidates than men. As a result, women are likely to be considered eligible only for jobs 
that require less commitment, mobility, or experience, and are therefore less financially 
rewarded. Thus, women’s relative economic disadvantage has been reinforced.  
5.3.2 The relationship between different types of social explanations 
In this section, we will take a brief look at how the different types of social explanations 
relate and to what extent evolutionary psychologists are aware of this. From what we have 
learned so far, we know that evolutionary psychologists think of social explanations 
primarily as socialisation explanations that make reference to learned differences. But 
there are important exceptions. David Buss and Michael Barnes, for instance, distinguish 
“socialisation” and “structural effects” (Buss & Barnes 1986). As an example of a social 
explanation that invokes structural effects, they discuss the “female economic 
powerlessness” hypothesis (Buss & Barnes 1986; see also Buss 1989a). The female 
economic powerlessness hypothesis is meant to explain women’s preference for partners 
with signs of high earning capacity, as measured in self-report questionnaires. The 
hypothesis suggests that women’s preference can be explained by the fact that women 
have less access to economic resources and power than men, and can therefore best attain 
these resources by choosing a mate that can provide them (Buss & Barnes 1986, 569).  
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Despite distinguishing socialisation and social structural processes conceptually, Buss 
and Barnes later suggest that the two are empirically connected to a degree that, for them, 
seems to make it unnecessary to discuss each as a causal mechanism in its own right. They 
claim that “traditional socialization practices are presumed to maintain and support these 
structural differences, and are used to inculcate role-appropriate values in males and 
females” (Buss & Barnes 1986. 569). Consequently, in all of the following discussion, 
socialisation and social structural explanations are treated as a single “Structural 
Powerlessness and Sex Role Socialization” hypothesis for the gender differences in mate 
preferences (Buss 1989a; Buss 1989b; Symons 1989)  
The claim that socialisation and social structural mechanisms are empirically connected 
is certainly true to an extent. Socialisation and social structures are intricately related and 
in many cases mutually constitutive. After all, individuals are generally subject to particular 
types of socialisation (e.g. gender socialisation, professional socialisation) qua occupying a 
certain social position. Often, socialisation pressures on these positions will work to 
stabilise and reinforce the social structure. Moreover, it seems that social structural 
features themselves could give rise to socialisation processes. In our examples, the fact 
that Lisa and Larry confront different social constraints might lead them to develop 
desires, preferences, and expectations. For instance, Larry’s desire for a professional 
career might plausibly be reinforced by the relative prospects of success. By contrast, in 
light of her professional challenges, Lisa might learn to “not want what she can’t have” 
and attribute higher value to things like spending time with her child and looking after the 
house. In this case, differential structural constraints made Larry and Lisa develop 
different psychological characteristics, hence set off a process of gender-differentiated 
socialisation in its own right. 
Although socialisation and social structures are likely to be intertwined in the way Buss 
and Barnes suggest, the problems with entirely collapsing the different aspects into a 
single hypothesis are several. First of all, Buss and Barnes’ characterisation suggest that 
socialisation and social structural features always point in the same direction. This ignores 
the possibility that socialisation and social structures can have a significant degree of 
independence. Socialisation processes, for instance, need not support existing social 
structures unequivocally. Imagine that a government decides to address the gender wage 
gap by implementing a policy for progressive gender role socialisation that aims to get 
more women into the better-paid traditionally male professions. If successful, this 
“socialisation reform” would counter rather than reinforce the social structures that 
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disadvantage women economically. Now imagine the scenario of a society that managed 
to abolish the wage gap and its resulting social structural effects. In such a scenario, 
residuals of traditional gender role socialisation could lead women to continue doing the 
majority of housework despite equal or higher professional success than their male 
partners. These examples suggest that socialisation can precede as well as lag behind social 
structural change – the influence of socialisation and social structures need not be 
consistent. 
The same is true the other way around. Social structures can effect gender-
differentiated behaviour without requiring any supporting socialisation, that is, without 
requiring learned (or, for that matter, innate) differences in men’s and women’s underlying 
psychology. Consider again the example of Lisa and Larry. The example presumed that 
Lisa and Larry are entirely identical with regard to their education, talents, interests, and 
intelligence, yet settle on a division of labour in accordance with traditional gender 
stereotypes. This suggests that social structures like the wage gap may lead to a gender-
differentiated pattern of behaviour even when men and women have not been exposed 
to any gender-differentiating socialisation. In other words, while socialisation explanations 
explain gender differences in behaviour by referring to learned differences in men’s and 
women’s psychology, social structural explanations do not require psychological 
differences of any kind. Instead, they can explain such differences simply by pointing to 
the differential structural constraints faced by men and women.  
In addition to conflating socialisation and social structural explanations, Buss and 
Barnes’ fail to acknowledge different types of socialisation explanations. Their claim that 
socialisation processes “inculcate role-appropriate values in males and females” suggests 
that gender role socialisation always involves internalisation of the relevant values. This 
description fails to acknowledge the difference between conscious and subconscious 
internalisation, which – as argued above – require different methods for being picked up 
empirically. It also fails to acknowledge that some socialisation processes do not involve 
internalisation at all. As discussed above, individuals might decide to adhere to social 
norms for purely instrumental reasons, without making the norm a conscious or 
subconscious part of their belief system.  
In other words, when discussing social explanations of gender differences, 
evolutionary psychologists do not always acknowledge the different types of social 
explanations and the underlying causal pathways that they represent. This omission may 
have a grave impact on evolutionary psychologists’ scientific reasoning. Distinguishing 
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the different social processes is not simply a matter of acknowledging the complexity of 
social mechanisms for gender differences. It has important implications because each of 
the mechanisms described above potentially requires different kinds of evidence to be 
supported or dismissed. 
This problem becomes apparent in Schmitt’s discussion of gender differences in 
sociosexuality introduced above (Schmitt 2005). Schmitt considers gender socialisation as 
a possible alternative to his hypothesis that gender differences in sociosexuality are innate. 
His discussion of the socialisation hypothesis, however, is rather concise. Upon reviewing 
three studies that find no evidence that men and women in Western societies hold explicit 
sexual double standards, he concludes that the socialisation hypothesis has been 
disproved. Based on this reasoning, he infers that we should not assume “that men and 
women will soon become equally promiscuous in both attitudes and behaviors, even when 
women are eventually treated as the social equals of men across all cultures” (Schmitt 
2005, 272). In other words, Schmitt concludes from his brief encounter with social 
explanations that gender differences in sociosexuality are most likely “biological” and 
therefore unlikely to be affected by our efforts to build more gender equal societies. 
In light of the discussion in this section, it is obvious that this chain of reasoning is 
highly problematic. Schmitt’s decision to reject the socialisation hypothesis on the basis 
of three studies finding no evidence for explicit sexual double standards is not only based 
on a dubious evidential basis (how were those studies selected? What about the wealth of 
feminist literature on sexual double standards?) it also reflects an overly simplistic 
understanding of the complex and often subtle mechanisms of gender socialisation (Beal 
1994; Grusec & Hastings 2007; Rudman & Glick 2010). Part of this oversimplification is 
the assumption that double standards for promiscuity in men and women do not exist 
merely because they could not be measured in people’s explicit attitudes. As argued above, 
people can internalise such values subconsciously, without being able to report having 
them. As a result, the evidence brought forward by Schmitt is a long way from providing 
a conclusive case against the socialisation hypothesis.  
In addition to this, Schmitt believes that the lack of evidence for explicit sexual double 
standards undermines both the socialisation hypothesis and the social structural 
(“structural powerlessness”) hypotheses as plausible explanations for the observed gender 
differences (Schmitt 2005, 272). But this is not the case. Even if the cited studies would 
undermine the socialisation hypothesis as a plausible explanation of gender differences in 
sociosexuality, it may still be possible to explain the differences with social structural 
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features. Proponents of a social structural explanation for gender differences in 
sociosexuality could point to the fact that men and women are subject to very different 
social structural constraints when it comes to relative power in relationships, economic 
dependence on a long-term partner, or the risks of becoming victim of violence at the 
hands of a sexual partner. In light of these differences, they could argue that sex outside 
committed relationships is an objectively far more risky endeavour for women than for 
men. According to this argument, what discourages women from engaging in 
sociosexuality is not confined to the realm of cultural norms and ideas. It partly stems 
from real structural asymmetries which distribute the dangers associated with 
promiscuous behaviour unfavourably towards women.  
5.3.3 Summary 
In this section, I argued that it is important to distinguish two types of social explanations 
for gender differences: socialisation and social structural explanations. Socialisation 
explanations explain gender differences by pointing to differences in gender socialisation, 
that is, differences in social norms, values, and expectations that men and women learn 
about during their lifetime. While socialisation explanations always refer to learning 
processes, these learning processes can lead to different results, including conscious and 
subconscious internalisation as well as merely instrumental awareness of the relevant 
norms. Social structures are empirically intertwined with socialisation processes. 
Nevertheless, social structural explanations do not need to postulate learned differences 
in men’s and women’s psychology in order to explain gender differences in behaviour. 
Instead, social structural explanations can explain gender differences in behaviour by 
pointing to the different social constraints faced by men and women.  
While evolutionary psychologists show some awareness of these distinctions, such as 
the difference between socialisation and social structural effects, they often do not fully 
acknowledge them in their arguments. This is crucial, because different types of social 
explanations come with different evidential requirements. I showed that the failure to 
recognise and address different types of social explanations for gender differences, has 
led some evolutionary psychologists to prematurely conclude that gender differences 
must be innate.   
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5.4 HOW EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL 
EXPLANATIONS RELATE 
The previous sections distinguished different types of social and evolutionary 
psychological explanations and explored to what extent the opposite parties recognise 
them. We saw that either side has only partial awareness of the explanations for gender 
differences offered by the other. Proponents of social explanations typically understand 
evolutionary psychologists as claiming that gender differences are innate or “hard-wired”. 
They fail to acknowledge that some evolutionary psychologists instead claim that gender 
differences are purpose-specific adaptations, which may be compatible with proximate 
social explanations. At the same time, evolutionary psychologists demonstrate only 
limited awareness of the different types of social explanations, which sometimes leads 
them to premature conclusions. While this discussion already pointed to some ways in 
which social and evolutionary explanations may or may not be compatible, a systematic 
examination of how different combinations of social and evolutionary psychological 
explanations relate is still outstanding. In this section I explore how exactly each different 
type of evolutionary psychological explanation identified in Section 5.2 relates to each 
different type of social explanation explored in Section 5.3.  
5.4.1 Explanatory relations 
For that purpose, it is useful to first of all recall the different types of logical relationships 
that can obtain between two explanations. The following list is by no means exhaustive, 
but it outlines the options that are of main relevance to the debate. 
5.4.1.1 Mutual exclusion 
Two explanations are mutually exclusive if they make conflicting claims about the causal 
facts that bring about a phenomenon. Mutual exclusion implies that the two explanations 
cannot both be true (though they can, of course, both be false). The idea that social and 
evolutionary psychological explanations of gender differences are mutually exclusive has 
been popular amongst feminists as well as among evolutionary psychologists who, so I 
argued, implicitly understand evolutionary psychological explanations as claims about 
trigger innateness. Saying that two explanations are mutually exclusive is the same as 
saying that they are incompatible. 
5.4.1.2 Compatibility 
Compatibility is the opposite of mutual exclusion. To say that two explanations are 
compatible is simply to say that they are not mutually exclusive. In other words, two 
143 
 
compatible explanations do not make conflicting claims about causal facts and can 
therefore both be true. Two explanations can be compatible simply in virtue of being 
entirely irrelevant to each other, typically because they are not addressing the same 
phenomenon. For instance, the explanation that the moon is bright because it reflects the 
light of the sun is compatible with the explanation that homosexuality became 
decriminalized in the US because of the Stonewall riots, but this is simply because the two 
explanations are not at all relevant to each other.  
This is not usually the case in the discussion on gender differences. Because the social 
and evolutionary explanations in questions tend to be explanations of the same type of 
phenomenon (for instance, observed gender differences in promiscuity) compatible 
explanations will generally be relevant to a joint explanatory purpose. Explanations which 
are compatible in this sense may differ with respect to explanatory or pragmatic concerns, 
that is, their underlying idea of a good explanation for the context at hand. Nevertheless, 
they can converge on the same causal-ontological story. One example of this form of 
compatibility are explanations which differ only with respect to causal selection. Such 
explanations implicitly recognise the same set of causal conditions for the occurrence of 
a certain phenomenon, yet differ in terms of which causal conditions they decide to 
foreground as explanatorily relevant in specific context. Depending on our interests, for 
instance, we may explain the fire in the barn by the presence of oxygen, or by the fact that 
the children were playing with matches. But both explanations converge on a single causal 
history, a history which involves both the presence of oxygen and the fact that children 
were playing with matches. 
5.4.1.3 Complementarity (of proximate and ultimate explanations) 
In the context of the discussion on gender differences, it is sometimes said that 
evolutionary psychological and social explanations are not mutually exclusive because they 
address different types of questions. This view, as in Section 5.1, presupposes that 
evolutionary psychological explanations are ultimate explanations which tell us why the 
extant population of humans consists of individuals who have a particular trait, and that 
social explanation are proximate explanations which describe the mechanisms by which 
individuals come to develop the trait during their lifetime. It is important to note that the 
claim can be interpreted in two different ways. The weaker interpretation merely states 
that evolutionary psychology’s ultimate explanations are compatible with social scientist’ 
proximate explanations, without making any suggestion as to how they relate. In general, 
however, proponents of this idea have a stronger claim in mind. They suggest that social 
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and evolutionary psychological explanations are complementary proximate and ultimate 
explanations of the same type of mechanism. For this to be true, the proximate 
mechanism that figures in a social explanation must have been subject to the evolutionary 
pressures described in evolutionary psychologists’ ultimate explanations. The discussion 
on how social explanations relate to claims about purpose-specific adaptations will tell us 
more about this. But to begin with, I will first look at the relationship between social 
explanations and explanations about trigger innateness. 
5.4.2 Social explanations and trigger innateness 
5.4.2.1 Socialisation and trigger innateness 
The relationship between socialisation explanations and trigger innateness explanations is 
seemingly straightforward. Since trigger innate traits are explicitly defined as traits which 
are not the product of learning, so it is commonly suggested in the debate, a trait cannot 
be trigger innate and the product of socialisation at the same time. Since the relevant 
contrast is with learned traits as such, we do not need to distinguish between conscious 
or subconscious internalisation and instrumentally learned traits. The common 
understanding suggests that socialisation and trigger innateness refer to two incompatible 
developmental processes – it’s either one or the other, but not both. However, once we 
take a closer look, this description turns out to be a false dichotomy. After all, there is no 
reason why a particular gender difference (such as differences in mate preference) could 
not be the joint product of a trigger innate and a socialisation component. For instance, 
men’s observed preference for young partners could be a trigger-innate tendency 
amplified by being socialised in a culture which objectifies women and values 
youthfulness.3 In other words, socialisation and trigger innateness point to independent 
causal processes. But, despite a common misconception to the contrary, there is no reason 
to think that they are necessarily mutually exclusive. 
5.4.2.2 Social structures and trigger innateness 
A similar consideration applies to the relationship between social structural explanations 
and claims about trigger innateness. Recall that trigger innateness explanations of gender 
differences suggest the existence of different innate mechanism in men and women. 
These differences would result in different manifest behaviour even in identical social 
environments. Social structural explanations, by contrast, suggests that gender-
differentiated behaviour is the result of differential structural constraints. These different 
                                                 
3 Note that, in this case, it would of course be wrong to say that the observed trait is innate. Instead, we would have to say that 
the observed trait has an innate component. 
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social constraints, so the idea goes, will lead to gender-differentiated behaviour even if 
men and women do not at all differ psychologically – neither due to socialisation nor as 
a matter of trigger innate differences. We can see from this that social structural 
explanations and trigger innateness explanations refer to two processes for gender-
differentiated behaviour which are causally independent – the one can occur without the 
other, and vice versa. However, this does not imply that social structural and trigger innate 
mechanisms cannot jointly be responsible for a particular behavioural outcome. 
To see this, it helps to look in a bit more detail at the potential interactions between 
socialisation and social structural mechanism. Social structural mechanism, as suggested 
above, can work in tandem with socialisation. It is plausible to assume, for instance, that 
the structural reasons that keep women in the home are amplified by a gender role 
socialisation which portrays men as breadwinners and women as domestic and caring. 
How exactly can we conceptualise this “amplification”? I suggest a useful way of thinking 
about it is in terms of “tipping points”. The tipping point, in this example, is the point at 
which structural constraints are so unequal as to affect differential behavioural responses 
from men and women. To illustrate this point, imagine we start off with a society of 
perfect gender equality where women are just as likely to pursue paid labour as domestic 
work. Assume that we gradually introduce a wage gap into this society. It seems likely that 
the more the wage gap disadvantages women, the more women will end up in domestic 
work rather than full-time paid employment. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to men.  
Socialisation interacts with these structural effects by changing individuals’ tipping 
points between different labour arrangements. Gender-differentiated socialisation can 
influence men’s and women’s readiness to give up paid employment and take on child 
care. This, in turn, affects how big the wage gap has to be to motivate individual couples 
to adopt a certain division of labour. If women, for instance, are socialised into a caring 
role and men are not, couples might tend to adopt a traditional division of labour even in 
light of a narrow wage gap. If the socialisation of men and women emphasises care work 
equally, by contrast, it will probably take a wider wage gap to bring about the same pattern 
of division of labour.   
Understanding this interaction between social structural and socialisation effects is 
important, because the relationship between trigger innate factors and social structural 
effects can be modelled in the same way. To see this, consider the suggestion that women, 
on average, have a stronger innate preference to care for children than men. This 
hypothetical innate difference can interact with structural effects just in the same way as 
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the learned difference described above. Hence, we can think of innate difference in caring 
preferences as influencing the tipping point of structural inequalities. In a society where 
women have a stronger innate preference for care work, the width of the wage gap 
required to make couples adopt a traditional division of labour would be narrower than 
in a society where men’s  and women’s innate preferences are identical.  
This discussion suggests that explanations which refer to psychological gender 
differences – be they innate or learned – are, in principle, perfectly compatible with social 
structural explanations. It is possible that social structural explanations and innateness 
explanations simply refer to different aspects of the causal history behind a specific gender 
difference. 
5.4.2.3. Innateness, social explanations, and evidence 
According to the previous discussion, any given gender difference could, in principle, be 
the joint product of any combination of socialisation, social structures, and trigger innate 
features. This suggests that social explanations and claims about trigger innateness are 
generally compatible. However, while the previous discussion suggests that both 
socialisation explanations and social structural explanations are in principle compatible 
with trigger innateness explanations on the level of causal facts, a tension becomes apparent 
once we consider how these explanations relate evidentially. Claims about trigger 
innateness, as argued in Section 5.2, need to be established by poverty of the stimulus 
arguments. Poverty of the stimulus arguments require demonstrating that the trait 
developed in an environment which is informationally impoverished relative to the output 
trait. This implies that the evidential route for establishing claims about trigger innateness 
is primarily an indirect or negative one: to show that a trait is innate, one needs to 
demonstrate that it appears in the absence of stimuli which are “informationally rich” 
with respect to the relevant trait. By contrast, if there is reason to believe that the 
environment is informationally rich enough to explain the trait without recourse to trigger 
innate components, claims about trigger innateness cannot get off the ground.  
In the context of the debate on gender differences, this means proponents of trigger 
innateness explanations would have to argue that the social environment is 
informationally impoverished relative to the observed gender-differentiated behaviour or 
psychological feature. In other words, they would have to demonstrate that the nature of 
the observed gender differences cannot be explained by reference to socialisation or social 
structural effects alone. The problem for proponents of trigger innateness explanations, 
then, is that both socialisation and social structural explanations of gender differences 
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describe environments as informationally enriched in the relevant respects. In 
socialisation explanations, the relevant informational content is present in cultural 
messages about social norms, values, and expectations and can be consciously or 
subconsciously internalised or just instrumentally learned. In social structural 
explanations, the informational content is imprinted into structural constraints which 
provide men and women with different options at different costs. This means that, as 
long as we have reason to believe that any of these social explanations are true for a 
specific gender difference, we have no reason to think that there could be a trigger innate 
component involved.  
Evolutionary psychologists make some efforts to show that the environment is 
informationally impoverished in the relevant ways. In Section 5.3, for instance, we saw 
Schmitt arguing that gender differences in sociosexuality must be innate because there are 
no sexual double standards in modern Western nations. Yet, due to Schmitt’s failure to 
distinguish socialisation from social structural mechanisms, this attempt fails. In other 
words, if evolutionary psychologists are to make a thorough case for trigger innate gender 
differences, they would have to engage with different types of social explanations of 
gender differences to a much greater extent than they presently do. In a surprising 
argumentative twist, evolutionary psychologists sometime try to turn this reasoning on its 
head. Hence, Buss argues that 
 
[the] structural powerlessness hypothesis […] and subsequent social structural variants are 
fundamentally indefensible, because their core premise of male and female identity of underlying 
psychology was always theoretically problematic and is now known to be empirically false 
 (Buss 2005, 279, my emphasis) 
 
However, such claims about the empirically established falsehood of the innate 
psychological identity of men and women are not generally backed up with any evidence 
other than evolutionary psychological conjecture. Buss’ chain of reasoning, for instance, 
concludes that evolution must have created innate, gender-specific adaptations on the 
psychological level simply because it has created them on the anatomical level as well. The 
upshot of Buss’ argument, then, is that social structural (and, presumably, socialisation) 
explanations of gender differences have no plausibility unless they demonstrate that there 
are no innate psychological gender differences. In other words, he suggests that the 
requirement of a poverty of the stimulus argument for trigger innateness is mirrored in a 
requirement for a “poverty of innate psychology” argument for social explanations.  
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This would be true if proponents of social explanations, by using the same reasoning 
technique as evolutionary psychologists, simply took the very existence of gender 
differences as evidence that there is a social explanation for it. Social scientists might use 
this technique as a heuristic device for discovering gender-differentiated aspect of 
socialisation or social structures that previously went unnoticed. But in general, social 
explanations of gender differences draw on a much richer source of evidence which often 
directly relate to the specific sort of mechanisms they describe. Consider the following, 
very brief sampling of such empirical resources: Studies show that adults evaluate and 
interact with babies differently depending on what they assume the baby’s gender to be 
(Culp et al. 1983; Meyer & Sobieszek 1972; Sobieszek 1978). Systematic evaluation of the 
presentation of men and women in media, literature, and advertising supplies ubiquitous 
evidence for gender-differentiated cultural norms and expectations (Davis 2003; Smith 
1994; Lauzen et al. 2008; Kay & Furnham 2013). Evidence for differential social structural 
constraints faced by men and women is provided, for instance, in the form of statistical 
data on the wage gap, professional segregation, or women’s higher susceptibility to 
becoming a single parent, to working in precarious conditions, or to becoming subject of 
violence at the hands of an intimate partner (Equality and Human Rights Commission 
2011; Office for National Statistics 2015; Department of Health 2005). 
In other words, unlike claims about innate psychological traits, claims about 
socialisation or social structures are based on empirical evidence for the underlying 
mechanisms. Such evidence undermines evolutionary psychologists’ claims about 
innateness, because it undermines poverty of the stimulus arguments. The result is an 
evidential asymmetry between trigger innateness explanations on the one hand and social 
explanations on the other. While proponents of social explanations can base their 
explanations directly on empirical evidence, proponents of trigger innateness – unable to 
produce any direct evidence for their own hypotheses – rely crucially on the absence of 
evidence for social explanations to give any credit to the idea that the mechanisms they 
propose exist. But the same is not true the other way around. Even if we had evidence 
for the existence of innate psychological gender differences, this would not by itself 
undermine social explanations of gender differences as long as there is direct evidence for 
the existence of the proposed social mechanisms.  
5.4.3 Social explanations and purpose-specific adaptation 
Having clarified the relationship between social explanations and claims about trigger 
innateness, it is time to consider how social explanations relate to the arguably less 
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controversial interpretation of evolutionary psychologists’ claims: the idea that gender 
differences are purpose-specific adaptations. On this interpretation, to say that a trait is 
the product of domain-specific psychological mechanisms is to say that it is an adaptation 
or, more precisely, that there has been selection for the trait in question because it 
increased our ancestors’ fitness. The relationship between social explanations and 
purpose-specific adaptation claims is bound to differ in one important respect from the 
relationship between social explanations and trigger innateness explanations. Trigger 
innateness, socialisation, and social structures all point to proximate mechanisms for the 
production of human behaviour. Hence, the relationship between these different 
explanations is a question of how different proximate mechanisms relate to each other. 
Claims about purpose-specific adaptations, by contrast, are claims about ultimate 
causation. As explained previously, they concern the selective history of a trait. They tell 
us whether a trait is widespread in the human population today for a particular reason – 
because it made a specific contribution to our ancestors’ fitness.  
As a result, there is a specific range of possible answers to the questions how social 
explanations and purpose-specific adaptation claims relate. In principle, there seem to be 
two ways in which social explanations and claims about purpose-specific adaptation could 
relate. The social explanation could describe the proximate mechanism for realising the 
adaptive trait. In this case, the social explanation would pick out factors which contribute 
to the same mechanism which produced the trait in our ancestors and which have been 
subject to natural selection. In this case, the social explanation and the evolutionary 
psychological explanation would be complementary, because they provide proximate and 
ultimate explanations of the same phenomenon.  
Alternatively, social explanations may describe a proximate mechanism for the trait in 
question which could not plausibly have been subject to natural selection. In this case, the 
social explanation and the explanation in terms of purpose-specific adaptation are not 
complementary, but they may still be compatible. The reason for this is that there might 
be other mechanisms which contribute towards the development of the trait and which 
have been subject to natural selection. In the debate at hand, a prime example of this 
scenario would be a gender difference which is the joint product of non-adaptive social 
mechanisms and an adaptive innate component. As long as there exists a component 
which has been favoured by natural selection for contributing to the gender difference in 
question, it would be correct to say that the gender difference is a purpose-specific 
adaptation. Since the social mechanism, in this scenario, also causally contributes to the 
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gender difference, we could say that the difference is socially caused and a purpose-specific 
adaptation, even though the two explanations are not in any way related. 
In other words, social explanations and claims about purpose-specific adaptations can 
be complementary, and they can be compatible without being complementary. Could they 
also be mutually exclusive? Evolutionary psychologists, as we have seen above, sometimes 
suggest that social and evolutionary psychological explanations are compatible simply in 
virtue of the fact that they address different levels of causation (proximate versus 
ultimate). If evolutionary psychological explanations refer to claims of purpose-specific 
adaptations (rather than trigger innateness in disguise) this is indeed the case. If social 
explanations of gender difference are compatible with the idea that the difference is in 
part due to innate psychological differences between men and women, it is also 
compatible with the claim that the difference is a purpose-specific adaptation. The reason 
for this is that the innate psychological difference could be the product of natural 
selection. As a result, social explanations and claims about purpose-specific adaptations 
are not generally mutually exclusive, but either compatible or complementary. Before 
closing this chapter, we need to consider under what circumstances different types of 
social explanations may be complementary to, rather than merely compatible with, claims 
about purpose-specific adaptations.  
5.4.4 Socialisation and purpose-specific adaptation 
When asking whether socialisation explanations could be complementary to claims about 
purpose-specific adaptation, we are essentially asking whether natural selection can 
operate on psychological traits which are learned rather than trigger innate. The reason 
for this, as argued above, is that proximate and ultimate explanations are complementary 
if the mechanism or factor identified in the proximate explanation is the same mechanism 
or factor which is identified as the product of natural selection in the ultimate explanation. 
Since socialisation explanations explain gender differences in terms of social learning 
processes, they can only be complementary to ultimate explanations if natural selection 
acts on transmission by learning.  
Incidentally, this latter question has been much discussed in philosophy of biology, 
with the general answer being “yes, but only under specific circumstances”.  In practice, 
there seem to be a number of human and non-human traits whose development, as well 
as transmission across generations, crucially relies on social learning. Prominent examples 
include language, upright gait, tool use and, arguably, imitation (Heyes 2011; 2018; Ray & 
Heyes 2011; McNeil et al. 1984; Sterelny 2005; Laland 2004). Moreover, all of these traits 
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are likely to make an important contribution to an individual’s survival and reproduction. 
It is therefore plausible to assume that these traits are adaptations which are transmitted 
via learning. Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb have explored this idea in detail on a more 
theoretical level (Jablonka & Lamb 2005). They argue that it is possible for natural 
selection to act on traits which are transmitted by social learning rather than genes. This 
is not obvious, because transmission by social learning differs from transmission by, say, 
genes in one crucial respect. Unlike genes, social learning not merely allows vertical 
(parents to offspring) transmission, but also for horizontal (within-generation) 
transmission. Horizontal transmission tends to undermine natural selection, because it 
allows traits to spread in the population irrespectively of their fitness benefit.  
This does not mean that horizontal transmission is automatically irrelevant to the 
discussion at hand. Some would argue that horizontal social transmission can give rise to 
an evolutionary process in its own right called cultural evolution (Richerson & Boyd 2005; 
Kronfeldner 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2012; Lewens 2015). Cultural evolution describes a 
process in which socially transmitted traits spread in the population, not (or not primarily) 
depending on whether they increase the fitness of those who carry them, but depending 
on whether they possess “cultural fitness”. However, it is plausible to assume that the 
concept of cultural selection is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. The reason for this is 
that cultural fitness describes a trait’s success in being transmitted across a population 
independently of whether or not it conveys a fitness advantage onto the individual who 
possesses the trait. Evolutionary psychologists, however, are concerned with whether or 
not a trait has spread in the population because it conveyed a fitness advantage on 
individuals who possess it. This means that, on evolutionary psychologists’ understanding 
of adaptations, socially transmitted traits that have been subject to cultural rather than 
natural selection to not qualify as purpose-specific adaptions.  
All this suggests that, in order for a socialisation explanation to be complementary to 
an ultimate explanation, the socialisation explanation must refer primarily to vertical 
(parent to offspring) rather than horizontal transmission by learning. But this is not 
generally the case for socialisation explanations of gender differences. Socialisation 
explanations of gender differences typically suggest that the norms, values, and 
expectations which underlie gender-differentiated socialisation permeate large parts of 
society. They are not only, and possibly not even primarily, communicated by parents, but 
also by peers, the media, teachers, and so forth. In other words, in the case of gender 
socialisation, horizontal transmission of the relevant norms, values, and expectations is 
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ubiquitous and might well overpower vertical transmission. This suggests that 
socialisation explanations do not usually describe mechanisms which could have been 
subject to natural selection. As a result, we should not expect socialisation explanations 
to be complementary to the ultimate explanations put forward by evolutionary 
psychologists.   
5.4.5 Social structures and purpose-specific adaptation 
Finally, consider the question whether social structural explanations and claims about 
purpose-specific adaptations can be complementary. As before with socialisation 
explanations, another way of phrasing this question is to ask whether social structural 
explanations refer to the same proximate mechanisms that evolutionary psychologists 
identify as purpose-specific adaptations. We can see that this idea runs into difficulties 
even more easily than when applied to socialisation explanations. Natural selection, as 
argued above, depends on their being heritable (that is, vertically transmittable) 
differences between individuals. Social structures, quite obviously, are not heritable 
differences between individuals. Instead, they are environmental factors that, by 
definition, affect individuals in the same social positions in the same way. While 
socialisation mechanisms could, at least in theory, be subject to natural selection acting 
on vertical transmission by learning, this is not the case for social structural effects.  
In principle, this leaves open the possibility that social structures could be subject to a 
different type of selection. Some philosophers and evolutionary biologists recognise the 
possibility of group selection (Griesemer & Wade 1988, Sober & Wilson 1998). Group 
selection is a form of natural selection acting on groups not individuals, and favouring the 
evolution of traits which are adaptive for the group rather than the individual. It might be 
possible to conceptualise social structural mechanisms as (socially) heritable differences 
between human groups, for instance between different cultures. In this case, social 
structural mechanisms might qualify for something like group selection acting on socially 
transmitted variants. To defend this option, we would have to discuss in more detail the 
controversy on group selection and explore how it may apply to social structures (Lloyd 
2001; Okasha 2006). However, these efforts would not help us to clarify the debate on 
gender differences. The reason for this is that evolutionary psychological explanations of 
gender differences are concerned only with individual-level adaptations, that is, traits 
which have been selected for increasing the fitness of individuals rather than groups. The 
issue of group-level selection is irrelevant to their claims about purpose-specific 
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adaptations. As a result, there is no reason to expect social structural explanations to be 
complementary to ultimate explanations.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrated and shed some light on the common phenomenon of hybrid kinds 
standing at the crossroads of social and natural scientific explanations. It did so by 
examining the hitherto poorly understood relationship between social and evolutionary 
psychological explanations of gender differences – a crucial and long overdue task in its 
own right. I argued that we need to distinguish several types of causal claims on each side. 
On the side of evolutionary psychological explanations, it is possible to identify three 
types of claims: claims about domain-specificity, claims about trigger innateness, and 
claims about purpose-specific adaptations. I argued that evolutionary psychology’s central 
concept of domain-specific psychological mechanisms, and the way it is used in discussing 
social explanations, resonates only with the idea of trigger innateness and the idea of 
purpose-specific adaptions. As a result, only trigger innateness and purpose-specific 
adaptation were considered in the further discussion.  
Turning to social explanations, I distinguished socialisation explanations from social 
structural explanations, and identified three different types of socialisation explanations. 
I pointed out that, although socialisation and social structural effects are intricately linked 
and partly mutually constitutive, distinguishing them is essential for two reasons: 
socialisation and social structural explanations rely on different types of evidence, and 
they may relate to evolutionary psychological explanations in different ways.  
Finally, I explored how the different types of social and evolutionary psychological 
claims identified in previous sections relate to each other. The answers varied and some 
were quite unexpected. The discussion revealed that social explanations of any type are in 
principle compatible both with trigger innateness explanations and with the claim that 
gender differences are purpose-specific adaptations. At the same time, we should not 
generally expect social explanations to provide proximate explanations that are 
complementary to these ultimate explanations. The finding that stands out most, 
however, is that no combination of social explanations and evolutionary psychological 
explanations makes mutually exclusive claims about causal facts. On a more general level, 
this suggests that natural and social scientific explanations for hybrid kind phenomena 
may tend to be compatible on the level of causal facts simply in virtue of the fact that they 
describe causal factors which may act in concert.  
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Given the heated debate on explanations for gender differences, this finding was 
somewhat puzzling. However, we discovered that this conflict may be rooted in an 
evidential rather than causal tension. The tension, so I argued, arises between trigger 
innateness explanations and basically any type of social explanation. It stems from the fact 
that the empirical evidence used to support social explanations for a specific gender 
difference will generally undermine trigger innateness explanations for the same gender 
difference because it precludes poverty of the stimulus arguments. This gives rise to an 
evidential asymmetry between social and evolutionary psychological explanations which 
has interesting implications for the debate on gender differences. At least on a theoretical 
level, proponents of social explanations of gender differences have little to fear from 
evolutionary psychology. Since proponents of social explanations for gender differences 
can usually draw on data that directly supports claims about the existence of the relevant 
mechanisms, there is no scientific need for them to challenge the existence of innate 
gender differences. These findings, however, leave open the question what to make of 
evolutionary psychological explanations for gender differences if one’s stakes in the 
debate are political rather than scientific. The next and final chapter of my thesis explores 
this issue on a more general level, by asking whether biological explanations of gender 




























CAN FEMINISTS IGNORE BIOLOGY?  
The previous chapter explored what happens when hybrid kinds, in virtue of their 
structure of base kind and associated social status, simultaneously fall within the 
explanatory realm of both natural and social sciences. But hybrid kinds not only tend to 
stand at the crossroads of natural and social scientific explanations. As argued in Chapter 
3, the question whether or not an individual occupies a specific classification-associated 
status can have a crucial impact on their lives. As a result, hybrid kinds also have a 
tendency to stand in the crossfire of science and politics. This last chapter explores how 
the political-pragmatic concerns that can be associated with a hybrid kind’s status relate 
to explanatory concerns regarding its base kind. Since the previous chapter suggested that 
there are few cases where this tension is as pronounced as in the discussion on gender 
differences and gender inequality, I will continue to focus on this case study. 
More often than not, the battle lines in relation to the debate on gender differences 
run between social scientific and biological approaches of a certain type. The biological 
explanations in question are explanations which suggest that men and women differ 
“naturally”, that is, independently of specific social and cultural arrangements. They 
typically involve claims supporting existing stereotypes about the role and behaviour of 
men and women, for instance that men are more competitive and women more caring. 
These biological explanations are usually juxtaposed in opposition with social 
explanations, that is, explanations for gender differences that make recourse to differences 
in social learning inputs or social structural arrangements for men and women (as 
illustrated in Chapter 5). In other words, when feminists critically refer to “biological” 
explanations of gender differences, this should not be understood as an outright rejection 
of any explanation employing biological vocabulary. Instead, such claims are best 
understood as addressing those explanations which propose an innate basis for observed 
psychological and behavioural gender differences, in a way that is seen to confirm existing 
stereotypes about men and women.1 Despite the risk of sounding overgeneralising, I will 
stick to the expression of “biological” explanations of gender differences for the sake of 
simplicity and to keep in line with the common terminology in the debate.  
                                                 
1 For a specification of the concept of innateness, and an argument that many evolutionary psychological explanations of 
gender differences are best interpreted as proximate claims about innate differences, see Chapter 5. 
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With this qualification in mind, we can explore in more detail the ways in which feminists 
tend to sympathise with social scientific explanations of gender differences while being 
wary of biological ones. Some feminists – usually those who hold a background in biology 
or neuroscience themselves – critically scrutinise biological explanations of gender 
differences quite extensively (Fausto-Sterling 1992, 2000; Fine 2010, 2017). They try to 
undermine these explanations by identifying methodological flaws and sometimes 
propose alternative frameworks and methodologies. This strategy is illustrated, to some 
extent, in Chapter 5. There, I argued that evolutionary psychologists’ arguments that 
gender differences are trigger innate are often undermined by their insufficient 
engagement with social scientific explanations of the same phenomena. Most feminist 
theorists and activists, however, do not have an in-depth understanding or carry out 
detailed scrutiny of the science behind these claims themselves. Instead, some of them 
only refer to existing criticisms pragmatically, to reject biological arguments for gender 
differences where they come their way (Oakley 1972). Others go further than that and do 
not seem to engage with biological explanations of gender differences at all (MacKinnon 
1989; Okin 1989; Haslanger 2012; Asta 2012; Jenkins 2016).  
In other words, there is a significant number of feminist theorists and activists who 
take a keen interest in social scientific explanations of gender differences but deliberately 
ignore biological ones (Lucal 2010). This happens to the dismay of many proponents of 
biological explanations, who lament the “biophobia” amongst feminist and other left-
leaning social theorists and activists (Pinker 2003; Campbell 2002; Barkow 2006). Some 
go so far as to liken large parts of today’s feminist movement to climate change deniers 
(Tierney 2016). Many of them urge feminists to engage with the relevant biological 
research, usually under the promise that it will benefit their efforts at furthering gender 
equality, but generally to little avail. 
This chapter investigates the adequacy of this prevalent feminist disinterest. Are 
proponents of biological explanations right in their demand for being heard, or do 
feminists have perfectly good reasons for ignoring them? I start this investigation by 
considering Maria Kronfeldner’s “right to ignore”, which centres on defending the 
autonomy of cultural anthropology from biological anthropology. Section 6.2 identifies 
parallels and differences between Kronfeldner’s discussion of cultural anthropology on 
the one hand and the discussion on gender equality on the other, and concludes that 
Kronfeldner’s argument cannot be applied to the feminist case. Section 6.3 examines two 
further strategies for justifying feminists’ ignoring of biological explanations. Finding 
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problems with both, it leaves the task of identifying an alternative justification, which will 
be developed in Section 6.4. 
6.1 KRONFELDNER’S RIGHT TO IGNORE 
6.1.1 Alfred Kroeber and the right to ignore evolutionary anthropology 
Luckily, our inquiry into whether feminists are justified in ignoring biological explanations 
of gender differences does not have to start from scratch. A case with some striking 
parallels has been discussed in the context of cultural and evolutionary/biological 
anthropology (Kronfeldner 2009, 2017; Meloni 2016a, 2016b). Unlike our debate, which 
concerns explanations for differences between men and women, the discussion in 
anthropology has traditionally been fought over how to explain differences between 
human racial groups. Evolutionary anthropologists used to argue that differences in 
human cultural achievements reflect innate cognitive differences between human racial 
groups. Cultural anthropologists, by contrast, explained these differences in terms of 
further social and cultural differences.  
But in order for this to happen, cultural anthropology first had to emancipate itself 
from evolutionary anthropology in the early nineteen hundreds. According to Maria 
Kronfeldner, one of the founding fathers of cultural anthropology, Alfred Kroeber, 
played a crucial role in this process. Kroeber, Kronfeldner suggests, successfully argued 
that cultural anthropologists have a right to ignore evolutionary anthropology’s claims about 
“natural” racial differences in their research (Kronfeldner 2009). By defending this right, 
Kroeber adopted what Kronfeldner calls a “separationist epistemic stance”. The 
separationist epistemic stance (or simply “separationist stance”) is a research heuristic that 
defends the right to ignore certain phenomena or causal factors in explanations typical 
for a specific discipline (Kronfeldner 2017). Kronfeldner argues that the separationist 
stance is an undervalued research heuristic which is usually overshadowed by a 
“synthesis” bias amongst both scientists and philosophers. The synthesis bias consists in 
the – according to Kronfelder unjustified – believe that synthesis and integration of 
scientific theories and perspectives are the best recipe for scientific progress. Kronfeldner 
wants to show that this bias is unfounded, and that separation and integration can be 
equally epistemically valuable research strategies.  
Kronfeldner makes two important qualifications to the right to ignore. Firstly, she 
emphasises that the right to ignore goes both ways. While her case study specifically shows 
how cultural anthropologists may be justified in ignoring evolutionary anthropologists’ 
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claims about natural differences, evolutionary psychologists may be just as justified in 
ignoring cultural anthropologists’ claims about cultural differences (Kronfeldner 2017, 
214). In addition, she points out that the right to ignore does not consist in “willfully 
accepting known inconsistencies, but in not checking for consistency” with biological explanations 
(Kronfeldner 2017, 214, original emphasis). It is important to keep these points in mind, 
because we will come back to them later.  
6.1.2 Epistemic and ontological arguments for the right to ignore 
Kronfeldner presents two arguments to support the right to ignore, an epistemic 
argument and an ontological one (Kronfeldner 2017; 2018). The epistemic argument aims 
to challenge the synthesis bias by demonstrating that a separationist stance can be just as 
epistemically fruitful as an “integrationist stance”. According to Kronfeldner, proponents 
of an integrationist stance argue that we need to integrate different theories and 
explanations because doing so is epistemically fruitful – it produces new insights, theories, 
and even disciplines. Kronfeldner uses the case of Kroeber to demonstrate that a 
separationist stance can be just as conducive to reaping these epistemic benefits. She 
suggests that Kroeber’s separationist stance produced several major epistemic benefits. 
 The first is the establishment and keeping alive of cultural anthropology as an 
autonomous discipline with its own methods. The second is the combating of scientific 
racism, which was based on the idea of Lamarckian inheritance (more on this below). In 
addition to that, Kronfeldner credits Kroeber with developing the precursor of a new 
scientific field –dual or multiple inheritance theory. Dual/multiple inheritance theory is a 
flourishing approach that examines the interaction of different systems of inheritance, 
most notably genetic and cultural inheritance (Jablonka & Lamb 2005; Richerson & Boyd 
2005). Some people even suggest that the insights from multiple inheritance theory, 
together with other advances in evolutionary and developmental biology, suggest a novel 
conceptual framework for thinking about evolution (Laland et al. 2015). According to 
Kronfeldner, although Kroeber’s strategy is too radical today, as we recognise important 
interactions between nature and culture in human evolution, his realisation that biological 
and cultural inheritance can be considered as two distinct systems of inheritance was a 
precondition for these theoretical developments.  
While the epistemic argument is intended as a general defence of the separationist 
stance as a fruitful research heuristic, the ontological argument pertains specifically to the 
subject matter of anthropology and the question whether the nature-culture that informs 
Kroeber’s right to ignore is ontologically plausible. Kroeber, as argued above, defends the 
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right to ignore evolutionary or biological claims about innate psychology when explaining 
human culture. This argument suggests that there are aspects of human psychology and 
behaviour which can be explained in terms of culture alone, without making reference to 
facts about human biology or genetics. Some people, however, would argue that this claim 
is untenable on the ontological level. Generally speaking, critics object that the influences 
of nature and culture are too entangled to be usefully singled out, and that persistent 
attempts at doing so are misguided and only hamper scientific progress. They object that 
any human trait is the product of complex interactions between genetic, epigenetic, and 
environmental factors. As a result, it simply does not make sense to argue about whether 
a certain human trait is largely “due to the genes” or “due to the environment”. Instead, 
all human traits are the joint product of genetic and environmental factors, and their 
individual contributions cannot be apportioned.  
This line of argument is usually made with regard to the nature-nurture debate, which 
concerns the relative influence of genetically inherited and environmental factors on 
human development (Fox-Keller 2010; Tabery 2014; Taylor 2014). Since “environmental 
factors” include cultural ones, the overall idea applies just as much to the nature-culture 
divide.2 Natural and cultural factors, so the idea goes, are entangled in such a way that we 
cannot meaningfully identify their relative contributions. This would seem to undermine 
the argument for a mutual right to ignore between cultural and evolutionary anthropology. 
If every single human trait or behaviour is the joint product of biology and culture, we 
would expect the biological factors investigated by evolutionary anthropologists to be 
relevant to cultural anthropology and vice versa.  
Against this view, Kronfeldner insists that we can identify an ontological distinction, 
on the basis of which it is possible to defend the right to ignore: the distinction between 
biological inheritance on the one hand and cultural inheritance on the other. According 
to Kronfeldner, we can meaningfully distinguish these forms of inheritance because they 
involve two largely independent channels of transmission which are characterised by 
distinct internal dynamics (Kronfeldner 2018). While Kronfeldner develops this argument 
in more detail, and in a way that accommodates the recent discoveries on epigenetic 
inheritance, she points out that the general idea can already be found in Kroeber’s account 
of culture as “superorganic” (Kroeber 1917, cited in Kronfeldner 2017). According to 
Kronfeldner, Kroeber used evolutionary biologists’ rejection of Lamarckian inheritance 
(the inheritance of acquired characteristics), in order to counter the then common belief 
                                                 
2 For a discussion that focusses specifically on the nature-culture divide, see Oyama (2000). 
161 
 
that “cultural change is evidence for and is causally linked to biological evolution” 
(Kronfeldner 2009, 117). Without inheritance of acquired characteristics, Kroeber argued, 
culture can still influence culture. For instance, the cultural ideas that exist in a society at 
a given time may influence people’s values and behaviour, which likely influences how the 
society develops culturally. But contrary to what evolutionary anthropologists at the time 
used to believe, a society’s culture cannot influence the innate and heritable cognitive 
capacities of those living in it. As a result, Kroeber concluded, culture is “superorganic” 
in the sense that cultural change is independent of biological evolution, in particular 
change in innate cognitive abilities.  
6.1.3 How do the epistemic and the ontological argument relate? 
In Kronfeldner’s view, then, Kroeber realised that culture and nature can be conceptually 
distinguished as separate systems of change and inheritance and defended his right for 
cultural anthropologists to ignore nature on the basis of this observation. However, it is 
not quite clear from Kronfeldner’s discussion how exactly Kroeber derived this right to 
ignore from the distinction between cultural and biological inheritance. In particular, 
Kronfeldner does not clarify to what extent the epistemic success of ignoring innate 
cognitive capacities as a fruitful research heuristic depends on the existence of an 
underlying ontological distinction between biological and cultural inheritance. This points 
us to the more general problem that Kronfeldner does not spell out how exactly the 
ontological argument and the epistemic argument relate in establishing a right to ignore. 
Intentionally or not, Kronfeldner’s discussion thus leaves open the possibility that the 
epistemic argument alone can establish a right to ignore – that there might be cases where 
a separatist stance historically proves to be epistemically fruitful even if we cannot find 
ontological reasons for why this is the case. Such a “success proves right” position might 
be defensible, but it comes with certain caveats that make it have limited use in the context 
of the discussion on gender differences.  
The most obvious problem with the “success proves right” argument is that it tells us 
what we are epistemically justified in ignoring only after we have already ignored it. In the 
context of science, this usually means that we have to build methodologies and theories 
on the assumption that we are justified in ignoring a certain aspect of our target 
phenomenon before having any idea as to whether doing so is a good idea. For anyone 
who stands at the outset of a new research project on gender differences and wonders 
whether it would be epistemically fruitful to ignore certain factors associated with the 
target phenomenon, the “success proves right” argument is of little help. It provides no 
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guidance on how to determine heuristically which factors could be ignored to our 
epistemic benefit, and therefore leaves us with a pure trial-and error strategy. Of course, 
it is perfectly possible that scientific progress is made on the basis of this pure trial-and 
error strategy. But the approach is obviously costly, and we would probably prefer an 
alternative strategy that gives us more guidance, if one exists.  
The problems with relying on the “success proves right” argument may go even deeper 
than that. Assume a group of scientists practice ignoring specific factors (think of feminist 
social scientists ignoring the possibility of innate cognitive differences in explaining of 
gender differences) and is epistemically successful on the basis of this research strategy. 
Without identifying any underlying ontological characteristics that suggest a separationist 
stance is likely to be successful in this specific context, we have no way of telling whether 
the epistemic success was merely coincidental. After all, we are not given any reason as to 
why a research strategy taking into account innate cognitive differences might not have 
led to the same or even superior epistemic results. This brief discussion does not 
demonstrate that the separationist stance cannot be justified on the basis of a “success 
proves right” argument alone. However, it suggests that we will fail to understand when 
and why a separationist stance is likely to be successful unless we take a keen interest in 
the ontological side of the story. In other words, it is time to take a closer look at 
Kronfeldner’s ontological argument and its relationship to the epistemic success of 
Kroeber’s separationist stance. 
Kronfeldner’s ontological argument, as explained above, states that Kroeber’s right to 
ignore potential innate cognitive differences between racial groups is justified because 
biological and cultural inheritance can be distinguished as two largely independent 
channels of inheritance. How exactly does this argument work? According to 
Kronfeldner, the missing link in the argument stated above is that scientific racism at the 
time was based on a Lamarckian view of evolution, that is, the idea that acquired 
characteristics are heritable. While innate physical differences between human groups 
could be readily observed, evidence for innate cognitive differences had to be conjured 
up by sophisticated argumentation. The Lamarckian view of evolution offered just that. 
On this view, one could argue that innate racial differences in cognition exist because 
human racial groups live in radically different environments. In response to these different 
environments, so the idea, different racial groups develop different physical as well as 
cognitive characteristics. These characteristics are then inherited, accumulate over time 
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and explain racial differences in cultural achievements, in particular “higher” (Western) 
and opposed to “primitive” (non-Western) cultures.  
Kronfeldner’s suggests that, without the Lamarckianism interaction between biological 
and cultural change – and methods for searching for racial differences directly in the 
genome not yet available – there is no reason to assume innate racial differences in the 
first place. Observed cultural differences between racial groups no longer support 
scientific racism, because they can be neither understood as evolutionary causes nor as 
developmental symptoms of innate cognitive differences. Instead, Kronfeldner suggests, 
scientists would have to presuppose what Kroeber called the “psychic unity of mankind.” 
This assumption states that although there may be individual innate differences in 
cognitive abilities, we should expect them to average out on the level of racial or cultural 
groups.  
As Kronfeldner observes, the assumption of psychic unity plays a crucial role in 
Kroeber’s argument that cultural anthropologists can ignore claims about innate cognitive 
differences. If innate cognitive differences average out at the level of racial and cultural 
groups, they are clearly unsuitable for explaining cultural differences between these 
groups. In Kronfeldner’s words, “nature becomes a disciplinary primitive [for cultural 
anthropology]: one can safely assume it and then ignore it since it does not make a 
difference for the historical change in culture that the cultural anthropologist aims to 
explain” (Kronfeldner 2017, 215). This means that, under the assumption of psychic 
unity, cultural anthropologists can safely ignore innate biological differences because they 
are irrelevant to what they want to explain. In other words, Kroeber did not deny that 
there is a shared human nature, or individual differences in natural abilities, but he denied 
that either of these are relevant for explaining what he wanted to explain: differences in 
shared culture. Instead, Kroeber came to the conclusion that “culture explains culture” – 
cultural differences across human groups can only be explained by reference to pre-
existing cultural differences (Kronfeldner 2009, 104-5). 
There is a further aspect of Kronfeldner’s paper that requires mentioning. In some 
passages, Kronfeldner suggest that a crucial aspect of Kroeber’s strategy was to 
reconstitute culture (understood as a system of inheritance and change in its own right) 
as an explanandum (Kronfeldner 2009, 123). According to Kronfeldner, this idea can be 
contrasted with earlier accounts which understood culture either as a different kind of 
explanandum, such as patterns of behaviour and symbols (Tylor 1871, cited in 
Kronfeldner 2009) or as an explanans of human behaviour rather than an explanandum 
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in its own right (Boas 1911, cited in Kronfeldner 2009). In particular, Kronfeldner seems 
to suggest that Kroeber’s strategy of ignoring nature was only feasible because his 
explanandum was human culture, not human behaviour.  
This difference, however, is overstated. On the assumption of psychic unity, the lack 
of a reason for assuming group-level natural differences affects explanations of group-
level behavioural differences just as much as group-level cultural differences. Neither 
cultural nor behavioural group differences can be explained by reference to natural 
differences unless there is reason to assume that natural between-group differences exist. 
This implies that the heavy lifting in Kroeber’s argument for a right to ignore natural 
differences is done not by reconstituting culture, understood as a system of change and 
inheritance, as the explanandum. Instead, the heavy lifting is done by the assumption – 
based on insights from evolutionary biology – that there are no relevant innate cognitive 
difference between human racial groups. The logic of this argument applies to group level 
behavioural differences just as much as to cultural differences.  
Taken together, these considerations provide a clear answer to the question as to how 
the epistemic and the ontological argument for the right to ignore relate. Ignoring factor 
F (such as innate cognitive differences) is likely to be epistemically fruitful if it is possible 
to define the explanandum in such a way that there is good reason to assume that factor 
F makes no difference to what we want to explain. Whether it is possible to define the 
explanandum in this way, however, depends crucially on the ontological structure of the 
target domain – the reason innate cognitive differences can be ignored in explaining group 
cultural differences is because innate cognitive differences are unlikely to accumulate at 
the level of cultural groups. 
This suggests that, strictly speaking, Kronfeldner’s right to ignore does not have that 
much to do with ignoring after all. While Kronfeldner admits that her argument does not 
establish a right to ignore inconsistencies that we are aware off, it does not establish a 
right to not check for inconsistencies we might be unaware of either. The reason for this 
is that such a right would be redundant in Kroeber’s example. We already know that there 
aren’t any such inconsistencies, because we have defined the explanandum in such a way 
that – given the assumption of psychic unity – inconsistencies with claims about innate 
cognitive differences are impossible. In other words, the strategy defended by 




6.2 FROM RACE TO GENDER – PARALLELS AND DIFFERENCES 
6.2.1 The psychic unity of “humankind”? 
In order to find out whether Kronfeldner’s right to ignore can be transferred to the 
discussion on gender differences, we need to examine to what extent the two cases are 
comparable. To begin with, we can immediately note a crucial disanalogy between 
Kroeber, who ignored the question of innate cognitive differences among racial groups, 
and feminists who ignore the question of innate cognitive differences between men and 
women. Kroeber’s right to ignore is based on his observation that the state of the art 
biology of his time provided no reason to believe in innate cognitive differences between 
racial groups. In more recent times, this idea has been corroborated again and again by 
scientific and technological advances. Despite scientists’ persistent attempts to provide a 
scientific foundation for entrenched folk racial classifications, geneticists and 
philosophers have insisted that none of their suggestions captures salient ontological 
structures (Lewontin 1972; Lewontin et al. 1984; Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994; Gannett 2004, 
2005; Bolnick 2008; Kaplan & Winther 2013). The only plausible exception to this are the 
social structures of often gaping inequalities that have formed around folk racial 
classification, and the imprint that these structures tend to leave on the biological, for 
instance in the form of health disparities (Kaplan 2010). In other words, the assumption 
that there are no innate cognitive differences between racial groups continues to prevail 
not only within cultural anthropology. It has become widespread consensus in virtually 
all academic disciplines dealing with human difference. 
Once we turn to the question of innate cognitive differences between men and women, 
the situation is very different – certainly in Kroeber’s time but still very much today. 
Kroeber’s crucial assumption of the psychic unity of “mankind” was primarily that – the 
assumption that there are no innate cognitive differences between men of different 
cultures. Implicitly, this assumption may suggest that there are no innate cognitive 
differences between women of different cultures either. But it says nothing on the matter 
of innate cognitive differences between men and women in general. It would be difficult 
to interpret this silence on the matter as anything other than agreement with the common 
belief of Kroeber’s time: that there are innate differences between men and women, across 
all cultural and racial groups, and that they make women suitable to traditional subordinate 
roles and men to traditional dominant ones.  
It was not until Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead that the common assumption of 
innate cognitive differences between men and women began to be questioned within 
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cultural anthropology (Mead 1928; 1932; 1949; Benedict 1934). However, unlike their 
colleague Kroeber, who could invoke evolutionary theory to support his argument for 
ignoring claims about innate racial differences, Benedict and Mead could not draw on 
support from the biological sciences. To the contrary, the idea that there are innate 
cognitive differences between men and women and that these are relevant to explaining 
behavioural differences was common sense at the time and has remained a respectable 
idea until today. Presumably, this is partly due to the fact that evidence which has become 
available to challenge the idea of innate cognitive differences between human racial 
groups simply is not suitable to challenge the same idea with respect to differences 
between men and women. Although we know today that, much like racial categories, male 
and female cannot be understood as non-overlapping categories with necessary and 
sufficient properties for membership, crucial differences between sex and racial categories 
remain.  
The most important one, I suggest, concerns to what extent these categories have 
proven to be epistemically useful. There is good reason to believe that sex categories 
qualify as homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kinds. HPC kinds are scientific categories 
which are constituted by a cluster of properties that are reliably coninstantiated due to 
underlying homeostatic mechanisms (Boyd 1989). It is widely assumed that HPC kinds 
are scientifically useful because their reliably associated properties facilitate inductive 
inferences. I argued in Chapter 4 that this claim has to be qualified – the reason such kinds 
facilitate inductive inferences is because we typically have a decent grasp of the underlying 
mechanisms.  
On either understanding of HPC kinds, there are good reasons to believe that sex 
categories fit the bill. While it is important to recognise the existence of intersex people – 
individuals whose combination of anatomical features (such as chromosomes, gonads and 
genitalia) does not conform to the mixes that we associate with either male or female – it 
would be wrong to conclude that this undermines the use of male and female as scientific 
categories in the human sciences. For one thing, the sets of properties that we associate 
with male and female are still very reliably associated. Combining numeric estimates for the 
frequency of different sex anatomy variations, the total percentage of intersex people is 
estimated to be 1.7% (Fausto-Sterling 2000a).3  What’s more, scientists understand the 
physiological mechanisms that support these patterns of association and variation to a 
                                                 
3 Some people have objected that Fausto-Sterling’s estimate is too inclusive and quantify the percentage of intersex people 
at 0.018% instead (Sax 2002). 
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remarkable extent (see Bashamboo & McElreavey 2016 for a review article). As a result, 
sex categories provide a useful base for inductive inferences in several scientific and 
practical contexts.  
The same can hardly be said for racial categories. As argued above, although scientists 
persistently try to identify an empirical basis that supports a similar type of argument for 
racial categories, such claims remain highly controversial. Anatomical properties, so the 
objection goes, do not cluster any more within traditional racial groupings than within 
many other possible groupings of the human population. As a result, racial categories 
simply do not cut nature at one of its joints – not even a fuzzy cluster joint – and therefore 
do not make useful scientific categories.  
These observations suggest that there is a crucial difference between the case of sex 
categories and racial categories when it comes to establishing a right to ignore. In the case 
of race, science has again and again undermined any reason for thinking that innate 
properties cluster within racial groups. The same is not true for sex categories. Since the 
assumption of a lack of innate cognitive differences at the group level played a crucial role 
in Kroeber’s argument for a right to ignore, we should not expect that argument to carry 
over smoothly to the case of gender differences. As a result, Kronfeldner’s account of a 
right to ignore may be valuable for critical race theorists, but it will be of little use to 
feminists.  
6.2.2 From nature-culture to sex-gender 
Against this background, it may come as a surprise that many feminist scholars have 
adopted a strategy that is, in some ways, remarkably similar to Kroeber’s. The nature-
culture distinction defended by Kroeber is, to some extent, mirrored in the sex-gender 
distinction commonly employed by feminists. Consider how the sex-gender distinction 
has been established. Feminists appropriated the concept of gender from sexologist John 
Money in the late 1970s. Money had introduced the term in the 1950s to distinguish 
physical characteristics of men and women from psychological and behavioural ones 
(Money 1955, 1957). But even before that, feminists interested in the social dimension of 
sexual categories used notions like “sex role” and “sexual identity” to demarcate their 
subject matter from sex, understood as a biological category. Since then, the distinction 
of sex role/sexual identity/ gender as opposed to physical sex has been used to identify a 
field-defining phenomenon for women’s and gender studies (Germon 2009).  
This process is strikingly similar to the establishment and demarcation of cultural 
anthropology on the basis of the nature-culture distinction. But more than that, scholars 
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in women’s and gender studies tend to ignore biological explanations of gender 
differences, to the extent that terms like “biology” do not even feature in some gender 
studies dictionaries (Griffin 2017). If scholars of women’s and gender studies engage with 
biological explanations of gender differences at all, it is often by way of explicitly 
contrasting their own approach to the biological study of gender (Martin 2008).  
The question, then, is this: how can feminists working in the areas of women’s and 
gender studies pursue the same strategy of ignoring innate cognitive differences as cultural 
anthropologists, without being able to draw on comparable scientific support for the 
assumption of a “psychic unity” between men and women? Since the conditions that 
enabled Kroeber to establish a right to ignore innate cognitive differences between racial 
groups are simply not given in the case of gender differences, it seems that we need to 
look for justification elsewhere.  
Note that there is additional reason to look further afield. Kronfeldner argues that the 
right to ignore applies both ways. This would suggest that feminists can ignore biological 
explanations of gender differences just as much as biologists can ignore feminists’ social 
explanation of gender differences. But this is at odds with feminists’ dual strategy of 
criticising biological explanations methodologically while ignoring them in their own 
approach. This approach suggests that feminists rely on a one-sided right to ignore: while 
feminists seem to consider themselves justified in ignoring biological explanations of 
gender differences in theory and practice, biologists’ failure to consider social and cultural 
explanations of gender differences is seen as both epistemically and politically dubious. 
In other words, what would be needed is a justification for ignoring biological 
explanations that does not depend on scientific evidence for the “psychic unity” between 
men and women, and which makes sense of feminists’ conviction that their right to ignore 
is not a mutual one. In the following, I will consider two justifications which are 
commonly brought forward to this effect in the feminist literature. 
6.3 FLAWED SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY – HOW FEMINISTS 
JUSTIFY IGNORING BIOLOGY 
Generally speaking, when feminists defend the decision not to engage with biological 
explanations of gender differences, they typically invoke either of the following two 
objections: 
 
(i) Biological explanations of gender differences are based on flawed science. 
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(ii) Biological explanations of gender differences are just ideology. 
 
The first objection is usually made by reference to one of the many existing critical 
discussions of biological explanations of gender differences (see, for instance, Fausto-
Sterling 1992, 2000; Fine 2010, 2017). Authors of these discussions claim to have 
identified a number of methodological shortcomings and flawed reasoning in extant 
biological explanations of gender differences. In doing so, they argue that these 
explanations fall short of the standards that scientists are expected to set to themselves. 
This is why the “flawed science” objection provides a powerful tool for challenging 
proponents of biological explanations of gender differences on their own terms. 
Feminists who bring forward “flawed science” objections for ignoring biological 
explanations argue that they can ignore these explanations because everyone else should, 
too. The explanations in question, so they argue, are scientifically unfounded, and 
therefore do not have special epistemic status.   
The second objection refers to the concept of ideology and is a bit more difficult to 
pin down than the “flawed science” objection. Philosophers have analysed the concept 
of ideology in much detail (see, for instance, Geuss 1981). To get an adequate 
understanding of the “just ideology” objection, however, it will suffice to understand the 
concept of ideology in a very general manner. Broadly speaking, “just ideology” objections 
do not (or not primarily) approach biological explanations of gender differences as claims 
of special epistemic status. This is because “just ideology” objections are typically made 
in a context where the focus is not so much on whether or not these claims are true, but 
on how they reflect and reinforce extant power structures in a society. This approach goes 
back to Michel Foucault and has been advanced in the context of feminism and gender 
studies by Judith Butler (Foucault 1978, Butler 1990). Feminists who make “just ideology” 
type objections tend to be more interested in how biological explanations reflect and 
reinforce the social circumstances from which they emerge (Contratto 2002, Cassidy 2007, 
Ahmed 2008, Lucal 2010). They understand biological explanations of gender differences 
first and foremost as another form of discourse which reflects and reinforces the values 
and distribution of power in a society.  
In the context of this feminist ideology critique, questions about the truth of biological 
explanations can in principle be ignored because they are irrelevant to what the approach 
aims to investigate: the social and cultural factors with lead to the acceptance of biological 
explanations, as well as the social and cultural effects which result from the acceptance of 
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biological explanations. These processes, so the “just ideology” approach assumes, 
operate quite independently of whether the explanations are factually correct or not.  
Both the “flawed science” and the “just ideology” objection stem from approaches 
that provide important insights into discussions of gender differences. “Flawed science” 
objections are based on an approach that provides detailed scientific scrutiny of biological 
explanations of gender differences. By improving the methodological soundness of 
biological explanations and preventing us from making political decisions on the basis of 
dubious scientific claims, it may yield scientific as well as political benefits. “Just ideology” 
objections operate within a framework that can provide important insights into the nature 
of the debate – such as the conditions under which scientific claims about the causes of 
gender differences become a recognised tool for negotiating power in a society – and may 
point to ways in which this discourse can be destabilised and resisted. 
Although both approaches make highly valuable contributions to the debate, each has 
crucial limitations when it comes to justifying a wholesale right to ignore biological 
explanations of gender differences. The “flawed science” objection relies on specific 
points of criticism targeted at specific biological studies of gender differences. It thus lacks 
generalisability – the criticism levelled at one type of biological explanation does not 
automatically apply to the next, let alone to biological explanations of gender differences 
in general. This means the “flawed science” objection applies only to biological 
explanations which have been shown to be based on a flawed methodology or false 
assumptions, plus those explanations which are similar to these in relevant respects. It 
does not provide feminists with a justification to ignore biological explanations once and 
for all. To the contrary, it may demand detailed scientific engagement with every single 
scientific study which claims to have identified a biological basis for gender differences in 
behaviour or psychology. This is unhelpful as a general feminist strategy. If feminists had 
to comprehensively scrutinise each and every study that claims to have found biological 
determinants of gender differences for methodological soundness and plausibility of 
assumptions, they would have little time to do anything else.  
The “just ideology” objection avoids this problem. Unlike the “flawed science” 
objection, it does not depend on the methodological and empirical details of individual 
scientific studies. Instead, the “just ideology” approach can in principle be applied, quite 
sweepingly, to any scientific claim about gender differences which is found to express or 
reinforce social inequality between men and women. But there are important drawbacks. 
The “just ideology” objection operates within a framework that can challenge claims 
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about gender differences only at a level that is external to the scientific discussion itself. 
It therefore does not allow us to challenge scientists on their own terms, and, most 
importantly, puts aside the question as to whether their explanations are true. To many 
proponents of biological explanations of gender differences, this will mean feminists 
simply sidestep the core question. They will object that, even if biological explanations of 
gender differences are symptomatic of women’s oppression and used to justify it, 
feminists cannot refuse to engage with them as truth-apt claims. Proponents of this view 
typically motivate their position by saying that whether or not biological explanations are 
true will make an important difference to feminists’ politics. 
Proponents of the “just ideology” approach could respond that the truth of biological 
explanations of gender differences is, to a great extent, irrelevant to feminist concerns. 
The reason for this, they could argue, is that the widespread acceptance of such 
explanations will be harmful to women no matter if the explanations in questions are true 
or not.4 In the extant social climate, so the idea, these explanations will predictably and 
inevitably be used to reinforce stereotypes about men and women, to disqualify women 
for positions of power, and to undermine efforts of addressing the social determinants of 
problems like sexual violence and the gender wage gap.  
Proponents of biological explanations, however, will likely reply that the feminist 
response it too one-sided and pessimistic. They will point out that there might be 
important benefits to accepting and publicising biological explanations of gender 
differences that we have reason to believe are true. Most notably, they will suggest, it 
might help us to identify important opportunities for intervention – if we discover that 
gender-differentiated behaviour is socially flexible in certain respects – as well as 
limitations – if we discover that it isn’t. This could allow feminists to target their political 
interventions more carefully and effectively. In other words, the problem with using the 
“just ideology” approach to justify ignoring biological explanations wholesale is the 
unclear net benefit. Proponents of biological explanations object that the benefits of 
engaging with biological explanations “properly” may well outweigh the costs. Although 
feminists have good reasons to assume that the promulgation of these explanations will 
be harmful to women in some respects, these harms could be overridden by the potential 
benefits that may come from the insights which biological explanations provide. 
                                                 
4 For a more general argument that explanations of human behaviour can have harmful effects irrespectively of their truth 
value, see Mallon (2016, Chpt. 4). 
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In sum, neither of the two rationales commonly used by feminists is quite sufficient to 
legitimise a wholesale right to ignore biological explanations of gender differences. The 
“flawed science” approach only justifies the piecemeal ignoring of biological explanations 
that have been shown to be scientifically lacking. The “just ideology” approach in 
principle licenses a more comprehensive right to ignore biological explanations, on the 
ground that such explanations may tend to reinforce gender inequality. But it is vulnerable 
to the objection that feminists risk prematurely dismissing biological explanations which 
provide crucial insights into combating gender inequality. In the following, I will identify 
rationales for ignoring biological explanations that avoid both of these pitfalls. They 
explain why feminists can ignore scientific explanations of gender differences more 
generally, without making them vulnerable to the objection that they forego scientific 
knowledge which is essential to their cause.  
6.4 A RIGHT TO IGNORE FOR FEMINISTS? 
In this section, I develop two distinct justifications for ignoring biological explanations of 
gender differences. The first justification is based on feminists reconstituting gender as their 
explanandum. This strategy is facilitated by the hybrid nature of the kinds men and women, 
but has important limitations that will be described below. The second justification is 
based on pragmatic considerations about the relevance of biological explanation to a wide 
range of feminist purposes, and is not subject to the same limitations. I will discuss both 
in the following, starting with the strategy of making gender the explanandum. 
6.4.1 Explaining gender and explaining gender differences 
As mentioned in several previous chapters, many human classifications can be understood 
as hybrid kinds. They consist not only of what I call a “base kind”, constituted by the 
properties that define the category, but also of an associated “status kind”, constituted by 
the social position that individuals acquire qua being recognised and treated as members 
of the specific category. A fruitful way to understand the concept of gender is in terms of 
this hybrid kind model. On this view, the feminist distinction between sex and gender 
attempts to conceptualise the hybrid nature of the categories men and women, with “sex” 
denoting the base kind and “gender” the associated status kind. Gender, in other words, 
refers to the social statuses – as opposed to the bodily features – that are associated with 
the human classifications men and women. 
This observation has crucial implications on the question whether feminists can ignore 
biology. Status kinds are characterised by a position in a network of social relations. They 
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are constituted by how one is regarded and treated by other people, and possibly by 
oneself. This means that the properties which characterise a status kind are exclusively 
social, relational properties. By redefining their target phenomenon in terms of the status 
kind gender, feminists gain considerable autonomy from biological explanations of sex 
differences. The reason for this is that the connection between base kind and status kind 
is peculiar and fragile. As argued in Chapter 1, the social position that individuals come 
to occupy in virtue of being classified has little to do with the properties that these 
individuals have prior to being classified. Members of the base kind come to occupy the 
social position that characterises the status kind only if they are recognised as members 
of the base kind. At the same time, individuals who are wrongly believed to be members 
of the base kind nevertheless come to occupy the associated social position, if only 
enough people who stand in relevant relations to them share the false believe. In other 
words, the connection between base and status kind is highly conventional, because it 
entirely depends on whether or not we (consciously or subconsciously) recognise 
individuals as members of a certain kind.  
This makes gender, in principle, independent of sex. According to the hybrid kind 
model, the fact that individuals classified as men or women occupy specific social status 
positions is not the result of their biological makeup. Biological characteristics are merely 
markers on the basis of which individuals are singled out for being treated and thought 
about in certain ways. The only link between their prior properties and their social position 
goes through us.  
This suggests that feminists can make use of a strategy similar to Kroeber’s after all. 
As cultural anthropologist did with culture, feminists can define their explanandum 
(gender) in such a way that makes biological explanations irrelevant for explaining it. In 
fact, it seems that the concept of gender can establish an even more far-reaching right to 
ignore biology than Kroeber’s concept of culture, because the success of the argument 
does not depend on biological facts about innate psychological differences. This is 
because culture and gender are independent of biological explanations for different 
reasons. Kroeber’s argument for the independence of culture from biology essentially 
depends on a biological assumption about the psychic unity of human racial groups. The 
argument for the independence of gender from biology, by contrast, does not depend on 
biological but on social facts – the fact that gender, as a status kind, is attached to specific 
biological properties only by convention. 
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On the downside, and precisely because psychic unity cannot be assumed, the right to 
ignore biology by distinguishing sex from gender has a serious limitation. It is limited to 
explanations of gender, and does not extend to explanations of behavioural and 
psychological differences between men and women. This is a big price to pay in the debate 
at hand. While there may be gender studies scholars who are interested in gender on a 
purely theoretical level, for instance by exploring and comparing the different statuses 
women occupy in different cultures, the feminist concern with gender usually goes beyond 
that. Feminists ultimately want to use the insights from investigating gender to change 
society, which means changing the way people think and act. In order to further gender 
equality, one could argue, it would seem that feminists need a robust understanding of 
why men and women tend think and act differently in patriarchal societies. If this is true, 
behavioural and psychological differences between men and women are a relevant 
explanandum for feminist purposes and cannot simply be defined out of sight. 
6.4.2 Do biological differences matter? 
The remaining question, then, is whether feminists may be justified in ignoring biological 
explanations of behavioural and psychological gender differences. To answer this 
question, I suggest that we start by turning the tables and ask: what reasons do feminists 
have for paying attention to these explanations? One of the responses that immediately 
springs to mind is that paying attention to biological explanations prevents feminists from 
making claims that are factually wrong. The response, prominent for instance among 
proponents of evolutionary psychology, is often motivated by the epistemological 
assumption that “hard” sciences like biology provide a more reliable guide to the causal 
structure of the world than the “airy” social sciences and humanities, together with the 
ontological assumption that, since biological and feminist explanations of gender 
differences differ, at least one of them must be wrong.  
Both assumptions have been discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. Against the 
ontological assumption, I argued that evolutionary explanations (often understood as 
claims about innate gender differences) and feminist social explanations need not 
necessarily conflict. Instead, both may correctly identify factors that contribute to gender-
differentiated behaviour. With regard to the epistemological assumption, I casted doubt 
on the idea that the epistemic strengths of feminist social explanations versus biological 
explanations can be judged in such a general manner. I argued that claims about innate 
differences, for instance, are usually established by poverty-of-the-stimulus arguments. To 
establish such arguments, proponents of biological explanations would need to 
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demonstrate that the social causes identified by feminists are causally insufficient, but their 
studies regularly fall short of this requirement. As a result, the scientific superiority of 
biological explanations cannot simply be presumed in a wholesale manner. Instead, 
different types of explanations are supported by different methodologies and different 
forms of empirical evidence, and their relative empirical adequacy and methodological 
soundness have to be established on a case-by-case basis.  
The idea that paying attention to biology prevents feminists from making false claims is 
closely related to another common justification for why feminists should consider 
biological explanations of gender differences. According to this justification, biological 
explanations are of immediate practical concern to feminists concerns because they help 
identify which aspects of social life can be changed and how easily. This idea has already 
been widely discussed, so I will not dwell on it for long (see, for instance, Lewens 2003; 
Dupre 2001; Buller 2005). The widespread consensus states that human behaviour and 
psychology are highly complex and plastic, and the only reliable way to find out whether 
a certain intervention will be effective is to try it out or consult experts on the influence 
of relevant environmental factors. This suggests that knowledge of biological causes of 
gender differences (such as innate cognitive differences) will likely tell us little or nothing 
about whether and how they can be changed. In addition, feminists are rarely interested 
in intervening on biological causes, but tend to focus on social ones (more on this below). 
In sum, there seems to be little reason why feminists should consult biological 
explanations of gender differences in order to identify relevant levers for change. 
Seeing as knowledge of biological explanations is far less important for understanding 
and altering gender differences than proponents of biological explanations have made it 
out to be, what other reason could there be for feminists to pay attention to such 
explanations? I think there is a third widespread motivating assumption, which, unlike the 
previous two, is rarely spelled out. According to this view, knowledge of biological causes 
of gender differences is relevant to feminists not because it tells us how to change unjust 
or oppressive social arrangements, but in order to determine which arrangements are unjust 
or oppressive in the first place. The argument underlying this claim can be spelled out as 
follows: Inequalities which are due to innate differences are not a matter of justice because 
they are not the result of social causes. Hence, if feminists want to claim that observed 
inequalities between men and women are unjust and need addressing, they first need to 
establish that these inequalities are the product of social factors rather than innate 
differences. On this view, knowledge about the biological determinants of gender 
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differences is essential for feminist purposes not primarily because of its epistemic or 
practical relevance. It is essential because the existence of such biological determinants 
has crucial normative implications and could undermine feminists’ justice claims.  
The view at hand is most clearly expressed in Janet Radcliffe-Richards’ discussion on 
sex equality (Radcliffe-Richards 2014, 45; see also Radcliffe-Richards 1998).  Radcliffe-
Richards criticises what she calls “only X% arguments”, and which have the following 
form:  
 
Justice demands sexual equality.  
But only x% of CEOs/ senior academics/ government leaders…. are women; Women have 
only x% of male earnings/ leisure time…; Men do only x% of housework/ child care…. 
Therefore there is still unjust inequality between the sexes. 
(Radcliffe-Richards 2014, 45) 
 
According to Radcliffe-Richards, conclusions of arguments of this type do not follow, at 
least not if we evaluate them on the basis of what she considers one of the most 
fundamental and uncontroversial accounts of equality (Radcliffe-Richards 2014). This 
idea, Radcliff-Richards argues, is today known as “ground-level impartiality” or “equal 
considerations of interests” but ultimately goes back to John Stuart Mill’s concept of 
“perfect equality”. The principle of perfect equality prohibits the arbitrary disadvantaging 
of one group merely for the purpose of advantaging another. This principle can be applied 
in the context of whatever other rules and principles organise life in a society. In Radcliffe-
Richards’ words, it is about “removing [...] balls and chains” that are arbitrarily attached 
to certain players in a game without questioning the principles of the game itself. As a 
result, Radcliffe-Richards points out, the principle is very powerful and very limited at the 
same time. It is very powerful because of its generality. According to Radcliffe-Richards, 
the principle is “now effectively beyond controversy” and therefore constitutes an 
“essential aspect of sexual justice” (Radcliffe-Richards 2014). Simultaneously, it is very 
limited because it does not allow us to question any further principles that guide the 
distribution of wealth and power within a society.  
Radcliffe-Richards suggests that adopting Mill’s principle has crucial implications for 
“only x%” arguments: it implies that observed inequalities between men and women 
count as unjust only if they are the result of arbitrary differential treatment rather than 
due to biology. Consider the following example. Within a liberal capitalist society that 
allows for significant inequalities between individuals based on “merit”, the principle 
dictates that it would not be permissible to arbitrarily hinder women from entering 
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capitalist positions of power. It would not be permissible, for instance, to systematically 
socialise girls in ways that make them less qualified than boys for a wide range of positions 
of power, unless such gender-differentiated socialisation could be justified on 
independent grounds. If it turned out, however, that women are innately less suitable for 
these positions (for instance because they are innately more caring and less competitive), 
the resulting underrepresentation of women in positions of power would be perfectly in 
accord with Mill’s principle of perfect equality. In other words, the strength of feminist 
complaints about only x% of women occupying positions of power depends on whether 
the underrepresentation of women is caused by social rather than by biological 
differences.  
But Radcliffe-Richards criticism of “only X%” arguments goes further than that. She 
insists that the burden of proof about what causes women’s underrepresentation lies on 
the side of those who claim that there are no innate gender differences. Since men and 
women differ in “systematic and striking ways”, Radcliffe-Richards argues, “no scientist 
would decide that it was reasonable to presume they must be alike, on average, in 
unknown ways unless there was positive evidence to the contrary” (Radcliffe-Richards 
2014, 55). She concludes that the case for discrimination based on “only x%” observations 
is only as strong as the evidence that men and women “are intrinsically alike in all relevant 
respects” (Radcliffe-Richards 2014, 54-55).  
This is of course controversial. We have encountered in previous chapters a fairly 
extensive literature suggesting that matters regarding the burden of proof and the state of 
empirical evidence for innate gender differences are much more complicated than 
Radcliffe-Richards admits. But the argumentative strategy she invokes is widespread and 
has proven quite resistant to this criticism. For that reasons, it is worth looking at the 
discussion from the other end and ask: what really follows for feminist politics if we accept 
Radcliffe-Richards’s argument? Pace Radcliffe-Richards, I suggest that her argument, if 
correct, would still provide an excellent justification for feminists to ignore claims about 
biological differences. The reason, put simply, is as follows. If innate differences are not 
a matter of gender equality – as Radcliffe-Richards insists they aren’t – there is no reason 
why feminists should consider them.  
To see this, consider alternative explanations as to why knowledge of such differences is 
relevant to feminists. One suggestion would be to say that knowledge of biological gender 
differences is pragmatically important for targeting feminist interventions – if feminists 
want to rectify biologically caused gender inequality, they need to understand the 
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biological pathways by which these inequalities come to be. But this is implausible. Innate, 
biological pathways for gender-differentiated behaviour or psychology are generally not 
something that feminists tend to mobilise against or seek to manipulate in order to further 
gender equality.  
Consider a notorious example. If we really had reason to assume that innate hormonal 
differences make women on average less apt at maths than men, it would be quite unusual 
for feminists to argue that hormone levels need to be adjusted to further women’s 
prospects in the labour market. A more plausible feminist response would be to object 
that the prestige of jobs involving mathematical ability reflects a male-biased standard that 
devalues professions traditionally carried out by women, such as care work. But this would 
involve feminists campaigning for a better remuneration and change of public perception 
of traditionally female occupations – not for chemical “correction” of hormonal 
differences. In other words, since intervention on biological causes is not something that 
feminists of any persuasion tend to advocate, it would be wrong to say that they need 
knowledge of biological differences for that purpose. 
Opponents of a feminist right to ignore biology could reply that the above suggestion 
is disingenuous. Knowledge of biological differences, they could argue, plays a rather 
different role in arguments about gender equality. The reason feminists need to 
understand biological determinants of gender differences is not because they may want to 
manipulate biological pathways, but because, epistemically, it is needed to determine 
whether the resulting inequalities are unjust in the first place. This view relies on the 
Millean principle of perfect equality and combines it with the implicit assumption that any 
evidence for observed gender differences being due to innate differences is at the same 
time evidence against the suggestion that such differences are due to social factors. If we 
accept both assumptions, evidence for innate gender differences would undermine the 
idea that the observed inequalities between men and women are unjust because only 
inequalities that stem from arbitrary differential treatment constitute injustices. 
The argument suggests that, in order to establish that a certain gender inequality is 
unjust, feminists need to make sure that it is not caused by innate differences. It assumes 
furthermore that the best way of doing so is for feminists to engage with biological claims 
about innate differences. This reasoning is seen as so self-evident by proponents of 
biological explanations of gender differences that it is are hardly ever spelled out. But it is 
far from obvious that it is true. Developmental pathways are numerous and complex. As 
argued in Chapter 5, different factors are not generally mutually exclusive, but can act 
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additively or interact in more complex ways. Accordingly, the idea that differential social 
treatment contributes to gender-differentiated behaviour is not made any less plausible by 
evidence for innate gender differences.5 In this context, trying to establish the efficacy of 
a certain causal factors by excluding the efficacy of all others would be a very poor 
research heuristic. A far more common and fruitful approach for establishing causal 
claims is by investigating causes individually to find evidence for their efficacy. But this is 
exactly what happens in large parts of feminist social scientific research. Researchers in 
this field have found a plethora of evidence for the differential expectations, attitudes, 
judgements, and behaviour that people demonstrate towards women and men (see, for 
instance, Brewer 2001; Fine 2010; Ridgeway 2011; Weisgram & Dinella 2018).  
This discussion suggests that, although we cannot simply assume that any observed 
gender difference is due to social factors, a different sort of reasoning is perfectly valid: 
to assume, on the basis of considerable evidence for the pervasive differential treatment 
of men and women, that observed psychological and behavioural gender differences and 
inequalities are at least partly attributable to social factors. Accordingly, in order to 
establish that gender differences are at least partially caused by social factors, feminists 
have little reason to consider claims about biological differences. All they need to do is 
produce evidence for the existence of the relevant social factors. Add to these 
observations Radcliffe-Richards’ claim that arbitrary differential treatment constitutes one 
of the most fundamental and uncontested forms of injustice and we suddenly have a 
substantial case for feminists to ignore claims about biological difference. As a result, even 
within the narrow framework set out the Millean principle of perfect equality, feminists 
can identify discriminating social arrangements, and make their abolishment a matter of 
justice, without giving much consideration to biology. As long as feminists have robust 
evidence for the existence of social determinants of gender inequality, there is no need to 
consult a biologist before identifying the inequality as unjust. 
6.4.3 Moving beyond Mill 
The argument above illustrates that a feminist right to ignore biology can be defended 
even when making significant concessions to the opponent. As explained above, Mill’s 
principle requires equal treatment within existing social structures but leaves the structures 
themselves unquestioned. But the greater – and, arguably, more insightful – part of 
                                                 
5 See Chapter 5 for an argument that the same is not true the other way around, i.e. the belief in innate gender differences 




feminist thought and activism is concerned with the critique of those very structures. As 
a result, few feminists worth their salt would limit themselves to the Millean principle. To 
put things into perspective, it is therefore important to briefly consider the range of 
feminist concerns that falls outside this minimal liberal justice framework and explore 
how they are affected by questions of natural difference. I will start with fairly obvious 
cases and then move on to the more tricky ones. 
To begin with, we can note that numerous feminist justice claims depend on the 
acknowledgement, rather than the denial, of natural differences between men and women. 
In key discussions such as those concerning birth control, abortion, or maternity leave, 
all parties agree that biological gender differences exist and that they are relevant to the 
discussion. This does not in any way diminish their status as matters of justice. To the 
contrary, feminist arguments in these areas are based on the fact that women’s bodies are 
generally naturally different from men’s in certain respects. Feminists argue that social 
institutions have traditionally been designed with male bodies in mind and that justice 
demands addressing and accommodating these natural differences. Accordingly, feminists 
argue that female hygiene products should be tax-exempt, that women should have access 
to affordable birth control and abortion, and that pregnancy and breastfeeding should be 
adequately accommodated in the workplace and public life more generally. In other 
words, there is a wide range of feminist debates in which acknowledgement of natural 
differences does not undermine justice claims but rather underpins them. The reason 
acknowledgment of natural difference is taken to support justice claims in these 
arguments is that most feminists find the Millean framework of perfect equality 
unjustifiably restrictive. They argue that a feminism which blindly accepts existing “rules 
of the game” is not a feminism worth having and that critique of social structures should 
be at the heart of the feminist project (see, for instance, Foster 2016).  
In addition to cases where natural differences support rather than undermine justice 
claims, there are several core feminist issues for which the question of natural differences 
has clearly very little relevance at all. Consider the discussion on fair pay for domestic and 
care work. Unless one were to propose that women have an innate desire to do unpaid 
labour, the question of natural difference is entirely peripheral to arguments for fair 
compensation for care and domestic work. Feminist campaigning on this matter typically 
relies on the idea that such work makes a crucial contribution to capitalist production and 
as such deserve adequate compensation. Questions such as whether women have more 
natural inclination or innate talent to do care work are quite immaterial to this argument. 
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What matters is that care and domestic work are necessary and quantifiable contributions 
to the economic output of a society.  
Similar considerations apply with regard to feminist criticism of the objectification of 
women in the media. The claim that women are widely objectified in movies, TV and 
advertising, and that this objectification is harmful on several levels, does not require 
recourse to questions of natural differences. It is a directly observable fact, and its harmful 
consequences have been widely documented by psychologists (Fredrickson & Roberts 
1997; Moradi & Huang 2008; Carr & Szymanski 2011). Both examples are central matters 
of feminist discourse and campaigning. In both cases, the argument that women are 
treated differently from men in a way that disadvantages them and facilitates further 
oppression can be made by considering social facts alone. Questions of innate cognitive 
differences simply do not arise, or if they do, are not relevant to determining the injustice 
in question.  
So far, we have seen that there are feminist issues where natural differences clearly do 
matter, but support rather than undermine justice claims, as well as feminist issues where 
natural differences clearly do not matter at all. In addition to these two fairly 
straightforward types, there is a third type of more complex cases. In the feminist 
discussion known as the “porn wars”, for instance, the extent to which questions of innate 
differences are relevant may not be immediately obvious (Bronstein 2011).6 Some 
feminists argue that the depiction of women in porn is harmful because it encourages 
sexual violence against women (MacKinnon 1987). The reason for this, they suggest, is 
that porn normalises and reinforces sexual aggression and the sexualisation of dominance. 
This claim can be juxtaposed with evolutionary psychologists’ suggestion that innate 
disposition may play a role in explaining male-against-female sexual violence (Thornhill 
& Palmer 2000).  
Feminists who argue that porn causes sexual violence often point to psychological 
studies which suggest that watching porn increases relevant attitudes, and criminal 
statistics which suggest that sexual offences tend to be inspired by porn (Scully 1990, 
Malamuth et al. 2000). Empirical evidence for these claims is contested (see Ferguson & 
Hartley 2009), but we can put the question of empirical adequacy aside for now. The 
purpose of this section is not to settle empirical debates, but to explore, on a conceptual 
and pragmatic level, the respective roles of claims about social causation (“porn causes 
                                                 
6 Note that this section employs a narrow definition of pornography as erotica that sexualises the subordination of women. 




sexual violence against women”) and claims about biological causation (“innate male 
disposition causes violence against women”) with regard to feminist political demands.  
Let’s assume then, for the sake of the argument, that empirical evidence clearly shows 
that consumption of porn encourages sexually violent behaviour in men. Many feminists 
would admit that this observation does not generally allows us to make inferences about 
whether or not men (more so than women) have an innate tendency towards sexual 
aggression. The reason psychological studies and crime statistics cannot disprove 
evolutionary psychologists’ claim, many feminists would argue, is because sexual violence 
and the eroticisation of domination are ample in the societies under study.7 As a result, 
we lack a comparison group. Since studies and statistics inevitable work with subjects that 
have been brought up in societies that sexualises dominance, we cannot determine – or, 
some would argue, even imagine – what sexuality would look like without these 
influences.  
Defendants of the porn industry could argue that this methodological concession 
backfires against the feminist critique. They could insist that determining the extent of 
“innate sexual violence” is elementary to the discussion at hand, because we cannot put 
the blame on porn without some way of quantifying how much harm done to women is 
actually due to pornographic imagery and narratives. Since we lack the control group of a 
society free of images and stories that normalise and romanticize sexual violence, it is 
impossible to know whether innate sexual psychological features would produce similar 
levels of sexual violence against women in the absence of porn. This information, they 
could argue, is vital because agents like the porn industry can only be held accountable 
for whatever harm they are actually responsible for, i.e. the difference between these two 
scenarios.8 
There are several ways feminists could respond to this. Firstly, they could object that 
asking “how much” sexual violence women would suffer in a society rid of porn means 
engaging in a fruitless and misleading form of social atomism, the attempt to see social 
problems as distinct matters that can be addressed individually. Pornography, they would 
object, is not an isolated issue. It is both symptom and reinforcing factor of women’s 
oppression in its many ugly shades. Accordingly, sexual violence should not be 
understood as produced by pornography alone, but as the result of a comprehensive 
                                                 
7 To be precise, feminists could argue that this observation undermines innateness explanations methodologically, i.e. it 
undermines the idea that evolutionary psychologists have sound evidence for their claims (see Chapter 5). They could not, 
however, infer the ontological claim that male innate tendencies towards sexual violence do not exist. 
8 This discussion does not take into account women who are harmed by porn directly, that is, the atrocities of coerced 
production. Arguments against porn made on the basis of direct harm are unaffected by the discussion above.  
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system of oppression that involves economic, political and cultural aspects. Since all these 
aspects are interrelated, trying to imagine a society that lacks porn but leaves all other 
aspects of gender oppression intact makes little sense both from an epistemic and from a 
political perspective. One could potentially compare the status quo to a utopian society 
in which women’s oppression has been eradicated altogether. But this strategy, if it is 
possible at all, would obviously fail to answer the “how much harm due to pornography” 
question. The reason for this is that the utopic control group is one in which a whole 
range of factors other than porn have been manipulated. It is not a suitable control group 
for the question at hand.  
The upshot of this discussion, then, is as follows. With phenomena such as porn, that 
are part of complex systems of oppression, the whole attempt of quantifying how much 
harm is done or who owes what to whom may be misguided. Because systems of 
oppression are so pervasive and complex, we may not even be able to imagine what an 
appropriate control situation would look like, let alone have any reason to assume that 
such a thought experiment will provide an effective tool for alleviating the relevant social 
problems. There is, in other words, much reason to believe that comparing the existing 
state to a hypothetical ideal situation is neither necessary nor helpful for understanding 
and ameliorating existing social problems. For that reason, many feminists and other 
social theorists are refusing to engage in this so-called “ideal theory” approach (see Mills 
2005). Still, the question remains how feminists can criticise a phenomenon like porn 
without being able to specify what exactly the removal of porn would achieve, or how the 
problem can be rectified without overthrowing all of women’s oppression at once. But 
this question loses its urgency once we recognise that it is not necessarily the goal of 
critical feminist analysis to tell us how we can improve specific situations or who owes 
what to whom. Instead, the primary – and in the foreseeable time only realistic – aim of 
such critique may be to raise awareness of the role that aspects of everyday life play in 
systems of oppression.9  
In addition, in the case of porn at least, it may still be plausible to make the following 
case. If there is robust evidence that porn increases violence towards women, it is 
irrelevant, from a moral point of view, whether this happens by reinforcing existing 
psychological tendencies or by creating new ones from scratch. In the light of this 
evidence, postponing action until the harm done by porn has been meticulously quantified 
reflects a concern for the producers and consumers of porn that can only be interpreted 
                                                 
9 See Finlayson (2016) for a detailed argument to this effect. 
184 
 
as a complementary disregard for those who suffer from it. Why not think that knowledge 
that porn harms would be enough to consider ways of regulating pornography, holding 
producers and distributors to account, or altering public perceptions of sexuality? In either 
case, there is little reason to think that feminists could further their agenda more 
effectively by consulting biological explanations. While social psychological research on 
whether and how pornography harms women is immediately relevant to this project, 
research into innate psychological inclinations towards sexual violence is not. 
6.4.4 Summary 
The preceding discussion suggests that the prospects of a feminist right to ignore 
biological explanations are much more promising than the discussion in previous sections 
may have made us believe. Depending on the explanadum in question, different 
justifications are available. If the explanandum is gender, understood as a status kind, 
biological explanations can be disregarded for the simple reason that they are irrelevant 
by definition of the explanandum. If the explanandum is the behaviour and psychology 
of men and women (and potential differences thereof), the situation is slightly more 
complicated. I identified two candidate reasons for why the information provided by 
biological explanations could be relevant to feminists. It may be relevant to understanding 
whether and how gender differences can be changed, or it may be relevant because it tells 
us whether observed inequalities are really the objectionable injustices feminists make 
them out to be.  
I noted that the first candidate reason has already been extensively discussed in the 
extant literature and ultimately been rejected. Claims about innate differences, so a 
widespread consensus states, are not generally relevant to understanding if and how 
behaviour and psychology can be changed. I then showed that the second candidate 
reason, which has not received a comparable amount of critical attention, is equally 
problematic. Although Radcliffe-Richards is right to point out that “only X% arguments” 
cannot generally be used to establish claims about discrimination, this does by no means 
imply that feminists need to consider biological explanations each time they want to 
identify a social arrangement as unjust. To the contrary the question of innate differences 
in entirely immaterial to several key issues in feminism, and of highly debatable relevance 
to a range of other feminist concerns. 
 There is, in other words, good reason to think that biological explanations of gender 
differences will tend to be of little use to feminists even when they are true. Taken together 
with the insight that the promulgation of such explanations tends to work against feminist 
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purposes independently of whether they are true or not, these observations provide a 
powerful rationale for feminists to ignore biological explanations.  
6.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I explored potential justifications for a feminist right to ignore biological 
explanation of gender differences. I argued that Kronfeldner’s right to ignore cannot be 
applied to the feminist case because of its dependence on the assumption of psychic unity. 
I then considered the frequently invoked “flawed science” and “just ideology” 
justifications. Although both provide important insights, I argued that they are too limited 
to establish a general right to ignore. The “flawed science” approach grants the right to 
ignore biological explanations only on a case-by-case basis. The “just ideology” approach 
is vulnerable to the objection that biological explanations – even if they are detrimental 
to feminist aims independently of their truth value – still need to be taken into 
consideration because they may also harbour important insights for feminist purposes. 
Contrary to the discouraging findings so far, the penultimate section suggested that a 
right to ignore can be defended. The hybrid kind model suggests that social explanations 
of the status kind gender generally have considerable autonomy from biological 
explanations of the base kind sex. This established a limited right to ignore for specific 
types of feminist explanations that have gender as their explanandum. Taking a different 
stance on the extant discussion suggested that, in addition to this limited right to ignore, 
a more far-reaching right to ignore may be within reach. By looking at a range of key 
feminists debates, and finding that questions of innate cognitive differences are of little 
or no relevance to any of them, the case for a comprehensive right to ignore could be 
rehabilitated. Although this discussion did not establish a “come what may” universal 
right for feminists to ignore biological explanations, it suggests that ignoring such 




My aim in this thesis has been to advance a number of debates on classification and 
explanation in the social and natural sciences by analysing them from the novel angle of 
the hybrid kind model. Hybrid kinds, so I argued, are categories that consist of a base 
kind and an associated status kind. While the base kind is constituted by the properties 
that are commonly used to identify the category, the status kind is constituted by the social 
position that individuals acquire qua being recognised and treated as members of the 
specific category. 
Although the core idea of this model has been around at least as long as Searle’s 
account of social kinds, its potential as a central tool for understanding the peculiarities 
of the social world and the social sciences had yet to be unleashed. I argued that the hybrid 
kind model not only allows us to understand core features of classifications in a social 
world better than competitors such as Guala’s and Epstein’s account. Its core virtue 
consists in making visible a common thread that runs through a number of key debates 
on the relationship between the natural and the social sciences.  
Following this common thread has led me to develop a tentative defence of the view 
that inquiry into the social world is in important respects different from inquiry into the 
natural world. Hybrid kinds, which we encounter whenever classifications acquire a 
meaning (“status”) in social contexts, are subject to moral and political considerations in 
a way non-hybrid kinds are not. The fact that our terminological decisions may have a 
wide-ranging impact on people’s lives suggests that moral and political considerations may 
legitimately play a direct role in these decisions. In addition, hybrid kinds can pose 
challenges to scientific inquiry that make them poorly suited to the epistemic role and the 
scientific approaches associated with natural kinds. These challenges include the tendency 
towards biased conceptualisation, the diversity and complexity of mechanisms mediating 
classificatory feedback, and the fact that the social meanings associated with classifications 
are too diverse and context-specific to make suitable candidates for natural kinds.  
Developing these arguments not only demanded establishing a novel understanding of 
the social world through the lens of the hybrid kind model. It often also required 
rethinking what we thought we already knew about the natural sciences and natural kinds. 
Accordingly, I suggested that semantic externalism is untenable not only with regard to 
the social sciences, but also in its traditional realm of the natural sciences. Furthermore, I 
argued that natural kinds are not simply vectors for projections and generalisations, but 
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analytic tools that incorporate assumptions about the causal mechanisms which constitute 
the kind. 
Moving from the topic of classification on to explanation, the case study of 
evolutionary and social explanations of cognitive gender differences proved an 
opportunity to argue not only for the difference but also the autonomy of the social 
sciences from the natural sciences. While the two approaches turned out to be 
unexpectedly amicable in terms of the pure logical compatibility of their respective causal 
claims, the picture changed when we considered their methodological and political-
pragmatic relevance to each other. On the methodological level, I argued that the 
empirical evidence used to support social explanations for gender differences tends to 
undermine certain types of evolutionary (trigger innateness) explanations. This gives rise 
to an evidential asymmetry between social and biological explanations of gender 
differences which runs exactly counter to the common pop-science portrayal in which 
biology calls the shots always. In addition to these methodological considerations, I 
suggested that there may be pragmatic considerations that make ignoring biological 
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